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Within popular culture and academic scholarship alike, a standard narrative exists about the rightful (non-)place 
of the Irish language in post/colonial society. It is a tautological narrative because the apparent unfitness of Irish 
for the exigencies of postmodern life both explains its disappearance and prevents its full revival (i.e., Irish is 
outmoded because it is outmoded). That Irish requires costly government expenditures to stabilize it only 
confirms its inherent infirmity. Yet the ‘problem’ of indigenous language is not so neatly resolved, especially as 
it threatens to erupt, symptom-like, in unexpected (i.e., Anglophone) contexts. The usual post/colonial 
paradigms cannot fully account for the disjunctive position of Irish. Critical theory, on the other hand, offers a 
way to think the striking disconnect between the constitutional fact of Irish as the ‘first official language,’ for 
example, and the reality that almost no one speaks it. Lacan called this type of disconnect a symptom. 
‘Symptomal torsions’ are everywhere evident in the Republic: from bilingual road signs to the near total 
displacement of the language onto reluctant school-children. Such measures guarantee that Irish will not be 
spoken in the more unruly space of the streets. The containment of Irish alongside its official valorisation makes 
certain that it (and the associated ‘barbarism’ of the pre-colonial past) cannot return in unforeseen ways. Yet 
return it does; all the cultural products analysed in the dissertation have some relationship to this return of the 
linguistic repressed. Each text highlights the fraught interface between the indigenous language and its imperial 
replacement, in both the North and the Republic. They may be humorous and satirical, as in the short films of 
Daniel O’Hara, or they may be resistant and political, as in the H-Block oral testimonies. They may be 
eulogistic, as with Brian Friel’s language play, Translations, or they may be more recognisably post/colonial, as 
in the essays of native intellectuals explaining their choice of English over the ‘mother tongue’. This research 
draws on textual analyses along with (analytic and continental) philosophies of language. It constructs a 
methodology based on close readings of literary, filmic, and archival texts through various modes of critical 
theory. By examining the ways in which these texts both converge and diverge, this research elucidates those 
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Notes on the Tongueless Native: An Introduction 
i. 
In Foe, J. M. Coetzee’s reworking of the story of Robinson Crusoe, the slave Friday does not speak. In 
this revised version, the narrator is an Englishwoman, Susan Barton, who is also cast away, though some fifteen 
years after the other two, who have long since established a presence on the island. Indeed, Cruso (Coetzee’s 
spelling) and Friday have remade the face of the landscape through elaborate terracing, despite the fact that 
there are no seeds to plant. Susan Barton assumes that Friday is simple, because while he responds to various 
order-words in English, he never replies. ‘Is Friday an imbecile incapable of speech?’, she finally asks. In 
answer to her question, Cruso commands Friday to open his mouth and motions for Susan to look inside. She 
peers into the black maw, but she does not look closely we later learn, for fear of what she might see: ‘“It is too 
dark,” said I. “La-la-la,” said Cruso. “Ha-ha-ha,” said Friday. I drew away, and Cruso released Friday’s hair. 
“He has no tongue,” he said. “That is why he does not speak. They cut out his tongue”’.1 
An analysis of a South African novelist reading Daniel Defoe may seem an unlikely starting point from 
which to introduce a dissertation about the ideological implications of the erosion of indigenous language in 
Ireland. Yet the steady disappearance of language provides an apt metonym for the colonial transformations that 
bear on no one colony exclusively, but are detectable to varying degrees in each. The eclipse and ultimate 
erasure of indigenous language and its replacement (in this case) by English is not a process unique to Ireland 
any more than it is to South Africa. Ireland will possess unusually exacerbated symptoms of language shift and 
language death, however, because it is both the oldest and the most contemporary colony. Partly due to the sheer 
duration of colonisation and partly due to the codified and systematic attempts to quash its use, Ireland is also 
among those colonies with the most thoroughly eroded indigenous languages. Despite official government 
support, Gaeltacht (or Irish-speaking area) is a classification that must be understood loosely, for though Irish is 
sometimes in use there, it is rarely at the expense of English. The infirmity of the living language is often linked 
to the magnitude of excess mortality during the Famine decade—roughly 1845-1852, though with demographic 
consequences continuing well into the 20
th
 century—which succeeded in decimating the last of its speakers. 
Over one million deaths were accompanied by the widespread dispersal and displacement of over one million 
more by way of emigration. With characteristic lyricism, David Lloyd describes the ‘terrible silence of the land’ 
following the years of Famine on which almost all contemporary observers remarked: ‘The silence is at once the 
silence of depopulation and the silence of a traumatized culture . . . It would seem as if the enclosure of those 
vestiges of the commons that sustained the space of Irish orality, together with the traumatic catastrophe of the 
Famine that brutally consolidated the transformation, led also to the closing of that most labile orifice, the Irish 
mouth’.2 Late colonial Ireland approaches a state of ‘speechlessness’ not unlike that of the mute Friday. 
                                                          
1
 J.M. Coetzee, Foe (London: Penguin, 2010, 1986c), 22-3. 
2
 Lloyd, David. Irish Culture and Colonial Modernity: The Transformation of Oral Space (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2011), 86. Lloyd writes, “That the moment of the Famine is generally regarded as that of the 
final and irrevocable demise of the Irish language is only one index of the ensuing assault on what had become 
an oral culture. Although it is possible to account for that demise in terms of the mass emigrations that took  
place mostly from predominantly Irish-speaking areas, or in relation to the pragmatic realisation of those who 
remained that their children’s survival depended on proficiency in English, there is little doubt as to the equal 
impact of the post-Famine traumatisation of a whole culture on the loss of the language’. Ibid., 60.  
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The operating presumption of almost all post/colonial studies, meanwhile, is that ‘speechlessness’ is a 
misplaced designation because English (a language after all) is available to be indigenised. There is even 
something considered subversive, rather than simply aphasic, regarding the mastery of the imperial replacement 
language. For example, the most pertinent inter-textual counterpart to Coetzee’s Friday would be the author of 
the famous slave narrative, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, the 
African. Olaudah Equiano educates himself, buys his own freedom, and publishes his story in elaborate and 
eloquent English, to both wide acclaim and considerable fortune. The renowned Nigerian novelist, Chinua 
Achebe, cites Equiano’s autobiography as an early ideal of African literature. Whether or not the embrace of 
English is indeed the most appropriate resolution to the problem of indigenous language death is less interesting 
perhaps than the haste and anxiety with which some assert it as the only one possible. The foundational text The 
Empire Writes Back is, in its entirety, premised on the prior assumption of the desirability of global English, so 
long as it is English with a small ‘e’, hence such statements as the following: ‘Though British imperialism 
resulted in the spread of a language, English, across the globe, the english of Jamaicans is not the english of 
Canadians, Maoris, or Kenyans’.3 Why this is proof of the debility of colonialism rather than its culmination is 
never addressed. Its authors begin the discussion from the late point at which a hypothetical Friday has already 
learned to write in English, become a master of it, and even been recognised as an innovator by those to whom it 
originally ‘belonged’. This work, by contrast, seeks to explore what is at stake in the twin movements of the 
burial of Irish and the elevation of English in the post/colonial condition. I will ultimately argue that the eclipse 
of Irish is an index by which to measure the eclipse of former life-ways. The disavowal of alternative socialities 
is not accidental to the occlusion of the Irish language, in other words, but is rather its objective. By the same 
token, the often charged effect of the unanticipated Irish speech act in an Anglophone context marks the extent 
to which the return of the linguistic repressed may burden and interrupt the power dispensation of the post-
partition state, providing a new site for expressly transformative goals.  
As Walter Benjamin would say, and David Lloyd in the Irish context, in ignoring the claims of our 
‘enslaved ancestors’ upon our living memories, we repeat the violence that ‘judged the dead dispensable’4 as 
well as benefit from their erasure. What, then, are the political implications of a ‘dead’ language as it ‘returns’ to 
disorder post/colonial capitalist social relations? Can there be a ‘subjunctive’ politics—that is, one which begins 
not from what is, but from what might have been—one which proceeds from the starting point of what might yet 
be done to ‘redeem’ Benjamin’s ‘generations of the downtrodden’, such as the Famine dead? 
The English language and the discourse of identity often accompany one another. This dissertation 
addresses questions of linguistic resistance by both deconstructing this standard (Anglophone, identarian) 
paradigm as well as sketching alternative praxes as they appear, sometimes fleetingly and fragmentarily, in texts 
and settings from late colonial to post-colonial Ireland. I also interrogate the reactive ideologies that would 
confine the Irish-speaking body to the manageable space of the schoolroom, the unread street-sign or the benign 
phraseology of the civil servant. I make use of Coetzee’s post/colonial allegory in this introduction because it 
vividly situates several aspects of the dissertation that bear directly on language.  
                                                          
3
 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-
Colonial Literatures (New York ; London: Routledge, 2003), 8. 
4
 David Lloyd, ‘The Indigent Sublime: Spectres of Irish Hunger’ in Irish Times: Temporalities of Modernity 
(Dublin: Field Day in association with University of Notre Dame Press, 2008), 40.  
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Firstly, he underscores violence—grisly, unrelieved violence—in such a way that it becomes 
impossible to assume that a future Friday simply developed a preference for English. For though a tongueless 
slave may eventually acquire English, it would be the height of sophistry to assume the choice was freely made.
5
 
Secondly, by dramatising its obverse, Coetzee manages to highlight the centrality of the speaking subject to the 
(re-)production of colonial capitalist social relations: the mute slave in London becomes a spanner-in-the-works. 
He produces a kind of gravitational void around which the speaking characters revolve, contorting them-selves 
to account for his silence as they would before the curve of reality or in the presence of a black hole. By 
illustrating the significance of the speaking subject to social reproduction, Coetzee delimits a space of 
intervention so concentrated in both its necessity and its fragility as to make it an ideal site for the interruption 
of Anglophone business-as-usual. Finally, in a related way, he demonstrates the total dependence of the centred 
subject upon language. The subject is an unavoidably linguistic construct, or as Jean-Jacques Lecercle writes, ‘A 
subject is . . . the result of an accumulation of speech acts . . .  made up of sedimented interpellation[s]’.6 Subject 
formation is utterly reliant on language; it cannot proceed without it. In that sense, Friday holds forth as a non-
subject, hesitating before the precipice of the Symbolic order in a way that never ceases to disconcert those 
around him. Coetzee duly magnifies the other side of such resistance, outlining the various social impediments 
that would ‘forbid’ such anti-identarian projects—the fear of becoming-monstrous, for example, since proof of 
monstrosity would suggest the coloniser had been right all along. This dissertation traces the tension between 
the desire to seize the missed opportunity to redeem the traumas of the past, and the ideology that would makes 




Tony Crowley is the most prolific historian of the fortunes of the Irish language, chronicling its decline 
(along with its occasional, temporary resurgences) from the first legislative efforts to eradicate it with the 
Statutes of Kilkenny (1366) to its ambivalent status in the contemporary Republic. Its contentious usage in the 
North is also well documented in his work. He describes the push and pull of various constituencies, conflicts 
and revival efforts in regard to the language, but a certain ineluctable feature of hindsight seems to guide his 
work. The marginalisation of Irish is largely inevitable, its revival as a living language unrealistic, and most 
people concerned are indifferent (if not outright hostile) to it anyhow. The best that could ever have been hoped 
for in the face of the overwhelming fact of English is a certain supplemental Irish—for either scholarly or 
identarian purposes in accord with Douglas Hyde’s very moderate vision. Crowley argues that the attempt of 
some nationalists to impose Irish on a reluctant population would have amounted to an (implicitly fascist) state 
                                                          
5
 Against Ngugi, Achebe argues that (Kenyans and) Nigerians clamoured for and desired English, hence what 
appears to be colonial imposition is actually the response to proliferating demand. This dissertation argues 
against such simplifications. Achebe writes, ‘Inconvenient though it may be, the scenario before us here is of 
imperialist agents (in the shape of Scottish missionaries) desiring to teach Kikuyu children in their mother 
tongue, while the patriotic Kikuyu peasants are revolting and breaking away because they prefer English! . . . In 
Nigeria, the demand for English was already there in the coastal regions as early as the first half of the 
nineteenth century. . . . Nowhere in all this can we see the slightest evidence of the simple scenario painted by 
Ngugi of European imperialism forcing its language down the throats of unwilling natives.’ See Achebe’s 
Education of a British-Protected Child (London: Penguin, 2009), especially ‘Politics and Politicians of 
Language in African Literature’. 
6
 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Interpretation as Pragmatics (New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 166. 
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of ‘monoglossia.’ He observes that ‘the English language [is] the sole medium of communication [of] the vast 
majority of the population.’7 Because this was the ostensible ‘choice’ of the Irish people it has be accepted in the 
spirit of democracy. He even suggests that a commitment to indigenous language over the imperial language 
amounts to an ethic of ‘purity’ that easily slips into totalitarianism. (Similarly, Ngugi wa Thiong’o is accused of 
‘ethnic chauvinism’ when he argues for the abandonment of English in support of his indigenous Gikuyu). By 
pronouncing on Irish indifference, which he supports with survey feedback confirming that indeed most people 
have ‘rather negative views about the way Irish has been taught in school . . .[and] a low or “lukewarm” 
personal commitment to its use,’ he ends up, like many historians of his ilk, confusing cause with effect. He 
quotes, ‘The average person has not sufficient ability in the language to converse freely in it’ and that she feels 
‘it is not very suitable to modern life’.8 Schoolchildren intuit that a language which is not spoken is not a 
language, and thus educational Irish may become a frustrating exercise in social futility. But by inverting cause 
and effect, Crowley also overlooks the possibility that people become ‘resigned’ in response to their language 
ceasing to function as such. The automatic attribution of anterior indifference as the cause of language decline 
does not make sense, though Declan Kiberd makes a similar error, which I discuss in Chapter One. As Pierre 
Bourdieu makes clear, indigenous populations, or ‘holders of dominated linguistic competences’ only 
‘collaborate in the destruction of their instruments of expression’9 as a result of accumulated indignities and 
convulsive historical disruption. Indifference, I argue, is the demoralised result of violence. 
For his part, Coetzee, lingers over violence the better to make its presence manifest. Partly due to its 
unknowability and partly due to lurid fascination, Susan Barton ruminates often on Friday’s cut tongue. She 
fixates on the culprit (Was it the slavers? Or Cruso himself?), the gruesome act, and the details of its execution: 
 
Did Cruso bind you hand and foot and force a block of wood between your teeth and then 
hack out your tongue? . . .  Did Cruso cut out your tongue while you were insensible? But how 
did he staunch the bleeding stump? Why did you not choke on your blood? Unless your 
tongue was not cut off but merely split, with a cut as neat as a surgeon’s, that drew little blood 
yet made speech ever afterward impossible. Or let us say the sinews that move the tongue 




Coetzee suggests that while it may have been a ‘painless’ ‘surgical’ operation—with careful incisions 
applied to avoid an excess of bloodletting—the effects of speechlessness remain the same. In fact, it makes no 
difference how the violence was deployed: in relative quiet or spectacular struggle. Yet Coetzee’s consistent use 
of graphic imagery discourages any presumptions about the benign inevitability of indigenous language loss. 
Benign inevitability is consistent with most post/colonial logic regarding language obsolescence; it assumes that 
though the imposition of imperial language was originally invasive and divisive, it remains nevertheless a gift. 
Douglas Hyde points out this sentiment in his famous speech, ‘On the Necessity for De-Anglicising Ireland’ 
where he writes, ‘I have often heard people thank God that if the English gave us nothing else they gave us at 
                                                          
7
 Tony Crowley, The Politics of Language in Ireland 1366-1922: A Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 2000), 6. 
8
 Ibid., 6.  
9
 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (New York: 
Polity Press, 1991), 49. 
10
 Coetzee, Foe, 84-5. 
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least their language’.11 He does not so much argue with this assertion as attempt to show that Irish is ‘worth 
knowing too’ or so say German (and French and Italian) philologists. English is indeed a gift, but the ‘educated 
Irishman’ should learn Irish too, in the same sense that ‘it would be . . . disgraceful . . . for an educated Jew to be 
quite ignorant of Hebrew’.12 Indigenous languages that are relegated to a space of gentrified cultural capital in 
this way are thereby ‘preserved’, but they cease to be spoken as living languages. Indeed the intellectualisation 
of an indigenous language often guarantees that it is no longer spoken by the peasantry, so that its erosion (and 
paradoxical ‘preservation’) mirrors the marginalisation of those who historically would have spoken it.  
Meanwhile, a unifying global English partakes of what Pierre Bourdieu calls the ‘illusion of linguistic 
communism’ in which language is like a ‘treasure trove’ and participation in it is almost ‘mystical.’ Such 
‘mysticism’ is apparent in much of the work on global Englishes, such as Bill Ashcroft’s recent book, Caliban’s 
Voice, which aims explicitly to ‘celebrate the inventiveness, strength and power of writing [in English] from 
post-colonized cultures’.13 The dream of a globalised language exalts the creativity of ‘variations’ of English 
without acknowledging the widespread linguistic effacements on which it is predicated. Bourdieu implies that 
such reveries as Comte’s in the following quotation obscure the question of (colonial) violence behind a veneer 
of infinite linguistic democratisation: ‘Language forms a kind of wealth,’ Comte writes, ‘which all can make use 
of at once without causing any diminution of the store, and which thus admits a complete community of 
enjoyment; for all, freely participating in the general treasure, unconsciously aid in its preservation’. Bourdieu 
accuses Comte of thus ‘resolv[ing] the question of the social and economic conditions of the appropriation of 
language without ever having to raise it’.14  
In some respects, the disavowal of violence is also effectuated by the ascription of ‘choice,’ since 
violence perhaps would be the opposite of choice. Douglas Hyde urges his listeners to choose to supplement 
their educations with the legitimately scholarly Irish language. More frequently, however, the post/colonial 
intellectual ‘chooses’ English, though it is of course, an ‘indigenised’ English. For Bill Ashcroft, language is the 
instrument of representation and one must choose which language most faithfully represents one’s world. Such a 
scenario relies upon an agent who exists prior to language, one who assesses the extent to which this language 
or that one corresponds to her pre-existent desires, and makes the choice accordingly. (Ngugi likewise chooses, 
though in a manner of recalcitrance; I discuss his linguistic strategies more fully in Chapter Six.) We find 
glimpses of Bourdieu’s linguistic communism in Ashcroft’s affirmation of common ownership: ‘For if language 
seems to represent “us” because it is “ours”, what of a colonial language? It is not exactly “ours” but it is not 
exclusively “theirs” either. It is “ours” because we make it “ours” and when we do so we choose to identify 
ourselves in a particularly contested, a particularly ambivalent space’.15 Ashcroft employs active verbs such as 
‘make’, ‘choose’ and ‘identify’ in order to confer upon the agent the extra-linguistic relation to language that 
metaphysical realism requires. At other times, English is presented as a kind of foreknowledge, a choice-which-
is-not-one, or perhaps, a choice already made, hence Chinua Achebe’s well-known utterance: ‘But for me there 
                                                          
11
 Douglas Hyde, ‘On the Necessity for De-Anglicising Ireland’, in An Irish Literature Reader: Poetry, Prose, 
Drama, eds. Maureen O’Rourke Murphy and James MacKillop (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
2006), 146. 
12Hyde, ‘On the Necessity’, 148. 
13
 Bill Ashcroft, Caliban’s Voice: the Transformation of English in Postcolonial Literatures (Abingdon, Oxon: 
Routledge, 2009), 15. 
14
 Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 43. 
15
 Ashcroft, Caliban’s Voice, 96. 
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is no other choice. I have been given this language, and I intend to use it’.16 Chapter Six involves a closer look at 
the justifications for the use of English by native intellectuals and the terms by which they stage or dramatise the 
choice. 
Decisionism is a natural outgrowth of the tradition of metaphysical realism on which most literary 
criticism rests. Metaphysical realism ‘presupposes an ultimately knowable “ready-made world” which pre-exists 
our descriptions of it’. It is a set of assumptions that project a ‘fixed totality of mind-independent objects . . . [in 
which] truth involves some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things 
and sets of things’.17 Ashcroft declares, from within this tradition, that it would be ‘profoundly erroneous’ to 
argue ‘that language embodies cultural meaning rather than represents it’.18 If language reflects what is already 
there, instead of actively constructing it—that is, if the subject and the world pre-exist language, rather than 
emerge as its effects—then it should be quite irrelevant whether one speaks Irish, speaks English, or speaks not 
at all (since ‘Friday is Friday’19 and so on). To put it another way, if the subject is constituted prior to language, 
then she abides, fundamentally unchanging over time, no matter what language she is speaking, i.e., indigenous, 
imperial, an indigenised version of the imperial, a hybridised dialect, etc. As Owen/Roland says in Brian Friel’s 
play, analysed in Chapter Three, on the difference between being called an Irish name and an English one: ‘It’s 
still the same me, isn’t it?’. Even if we assume that identity is fluid, unfinished, or ‘de-centred’, it is still used in 
precisely the same ways as it has since Descartes—as a core of self-transparent volition, actively involved in 
securing its own truth or certainty. In other words, the affirmed fragmentation of the subject has not dislodged 
the very notion as untenable, so much as it has merely caused it to bear slightly blurrier boundaries, while 
functioning in exactly the same manner. Lacan refers to the Cartesian fallacy in terms of a ‘homunculus’, a 
‘little fellow’ inside me who steers the vessel of my body.20 
Rorty locates the onto-theological hold-over of metaphysical realism in the discourse of the subject. He 
writes, ‘The history of modern philosophy has centred on attempts to preserve an enclave of nonmechanism, and 
thus to keep alive the notion of a “true self” and the plausibility of a morality of self-purification’.21 He goes on 
to argue that Descartes wanted to preserve the Platonist and Christian conception of the mind’s access to 
certainty in terms of ‘immediate, nondiscursive grasp of truth’. He writes, ‘The result of Descartes’ and later 
Kant’s “still smaller and more mysterious enclave of nonmechanism” was . . . the invention of “the 
individual”—a moral self who existed “prior to and apart from all roles,” who was independent of any social or 
historical context’.22 Like the subject of late (anti-) colonial identity, ‘to say that the moral self exists apart from 
all roles means that it will remain the same no matter what situation it finds itself in, no matter what language it 
uses to create its self-image, no matter what its vocabulary of moral deliberation may be’. The only character 
that matters, Rorty argues, is the one it already has.
23
 If the true self, ‘identity’, is already there—if it requires 
only developing, nurturing, and expressing—what need is there for a post/colonial politics? If the thing that 
                                                          
16
 Quoted in Crowley, Language in History: Theories and Texts (New York: Routledge, 1996), 50. 
17
 Hilary Putnam, Reason, truth and history (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981), 49. 
18
 Ashcroft, Caliban’s Voice, 14; original emphasis. 
19
 Coetzee, Foe, 122.  
20
 He writes, ‘I will pinpoint the function of the Cartesian cogito by the term monster or homunculus’. See 
Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 2004), 141. 
21
 Richard Rorty, ‘Freud and Moral Reflection’ in Essays on Heidegger and others (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1991), 155. 
22
 Rorty quoting Alisdair MacIntyre, ‘Freud and Moral Reflection’, 157.   
23
 Ibid., 157. 
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counts is what I already have, than there is no impetus to strategise redress for past violence. As I suggest in 
Chapter Six, it is as if no violence, no violation, had taken place, since what counted all along (my identity) 
survives intact. Truer than what colonialism destroyed, it is properly inaccessible to the probing coloniser and 
anti-colonialist alike; truer because ‘for Locke, Berkeley and Hume, no less than for Descartes, mind is better 
known than body in the sense that the internal is more certain than the external, the private is prior to the 
public’.24 Yet as Wittgenstein shows, the opposite is the case: the internal is the ‘place’ most subject to 
interminable slippage and thus infinite regress. Knowledge cannot be arrived at without language and language 
can establish nothing (or even be language) without inter-subjective criterion of correctness. The inherent 
structure of address of all language presupposes at least one other person. Lacan uses this to wield a critique of 
the cogito by recalling the fact that Descartes must tell us of the ‘I think’. That Descartes ‘can formulate it only 
be saying it to us, implicitly—[is] a fact he forgets’.25 
Because the cogito is a linguistic construct, it has to pass through the vicissitudes and lacerations of 
language before the possibility of the unity and certainty Descartes seeks. But of course because it must pass 
through language, so is it guaranteed that those things (unity and certainty) will never arrive. Similarly, it is by 
way of the private language argument that Wittgenstein most succinctly demonstrates the impossibility of a 
stable subjective core. It is thus in a sort of Wittgensteinian irony that Foe utters these words to Susan in order to 
assuage her existential doubt: 
 
The trick I have learned is to plant a sign or marker in the ground where I stand, so that in my 
future wanderings I shall have something to return to, and not get worse lost than I am. 
Having planted it, I press on; the more often I come back to the mark (which is a sign of my 
blindness and incapacity), the more certainly I know I am lost, yet the more I am heartened 




Wittgenstein’s private language argument bears a similar structure to this dropping of metaphysical 
breadcrumbs, while expounding upon the inevitability of failure.
27
 Wittgenstein designs a thought experiment: a 
person decides that each time he experiences a particular sensation, he will record the symbol ‘S’ in a special 
notebook. He feels the sensation, he writes down the ‘S’. If he does so consistently, he reasons, he will have 
ultimately devised a symbolic system that is meaningful to him alone, since no one else can inhabit his body, 
feel his sensations, or connect their occurrence with a symbol. He will have developed what is, in effect, a 
‘private language’. Anthony Kenny argues in his article ‘Cartesian Privacy’ that ‘If a Cartesian res cogitans uses 
a language it must be a private language in the sense defined by Wittgenstein’.28 Foe advises Susan Barton to 
look for ‘tokens’ and return to them again and again until such time as ‘you discover yourself to be saved’.29 
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Foe’s parable of Cartesian certainty is self-consciously flawed but nevertheless maintained, as if the mere 
repetition of its invocation would lend substantiality to its claims.  
Yet when he says, ‘the more often I come back . . . the more certainly I know I am lost’ he captures the 
predicament of Wittgenstein’s private linguist. The private linguist has no way of knowing whether he has 
correctly identified ‘S’ as ‘S’ as opposed to mistaken it for S2 or S3. For that reason, not only can he not verify 
the sensation on subsequent occasions, but he cannot even be sure that the first experience was ‘S’. He lacks an 
appropriate criterion with which to compare his various sensations, apart from his ‘memory’ of the first 
occurrence of ‘S’ which is itself unreliable. In other words, whatever seemed to be ‘S’ would be 
indistinguishable from what was ‘actually’ S. And all means of deciding appear equally absurd: he can ‘attempt 
to point to it inwardly, cast a sidelong glance at it . . .  or try to impress it on [himself] by inwardly staring at it. 
But none of these “ceremonies” can give us a basis for recognising whether something is or is not the same on 
some other occasion’.30 Wittgenstein suggests that I cannot even be certain of the establishment of my inner 
(grammatical) rule, much less hope to follow it on successive occasions,
31
 and if there is no way to establish 




Another, more Lacanian objection is that I cannot establish an Archimedean point within myself that 
‘holds still’ in order to make my sensations, or ultimately my-self, into objects for scrutiny. 33 Ultimately my 
‘self’ is, so to speak, in the way. Lacan traces and problematises the ubiquity of the representative paradigm 
which he designates as I see myself seeing myself.
34
 And Foe’s lost self does not find his way back, because the 
‘signs and markers’ keep imperceptibly shifting. Or as Wittgenstein states, ‘Always get rid of the idea of the 
private object in the way: assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your 
memory constantly deceives you’.35 
The most pertinent facet of the private language argument for this dissertation is the idea that identity, 
which must be determined through language, cannot be maintained in the absence of a speech community. 
(Rather something else is maintained, an ideological fiction, used to uphold and reproduce certain social 
conditions.) A sign must have a rudimentary grammar in which it figures as sign in order to be a sign at all. That 
is to say, ‘The presence of a community of people who act in accordance with rules, [is] a necessary condition 
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for there being any rule-following at all’, i.e., speaking of language.36 Friday uses signs which are unintelligible 
to Susan Barton. She regards him more sympathetically the moment she understands him as a sign-using 
creature, but Wittgenstein’s paradigm suggests that in the absence of a sign-using community—that is, some 
semblance of an external set of corroborative ‘institutions’—these signs would eventually be meaningless even 
to Friday himself. Finch elaborates the argument thus: 
    
We begin by imagining a language that only I can understand because its meanings 
come only from my imagined references to my own private sensations, and then we 
see that even I could not understand such a language, and even I would only appear 
to understand it. In other words, what Wittgenstein shows is that the supposed private 
language (which is totally private by definition) would not even be a language for the 
person who had it, but only empty sounds or meaningless marks. The point is not that 
no one else could understand it (for this is assumed from the start), but that even I 
myself could not “understand” it.37 
 
If I do not recognise a sign on a subsequent occasion, then I cannot be said to ‘understand’ it. 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein provides an example of someone who may utter words that could conceivably be 
recognised as German, but if he uses them in the wrong contexts and without ‘rhyme or reason’ then this person 
as good as has no language.
 38
 (Daniel O’Hara will exploit this reality to great satirical effect in his short films, 
analysed in Chapter One.) But the question arises, how can the dispersed and dispossessed survivors of the 
upheavals of ‘primitive accumulation’, maintain anything in the absence of a community of rule-followers? The 
solitary speaker—which roughly corresponds to the appropriately named philosophical problem of the ‘life-long 
Crusoe’—is anomalous and incapable of ‘rule-following’ without the company of other rule-followers. 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on a ‘life-long Crusoe’ are cursory and inconclusive. But it stands to reason that since 
any speech act already presumes a structure of address, and any sign is only a sign within a customary, i.e., 
social, convention of usage, then there is no such thing as a solitary speaker, just as there is no such thing as a 
private language. Could we not say then that Friday would ultimately ‘lose track’ of what it was he knew (of 
Friday)? How can Friday produce an identity, a unified narrative self, and translate it into terms that Susan 
Barton can recognise in order for her to know that which he himself cannot even know? 
In the late colonial context, the fiction of the ‘true self’ persists in the discourse of identity, with 
identity being coded as that which (naturally) resists efforts to colonise it. Spivak poetically characterises her 
sense of the enclave of non-mechanism as a ‘space which may or may not be a secret but cannot be unlocked’.39 
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Ashcroft likewise connects the psychic interior to a spatial metaphor—calling to mind the famous Cartesian 
theatre—when he writes of Caliban, ‘But there is a place where the power of [Prospero’s] language cannot 
reach’.40 Several critics have attributed Friday’s uncanny power to warp and unsettle the broader narrative of 
Foe, as well as the internal castaway narrative Susan Barton hopes to shape into a saleable whole, to an 
operation of ‘withholding’. Spivak calls Friday the ‘unemphatic agent of withholding in the text’. The space of 
secrets which cannot be unlocked operates on a principle of withholding. But in order to withhold, Friday must 
have some thing, an inner possession which he would be inclined to reveal, if not for his desire to punish, avoid 
detection, or rebel against Susan Barton’s obvious wish to ‘construct him as subject so that he can be her 
informant’. Indeed, ‘withholding’ suggests the (self-) presence of a thing that demands to be communicated and 
which requires an act of will to hold back. Yet by so inscribing a pre-discursive subjectivity and hence a 
motivational structure that we can read, Spivak effaces the un-decidability that makes the silence of Friday so 
disconcerting. Coetzee presents Friday as having no discernable desire to learn English or not to learn it, no 
discernable desire to return to Africa or not to return, and so on. In other words, it is the vertiginous vacancy 
where a subject should be that makes Friday dreadful to Susan Barton, not his ability to withhold (his truth, the 
“truth of Friday”41) indefinitely. For the latter amounts to a stubbornness that will eventually yield to its 
obverse: the ‘native’ cannot hold out forever. This withholding is as laudable as it is temporary.  
It is a small step from mutilation to the acquisition of English, in order that Friday may be given a 
voice with which to proclaim his identity.
42
 Yet Coetzee, further troubling the presuppositions of metaphysical 
realism, intimates that if Friday were able to report upon what he saw when he looked deep inside, ‘There 
[would be] nothing to be found save traces of accidental encounters’.43 Quine argues something similar when he 
says not that the mind of the ‘heathen’ is inscrutable, but famously that rather, ‘There is nothing to scrute.’44 It 
would be more accurate to think of ourselves ‘as random assemblages of contingent and idiosyncratic needs 
rather than as more or less adequate exemplifications of a common human essence’.45 The repeated conjuration 
of an identarian core against the more apparent ‘radical heterogeneity . . .  gaping within man’46  is of deep 
political and ideological concern (a fact that Althusser intuited and to which we will return). Lacan argued that 
Freud’s discovery of the ‘self’s radical ex-centricity to itself’—that is, ‘the non-coincidence of the subject to 
itself’—could not be glossed over without the reasons for this concealment being ‘profoundly dishonest’. 47 If I 
am interpellated constantly, to use Althusser’s idiom, or if my ‘true self’ is referred to often enough—if it 
becomes a certain ubiquitous signified, then this ‘self’ will take on a certain ‘natural’ entrenchment. The use of 
repetition to establish an illusory consistency is related to what Lacan calls the Cartesian ‘sleight of hand’. 
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Upon glimpsing the lack at the heart of the cogito—refracted as it is through the lens of Friday’s 
multiplicitous lack—Susan Barton dissolves into panic. She says: ‘I thought I was myself . . . But now I am full 
of doubt. Nothing is left to me but doubt. I am doubt itself. Who is speaking me? Am I a phantom too? To what 
order do I belong? And you: who are you?’48 Mere proximity to Friday it would seem—who in existing at a 
remove from the Symbolic order rather than within it—cause Susan’s own subject position to become 
increasingly destabilised and thrown into crisis. The repetition of the word ‘doubt’, here and elsewhere, 
reaffirms that the crisis is Cartesian in nature and thus linguistic as well.    
Linguistic (and Cartesian) privacy form the background to the analyses in Chapter One of Daniel 
O’Hara’s short films, ‘Yu Ming is Ainm Dom/ My Name is Yu Ming’ and ‘Fluent Dysphasia’. O’Hara 
underscores the absurdities inherent in the state’s official promotion of Irish alongside the language’s increasing 
confinement to the status of a kind of non-language. The paradoxically public markers of Irish (on road-signs, in 
schools) become ‘empty sounds and meaningless marks’ in the absence of a community of ‘rule-followers’ who 
actually speak it. The comic playfulness of the two films is in tension with the obsolescent speech community 
whose disappearance it outlines.  
iii. 
Jacques Lacan likens the process of subjectivation to a stick-up. He belies the notion of ‘choice’ 
elaborated above, since subject formation, i.e., the call to the Other, is always rendered under conditions of 
duress, so to speak. One is ‘forced’ to make the ‘choice’ which always unfolds in a violent situation. Hence 
when Althusser develops his own version of the call to the Other, the scene of interpellation, the hail will be 
initiated by a representative of the monopolists of violence, i.e., an officer of the law. This violence takes place 
in a double register. Firstly, since Lacan’s ‘scene’ unfolds after a certain amount of structural violence has 
already transpired. The only way to be confronted with the ‘choice,’ of so-called ‘being born’, of entering the 
Symbolic order as subject, is for a series of violent dislocations to first have taken place. In Friday’s case, this 
violence and dislocation is quite literal—enslavement, mutilation, forced migration—and had it not already 
occurred, the occasion for him to be ‘born’, to be presented with the choice at all, would never have arisen. Thus 
Žižek writes, ‘What this means is that the “subject of free choice” in the Western “tolerant” multicultural sense 
can emerge only as the result of an extremely violent process of being torn out of a particular lifeworld, of being 
cut off from one’s roots’.49 The conditions of the possibility of subject formation are already imbued with 
violence from the outset.  
Secondly, Lacan allegorises the coercive interchange with the phrase, ‘your money or your life!’50 He 
explains, ‘If I choose the money, I lose both. If I choose life, I have life without the money, namely, a life 
deprived of something’. The very fact of being presented with the choice—mugged, if you will—is what is at 
issue, because both responses entail a diminution of life, a diminution separated only be degrees. Neither 
response can be advantageous to the interpellated, who by the very act of being given a choice has lost. 
Furthermore, Althusser remarks on the suppressed violence of the hail itself. Though it proceeds in language 
and thus ostensibly outside the remit of force, this is only the case because the agent of the law is galvanised by 
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the entire repressive state apparatus. The officer of the law is synecdochal of this apparatus, to which he has 
ready recourse, any time that language stops working ‘all by itself’. In Chapter Two, I draw out the aspects of 
what might well be called the disavowed thuggery involved in the scene of interpellation, especially as it is 
enacted in the Irish post/colony, both north and south. I look at strategies in which the interpellated seek to 
derail the process of interpellation, considering that the choices (your money or life, which Lacan extends to the 
more pertinent, your freedom or your life) are unendurable. The targets of the hail in these scenarios deploy 
indigenous language to counter-interpellative effect.  
Lacan’s second formulation of the stick-up proceeds as such: ‘If he chooses freedom, he loses both 
immediately—if he chooses life, he has life deprived of freedom’. He argues that there is something ‘special’ 
about this, and that we shall call it the ‘lethal factor’.51 Lethal, because as soon as the subject appears in the 
discourse of the Other, she disappears elsewhere, which Lacan calls aphanisis. The entry of the subject into the 
chain of signifiers produces aphanisis, that is, a kind of simultaneous appearance and fading, it entails 
diminishment or even a kind of death at one site (being) inasmuch as it registers at the [O]ther site as meaning.
52
 
This structure of metaphor is crucial, as its ‘constitutive metaphoricity’ is duplicated in the structure of the 
politics of identity so familiar to post/colonial studies. Lacan writes, ‘The signifier, producing itself in the field 
of the Other, makes manifest the subject of its signification. But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the 
subject in question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the same movement in which it 
calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject’.53 The hardening, or petrification of the subject qua signifier is 
at once the movement of emergence and renunciation, emergence in the Other and renunciation of the 
‘primitive’ logics anathema to it.54 The individual’s undecidability is ‘traded’, in other words, for an inscription 
in the Other, and it is in this process of substitution that Lacan locates a certain inescapable violence, even 
annihilation. In order to become an ‘identity’ in the Other, I must renounce the undecidability that self will 
replace, but so does this renunciation entail ‘the abandonment or supercession of other potential social forms’.55 
David Lloyd has intimated that a state of ‘sheer potentiality’ must be ‘surrendered and disciplined’ in order to 
assume the form of the (modern) subject, so that ‘identity’ literally replaces, displaces, alternative ‘modes of 
sociality’.56 As Francois Raffoul explains, ‘Lacan conceives of representation in a quite classical way, as a 
holding-place of a reality in its absence, or as the murderous substitution of a thing’.57 Identity serves as the 
holding place of a reality in its absence, because absent is that which would make identity a redundant 
discourse. There was no need, for example, under older forms of Gaelic communalism (such as the formations 
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up to and including rundale) to assert oneself as ‘Irish’—this kind of designation only arises, as I explain more 
fully in Chapter 6, when what it is meant to evoke is already gone.
58
 
The fact of having been given a choice (identity or annihilation) that one cannot escape making—this 
would appear to be the repeated trauma that constitutes the rhythm of colonial modernity. When Spivak argues 
that the original Friday from Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe ‘kills his other self’ in order that he might become a 
good colonial servant, she does not exaggerate. Perhaps she might have said ‘killed’ every other possibility. He 
cuts off, or kills, that which interferes with his steady inscription in the Other. She calls him ‘the prototype of a 
successful colonial subject’ in that: ‘He learns his master’s speech, does his master’s work, happily swears 
loyalty, believes the culture of the master is better, and kills his other self to enter the shady plains of 
northwestern Europe’.59 Defoe’s Friday speaks to the bear he later savages in English, words that Spivak 
emphasises, before remarking, ‘He is on his way out of the margin’.60 In order to become a self at all, a self 
upon the ‘shady plains of northwerstern Europe’, Friday has to ‘cut off’ the radical undecidability that ‘self’ 
supplants. We can surmise perhaps why an idiom of castration is so often invoked in this capacity. 
 Defoe’s Friday is a eunuch, ‘the prototype of a successful colonial subject’, yet Coetzee’s Friday 
defies such categorisation. Susan Barton intuits, however, that the proof of one will be the index of the other. 
She thinks of his amputated tongue and wonders ‘if a yet more hideous mutilation might be thrust upon my 
sight’. She writes  
 
Now when Cruso told me that the slavers were in the habit of cutting out the tongues of their 
prisoners to make them more tractable, I confess I wondered whether or not he might be 
employing a figure, for the sake of delicacy: whether the lost tongue might stand not only for 





Castration does not merely signify what Barton refers to as ‘eternal obedience, as gelding takes the fire 
out of a stallion’.62 Lacanian psychoanalysis provides a striking description. Castration is ‘not the negative 
operation of the removal of an organ; on the contrary, it is a labour of unceasing proliferation of successive 
signifiers. And if anything suffers privation, it is not the penis, but the subject itself. To castrate is to decapitate, 
for the more the signifiers insist and reappear, the more the subject is less’.63 Another way to conceptualise 
castration within the context of this dissertation is in relation to a linguistic identity politics. Once the subject 
accedes to an inscription in the Other, whatever she might strategise in terms of linguistic resistance has already 
been anticipated there. The very idea, so central to nationalist politics, that I could achieve a ‘restored 
wholeness’ in the Other by way of identity is not subversive but preordained. In other words, as Manfred Frank 
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writes, ‘This means that the attempt at a phantasmatic self-grounding of the ‘I’ (ich) which evades the incisions 
and articulations of the symbolic order fails precisely because the wish to preserve itself from the Other’s 
intervention . . . has itself already been produced by the Other’.64 Identity politics has as its goal a more 
prominent inscription in the Other. Whatever identarian move I could make is already domesticated because it is 
always already awaited. That all eventualities can be determined in advance is due to the fact that whatever is 
outside the parameters of its logic could never have appeared at all, hence Lacan writes, ‘The Other is the locus 
in which is situated the chain of the signifiers that governs whatever may be made present of the subject—it is 
the field of that living being in which the subject has to appear’.65 In the context of our discussion, this is the 
meaning of castration. 
Friday, it would seem, keeps avoiding this trap, to the agitation and discomfort of Susan Barton. She 
steals looks, scours his body with her gaze, and thinks she has ‘seen’ the voided appendage, proof of his 
(further) lack. But she cannot be certain: ‘What had been hidden from me was revealed. I saw; or, I should say, 
my eyes were open to what was present to them. I saw and I believed I had seen, though afterwards I 
remembered Thomas, who also saw, but could not be brought to believe till he had put his hand in the wound’.66 
That the phallus resembles the tongue and that the tongue resembles a worm make for intertextual echoes in 
Coetzee and Lacan, since in the Lacanian lexicon, the phallus-tongue-worm invoke the cleavages of language. 
Lacan speaks of the worm which ‘worms’ its way into the subject as the effect of language and splits it. Susan 
Barton thinks of the worm of Friday’s stump, ‘the thick stub at the back of the mouth . . .  wagging and straining 
under the sway of emotion as Friday tried to utter himself, like a worm cut in half contorting itself in death-
throes’.67 Both Coetzee and Lacan, moreover, interrupt and undermine the notion of the pre-discursive unity of 
the subject.  
In the vein of Spivak’s ‘withholding,’ Lewis MacLeod argues that Friday does in fact have a tongue 
but decides not to use it. He proposes ‘to read Friday’s silence as a voluntary act, to think Friday has the 
capacity, just not the inclination for speech’.68 Friday, according to this paradigm, refuses to offer himself up as 
raw material to the discursive machine in which Susan Barton and Foe hope to entangle him. Yet is it not the 
case that he will be ‘cognised’ and ensnared in imperial discourse with or without his permission and with or 
without his participation? To put it another way, MacLeod configures Friday as one who ‘messages’ in a 
particular way. For example, he communicates ‘refusal’ or ‘contempt’ for hegemonic discourse, but within this 
construction, so are his actions confined to what Freud would call ‘acting out’. ‘Acting out’—no matter how 
aggressive or disruptive—is still sending a message to the Other, it is a way of seeking a more appropriate or a 
bolder inscription. Meanwhile, Lacan contrasts ‘acting out’ with the rarer and more radical ‘passage to the act’ 
(passage a l’acte). The passage to the act is unique in that it seeks not to implore the Other for one or another 
end but rather to exit the Symbolic order altogether. The passage a l’acte, in effecting an extrication from the 
Other, is successful precisely because it is not ‘understood’ and thus could not have been foreseen. This is very 
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similar to Badiou’s notion of event as rupture or radical break, since it cannot be explained in the language of 
the doxa. In Chapter 4, I argue that the excremental semiotics of the ‘Dirty Protest’ should be read not as a 
belligerent message to the Other, nor as a means to beseech the Other for ‘political status’, but rather as a means 
to effectuate a ‘passage to the act,’ that is, a complex performance of collectivity that both exposes the Other as 
non-existent and escapes, however fleetingly, from the awful remit of its ‘forced choice’. MacLeod’s assertion 
that ‘no one can locate Friday well enough to manipulate him’69 is a simplification of Coetzee’s project. That he 
has a tongue, but decides not to use it, also partakes in the logic of the ‘withheld secrets’ of the Cartesian 
enclave. In MacLeod’s version of events, Friday becomes legible, and we can identify with him and his 
‘choices’. Yet to impose a transparency that Friday lacked—to ascribe motivation, intention, and ‘agency’ to his 
unexplainable behaviour—is to leech the strange power he holds out of the narrative entirely. Much more 
interesting, I would argue, is the warping effect on events and their narration that the tongueless slave, in his 
unknowability, produces. For if it is the case that “the ‘I’ of self-consciousness exists essentially as that which 
the Other addresses and makes demands upon”70—if the I is nothing more than an appeal to the Other—then 
Friday neither makes demands nor receives them. He is, and remains, foundationally undecidable.  
Confronted by the ubiquitous hail, your freedom or your life, Friday hesitates, and thus exists in a kind 
of ontological suspension. By default of not-choosing, it could be said that he consequently ‘chooses’ to give up 
his freedom and preserve his life. Except that he does not go on to behave in any of the ways we might normally 
ascribe to a free person, or an enslaved person for that matter, or any recognisable person at all. (Likewise, in 
Chapter 2, it is dangerously unclear which Mícheál has chosen, but because it appears to be freedom, he loses 
both.) 
The final section of this introduction will examine the possibilities for a subjunctive politics in which 
the goal is not to produce a more robust identity, but to produce the conditions in which identity becomes 
superfluous. Or as Edouard Glissant has written of the (French Caribbean) colonial experience: ‘To the extent 
that French linguistic hegemony is exercised through a mechanism of “humanism”, this revision could partake 
in what might be called an ‘anti-humanism”.’71 Firstly, it will be necessary to make a brief detour through the 




Susan Barton is appalled that apart from a few monosyllabic order-words, Cruso never imparted to 
Friday any English.
72
 She is as nonplussed by the absence of language as she is by Cruso’s disinterest in 
recording events or keeping track of time. She can find no makeshift journal, no carvings, no notches indicating 
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that ‘he counted the years of his banishment or the cycles of the moon’.73 Indeed Spivak argues that because 
there is little attention to ‘the timing of labour and history’ in Foe, we can safely assume that Coetzee is intent 
on narrating the story of ‘empire and gender, rather than the story of capital’.74 Unlike the industrious hero of 
Defoe’s work—who James Joyce called the true prototype of the British colonist75—Coetzee’s Cruso may have 
been produced by merchant capitalism, but he has no further interest in ‘being its agent’. Satisfying him-self 
with the simplest of tools, content for time to pass unmeasured,
76
 he positions himself and his activities, 
according to Spivak, well beyond the relations of capital. Yet this assessment amounts to an oddly selective 
understanding on Spivak’s part of capital as synonymous with metropolitan production. By opposing late 
‘empire’ to capital as parallel but autonomous enterprises, she misinterprets the antecedent conditions for the 
consolidation and emergence of capitalism as well as the inherent logic of its own self-renewal. Yet notions of 
capital as relatively confined to the mechanisms of ‘the factory’ are not unusual. As Althusser notes, ‘The 
tenacious obviousnesses of the point of view of production alone . . . are so integrated into our everyday 
‘consciousness’, that it is extremely hard, not to say almost impossible, to raise oneself to the point of view of 
reproduction’.77 From its inception capital has been both a multi-vectored and transnational phenomenon, and 
colonialism is both its precondition as well as a primary means to its self-perpetuation. 
The ‘labour’, therefore, of settler colonialism is not unproductive so much as it is appropriative and 
reproductive. Still Spivak reads the relentless terracing of the island as inconsequential, a measure of Cruso’s 
gentle bequeathing of what she calls a ‘lightly inscribed space to an indefinite future’. She derives this notion 
from his response to Susan when she asks what he intends to plant. He says, ‘This planting is not for us . . . .We 
have nothing to plant—that is our misfortune . . . .The planting is reserved for those who come after us and have 
the foresight to bring seed. I only clear the ground for them’.78 Spivak is of the opinion, alongside Barton, that 
terracing without seeds makes for ‘a stupid labour’79 and a ‘foolish kind of agriculture’. Yet these are anything 
but ‘light inscriptions’ or evidence of frivolity or indifference. Cruso is as fixated on remaking the wild 
landscape into a picture of rationalised agriculture as Susan Barton will be with getting Friday to ‘speak’. The 
terraces are not light but extensive, so much so that Susan Barton asks, ‘Is it your plan to clear the whole island 
of growth, and turn it into terraces?’80 The labour of the settler colonist may appear unproductive but that is 
because it is a labour of transition, of deferral, one which does not so much reap a harvest as enable its reaping 
in future. On the vastness of the endeavour Susan Barton remarks throughout the novel, though she likens it to 
the behaviour of ants that ‘carry grains of sand to and fro, for want of better occupation’.81 She notes 
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There were twelve levels of terracing at the time I arrived, each some twenty paces 
deep and banked with stone walls a yard thick and at their highest as high as a man’s 
head. Within each terrace the ground was levelled and cleared; the stones that made 
up the walls had been dug out of the earth or borne from elsewhere one by one. I 
asked Cruso how many stones had gone into the walls. A hundred thousand or more, 
he replied. A mighty labour, I remarked.
82
  
After he is dead, Susan accuses Cruso of nurturing idle fantasies about the coming of Aryans (‘golden-
haired strangers’83) bearing sacks of corn, yet they are precisely to whom such labour is directed—if not 
immediate descendants then white waves of the settlement to come. It is both a Weberian and a Lockean labour; 
Weberian because it is unceasing and unrewarded, for its own sake, purifying in its pointlessness, a personal 
sacrifice for the future, and Lockean, because the very act of ‘mixing’ labour with the land confers upon it 
ownership. Labour itself changes the relationship between labourer and land through a process of ‘annexation’. 
Locke states with almost Biblical gravitas, ‘And hence subduing or cultivating the earth and having dominion, 
we see, are joined together. The one gave title to the other. . . . And the condition of human life, which requires 
labour and materials to work on, necessarily introduce private possessions’. 84 This Lockean trajectory of private 
ownership, once put into effect, will be difficult to reverse. The sense of futurity involved (of activating what is 
dormant into terms of the ‘henceforth’) may provide the distinction between Spivak’s productive time and 
Coetzee’s reproductive time85: the latter entails both present activity and the colonisation of the future. 
Reproduction entrenches and sets in motion the social relations that impel their own renewal. Reproduction 
accomplishes something in the present at the same time as it projects that same thing into the future; it 
simultaneously works upon current relations and prolongs them, encouraging where possible a certain self-
generating momentum. 
If Cruso does not measure productive time—is not ‘the normative man in nature, already committed to 
a constitutive chronometry’—it is because his manservant is a slave. There is no need to calculate Friday’s 
labour power in wage-units, as there is no surplus value to be extracted, and thus no cause to keep track of time 
at all. Furthermore, despite Susan’s objections, Cruso’s relationship to Friday does not require language, 
because it is strictly coercive. All that Cruso requires, in other words, is Friday’s labouring body; he does not 
require his assent. At the same time, the arrival of Susan Barton on the island, and the subsequent emergence of 
Friday’s speechlessness as a conundrum, signifies the difficulties of reconciling the modus operandi of 
mercantile capital (plunder, territorialisation and enslavement) with the imperatives of a consolidating 
commercial capital, with its need for a private subject, who, amongst other things owns her person and thus her 
labour power, which she can exchange for additional property. Friday marks an aporia because the mixing of his 
labour with land cannot confer entitlement upon his person since he neither owns the person nor the labour 
power. Cruso’s labour confers ownership; Friday’s does not. Yet the labouring body of the slave (or the destitute 
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rack-rented peasant) is no longer sufficient to satisfy the reconfigured exigencies of global capital. What must be 
activated in its stead is the subject who speaks and desires. Social relations will no longer operate primarily by 
force, in other words, because they operate by language.
86
  Language overcomes coercion in the new 
dispensation, where the subject succeeds the slave.  
In other words, Cruso’s era of slavery and territorial conquest is at an end, hence his death aboard the 
rescue ship en route to England. This oceanic crossing, this geographical shift midway through the book from 
the desert island to the heart of empire, effectuates a socio-historical transition, inaugurating what Spivak calls 
‘the trauma of the transition from mercantile to commercial capitalism’.87 If Cruso is associated with slavery and 
conquest, of what can Susan Barton’s anxious anti-slavery stance consist, if not the embodiment of the transition 
to a linguistic (ideological) rather than an overtly coercive capital? No longer in bondage, then, Friday rather 
falls under her ‘care’.88 The corollary to Cruso’s settler colonial ‘ground-clearing’ (‘I only clear the ground for 
them’) would be what Spivak terms, in regard to the Christian colonial mission, ‘soul-making’. Susan Barton 
stands in for the liberal-secular soul-maker—the ‘subject-maker’ perhaps—who takes Friday on as her burden. 
She regards it as her mission to hasten his entry into the Symbolic order, and likewise, Foe states, ‘We must 
make Friday’s silence speak, as well as the silence surrounding Friday’.89 
And he is already halfway there: expected by the fact of a name, ‘Friday’; deposited on the grimy 
streets of Victorian London; and manumitted upon the death of Cruso, he makes land as a free person. This 
nominal ascription, this spatial determination and this newfound ownership of self —a residence, a proper name, 
and a status before the Law—already presuppose him as subject in a way he needs only to affirm in order to 
actualise. In other words, because he is no longer a slave, Susan Barton does not force him to do anything. 
Instead, she offers him a multitude of opportunities. She tries communicating with him non-verbally, she tries 
teaching him to shape English letters, she tries engaging him in pictorial referent-to-word exercises with a chalk 
and slate, and so on. She slips, unintentionally, between developing his general usefulness and training him like 
a dog: ‘Watch and Do: those are my two principal words for Friday, and with them I accomplish much’.90 
Because he is not a slave, she presents him with choices, yet she never ceases trying to impose limits on his 
abyssal presence. She speaks of building a bridge of words to Friday and constantly interpellates him: ‘Through 
all my chatter . . . I make the air around him thick with words’.91 She saturates the ether with her language. 
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(Althusser makes the play on the word ‘subject’ in order to describe the paradox of the individual who must 
‘freely’ subject herself in order to become a subject.) 
Yet no legible sign and no affirmation are forthcoming. Muteness doubles as opacity, the heart of 
darkness is reflected back to the metropole as the darkness at its heart, and Susan Barton’s anxiety amounts to a 
fear that ‘the inchoate practices and desires of the savage’ will fail to be ‘disciplined’.92 Ever the mistress of 
empire, she both pities and despises her black charge, though her empathy strains against itself and her dread of 
Friday deepens. In his speechless indeterminacy, he literally cannot be figured. And this strikes her as 
monstrous: ‘Did Cruso truly believe, I wonder, that you were once a cannibal child? Was it his dark fear that the 
craving for human flesh would come back to you, that you would one night slit his throat and roast his liver and 
eat it? Was his talk of cannibals rowing from island to island in search of meat a warning, a masked warning, 
against you and your appetites?’93 Later she fears he will go back and find the dead baby they discover in the 
ditch and eat its cold corpse, if not her own warm flesh. Is Friday harmless, like a slow-witted child? Or is he 
cunning, waiting until we sleep ‘slit our throats’?  
The problem is having no way to know, no measure by which to read intention. The structure of 
interpellation is the call to transparency and assent to things as they are, such that the subject verbally 
acknowledges the ‘obvious’, ‘right’, and ‘true’ nature of the conditions of her existence.94 This is in accordance 
with the imperative to speak English and ‘cut off’ the atavistic features of indigenous ways. (This fear of the 
judgment of the Other, that one will indeed be monstrous, effectively decommissions vast swathes of indigenous 
resource. It is not only the Other who believes I am monstrous, but I believe it myself. To relinquish the fear of 
the Other’s judgment—for whom one will always be, in Homi Bhabha’s phrase, ‘not quite/ not white’95—would 
appear to be the first step toward the revolutionary act.) If I speak English, I can never be a complete void, 
because my coordinates can be situated, so to speak, by virtue of the fact that you speak English, too. Brian 
Friel’s play, Translations, analysed in Chapter Three, advances from the notion that the remaking of the world 
in English is agreeable so long as it is properly and sensitively indigenised. In fact there is something refreshing 
about the creativity involved in such mutual accommodations. Violence indeed erupts in the play but it is off 
stage, as if to say that violence and politics are separate from more transcendental matters of culture and 
language. (Hence the ideology of ‘The Fifth Province’ where Habermasian consensus is the goal as opposed to 
further antagonism).
96
 Friel dismisses the nostalgic pieties that would ‘return’ the Irish to land and community. 
Because it dramatises the translation of the Irish life-world into English, metaphoricity is again central. Irish 
heteronomy is traded for the orderly phonetic signifiers of English. The linguistic parameters around Irish 
undecidability are enforced by Friel with an instructive and self-conscious lack of sentimentality. English 
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becomes Hiberno-English, or as with other post/colonial locales, another ‘global english’ with the lower-casing 
of the name meant to signify dissociation with colonial privilege. As attractive as these scenarios may be, none 
of them interrupts the reproduction of capitalist social relations so much as they self-adapt it. Identity is nothing 
but an indigenised idiom for the subject, such that the discourse of identity amounts to the spontaneous auto-
translation of the colonised for the benefit of capital.  
Once the initial assent can be secured, all the violence that preceded its solicitation is effectively 
assuaged, dis-remembered, lost in this process of becoming-subject. One does not seek redress for the violence 
ensuing upon a state of affairs in which she has a pre-inscribed position
97
 and which she has publicly 
acknowledged as ‘obvious,’ ‘right’ and ‘true’. Isn’t what Susan Barton ultimately seeks from ‘Friday’ the 
assumption of what Derrida calls ‘the auto-position of the subject saying yes to itself before the possibility of 
discourse’98? Must he not, upon acceding to the position of subject, thereby accept the violations and 
dislocations of imperialism as more or less disinterested improvements? Is it not then an affirmation from the 
victim of violence himself that such violence was necessary and therefore palatable and even an occasion for 
gratitude? It is without irony that Susan Barton issues her refrain: ‘He does not understand that I am leading him 
to freedom. He does not know what freedom is . . . How can he guess . . . that without me he is lost?’99 The 
assent, the ‘choice’, of subjectivation is the mechanism by which both prior and continuing violence is made 
linguistic, ‘mitigated’ and normalised. Hence the subject is the site of all ideological ‘conscription’: ‘That you 
and I are subjects – and that that does not cause any problems – is an ideological effect, the elementary 
ideological effect’.100 
Friday is absorbed in unknowable obliquities (the spinning, the repetitive music, the sullen blankness, 
and previously on the island, the strewing of flower petals off the shore). Susan broods: ‘I saw pictures in my 
mind of pincers gripping his tongue and a knife slicing into it, as must have happened, and I shuddered.’101 
Susan’s desire to know is all-consuming. Friday must yield his voice, but what is it he could say, assuming he 
were capable of speech, that Susan Barton does not already know? That is, with what words should he interpret 
his abduction and grisly amputation? For what community of listeners and to what end? Were Friday to be 
schooled in the pursuits of the classes who write, in other words, he would ultimately ‘speak’, but only to them. 
What Coetzee successfully shows is that the obsession with giving Friday ‘voice’ has almost nothing to do with 
him, and everything to do with Susan Barton.
102
 It forms a kind of triangulated appeal to the Other, a desire 
bordering at times on paranoia and panic, which may be read as a ‘call upon the Other to vouch for the truth in 
which [she] exists.’103 Because Friday never properly writes and thus never ‘speaks,’ his parturition is stalled.104 
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Susan Barton says, ‘He is the child of his silence, a child unborn, a child waiting to be born that cannot be 
born’.105 
Yet if Friday hovers around the void of being no-one, it is because he has not undergone the 
metaphorisation that would replace an unravaged life-world with a congealed identity in the Other. In regard to 
Wittgenstein’s sociality, Norman Malcolm writes 
 
To speak a language is to participate in a way of living in which many people are engaged. 
The language I speak gets its meaning from the common ways of acting and responding to 
people. . . . To follow the rules for the use of an expression is nothing other than to use the 
expression as it is ordinarily used—which is to say, as it is used by those many people who 




In time, Friday, bereft of a community, will have no language at all, except the one Susan Barton 
‘gives’ him. The ‘glossectomy’ of dispossessed peoples (who cannot tell, and therefore neither can they 
continue, indefinitely, to remember, the stories of those dispossessions) is not accidental. What if ‘the native’ 
exists only at the site of her intersecting social practices, is nothing but her relationship to land, language, and 
community? When one by one she is dispossessed of those things, there is truly nothing left, particularly, if as 
Gilbert Ryle would put it, ‘there is no ghost in the machine’.107  
In some ways, Coetzee has staged the unthinkable, the nothingness prior to language. He has succeeded 
in placing Friday in the (impossible) position of the infans, the child who does not yet speak. The infans cannot 
‘code’ or ‘witness’ her own accession to the Other, since in the absence of prior language, she is not ‘there’ for 
the drama of entry. Any ‘thereness’ would be a (false and) retroactive ascription. Though shrouded in 
‘primordial fog’, as it were, we all know that we did in fact acquire language, even though we too were absent at 
the event of its happening. Is Friday attendant at his own lacerating shift from the ‘nothing’ into language, 
provided he goes on to speak? It is a most irregular constellation of states that Coetzee dramatises, but the most 
striking aspect, I would argue, is its disruption of what Althusser named the toujours déjà. Coetzee breaks apart 
the sequence, the presumed telos, the inevitable trajectory, the unilinear time of the infans hurtling toward the 
‘I’. Instead he makes thinkable the ‘return’ to radical undecidability and the unmaking of the ‘forced choice’ by 
way of Friday. Walter Benjamin’s Marxism, it might be added, relies on this very sense that temporality is not 
unalterable, that by making the sort of retroactive ascriptions we commonly make anyway, we can still ‘change’ 
the truth-conditions of the past, and thereby seize and activate alternative possibilities. The enormous weight of 
the toujours-deja, the unrelenting march of ‘empty homogenous time’ is scrambled in this way, rewritten, and 
lived anew. Friday enacts an anti-temporal return to ‘sheer potentiality’, invoking what could yet be a 
Benjaminian ‘redemption’ of the missed opportunity. To a great extent, the chapters on the subjunctive politics 
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of the H-Block struggles, especially Chapter Five, involve just such a reconstruction of the damaged but 
recuperable past, which is solidified and enabled through the speaking of the Irish language. To speak 
indigenous language in these contexts is to ‘resurrect’ the dead as well as the lost context in which they would 
have thrived.  
Because Friday does not assent, neither does he exonerate past violence nor participate in its present 
and future enactments. Friday deters and frustrates the machinery of social reproduction by virtue of the fact that 
he does not speak. It literally stops with him. And because subject formation, and hence social reproduction, 
cannot proceed without language, so does language provide a zone of intense volatility. Suppose interpellation 
becomes counter-interpellation, language gets returned as a ‘dead letter’, or is replaced by an opaque and 
‘primitive’ code such as Irish Gaelic? Then reproduction necessarily falters. For how else do the ‘primitive’ 
languages appear to the speaker of English, if not as instances of unmanageable difference, as obstacles to social 
reproduction? Subject formation in the colonies cannot take place without the transparency which is its aim, and 
language which is its vector. Althusser wrote: ‘As Marx said, every child knows that a social formation which 
did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year’.108 The 
anti-colonial promise inherent in the words, ‘would not last a year,’ provides the impetus to those instances of 
linguistic resistance elaborated in the forthcoming chapters. 
The Irish language, like Friday’s tongue, vanishes as a result of violence. Irish, like Friday, also 
behaves like a symptom
109
 in the post/colonial republic. That is, the Irish language cannot be ‘corrected’ (i.e., 
restored) lest the whole structural edifice on which the Anglophone social relations of the post/colonial state are 
erected begins to crack. Likewise Friday presents a symptom because the only way to ‘resolve’ him would be by 
reassembling the community and mode of life in which his utterances would have meaning.
110
 And Africa, like 
Friday, has been dismembered, too, it can only exist as nostalgia and damage from within the new power 
dispensation of global capitalism. Hence Susan Barton’s decision to send Friday back to ‘Africa’ – her attempts 
to resolve him as symptom—are confused and defeated in advance.111 Still Friday’s tonguelessness is not 
accidental. Coetzee constantly reminds us of the grim violence of its occurrence so that we can never suppose 
Friday simply preferred to speak English. 
Friday responds to his interpellations so opaquely as to render them inoperative, confounding his 
interlocutor into a confused immobility. Susan Barton clearly detects a threat in this response but the nature of 
the threat is so diffuse as to make it unclear how best to mitigate it. Friday’s puzzling behaviour does not 
outmanoeuvre or overcome his interlocutor, so much as it suspends her ability to follow through on the scenario 
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as it had been constructed. It disassembles the terms by which the world proceeds and this is precisely why it is 
powerful.  
Yet indigenous language is even more effective than silence because it contains within it the possibility 
of recovering a lost speech community, which will disable the reproduction of this violent social formation by 







1.           Irish as Symptom: The Short Films of Daniel O’Hara 
 
In his seminal essay, ‘The Language of African Literature,’ the Kenyan novelist Ngugi wa Thiong’o 
underscores the subtle but mortifying effects on decolonisation of continuing to think, write, speak, and 
otherwise live, in the same language that conceived, justified, and administered your colonisation. This is 
because English in Ngugi’s construct is not a transparent vessel or a medium without content, needing only to be 
indigenised following independence. Rather a language itself already comprises an episteme.
112
 English in 
Kenya, in other words, constitutes a world-view with an historic inheritance, unforeseeable epiphenomena, and 
most importantly, lasting material effects.  
Ngugi suggests we consider the Swedes. The Swedish can comport themselves in English with agility 
should the commercial, educational, diplomatic, or creative need arise: ‘[English] is spoken in Britain and in 
Sweden and Denmark. But for Swedish and Danish people English is only a means of communication with non-
Scandinavians’.113 There is no imperative, in other words, to abandon or despise Swedish or Danish as a result. 
The fluent and occasional use of English need not be predicated on the burial of Swedish. What distinguishes 
Sweden from Kenya (and for my purposes, Ireland) is a heritage of colonial damage. Irish in Ireland could be 




What is common enough to be called the standard narrative encourages this mentality, rather than 
confront the inherent violence of a language shift (from Irish to English) of such dramatic proportions. The 
following passage by Declan Kiberd provides an instance of the standard narrative. While perfectly reasonable, 
it nonetheless forecloses the possibility of a more symptomatic reading:  
 
It was, however, only in the mid nineteenth century, that the native language 
declined, not as an outcome of British policy so much as because an entire generation 
of the Irish themselves decided no longer to speak it. . . . To put the matter starkly, 
Irish declined only when the Irish people allowed it to decline. Brit-bashing 
mythology which cites the tally-stick, National Schools and Famine as the real 
causes was designed by politicians to occlude the painful truth, lest it cast a probing 
light on the contemporary situation, which is that Irish is still dying, still recoverable, 




Kiberd is himself a non-native Irish speaker fluent in the language; his Irish Classics addresses many 
of these same issues. It might be possible to assess the above passage in terms of strategy: by demonstrating to 
the Irish the extent of their complicity in the demise of the language, they might yet be motivated to recover it. 
Still this approach elides any explanatory account of Irish linguistic collapse apart from, they ‘decided no longer 
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to speak it’. If there is no structural question and no institutionalised coercion: no ritual shaming , no punitive 
educational apparatus (tally-sticks, National Schools); no depopulation (Famine); and no systemic devaluations 
(British policy) to blame, then why did the Irish people simply ‘allow it to decline’? While he does not believe 
this, Kiberd’s brief account is still compatible with the idea that there is something inherently disagreeable, non-
modern, or tedious about the language itself. A more demanding approach derives from Pierre Bourdieu, who 
asks the vexed question: what could possibly ‘induce the holders of dominated linguistic competences to 
collaborate in the destruction of their instruments of expression?’116 Bourdieu de-naturalizes the rhetoric of 
inevitability that saturates the dominant narrative and reinstates a measure of the catastrophe involved. He 
restores a sense of scale by asking: what convinces a people to destroy their own language? 
It is more in alignment with Bourdieu’s methodology than with Kiberd’s then that we proceed. In his 
Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu explains how one language comes to attain ‘legitimacy’ at the 
expense of dialectical variants and other languages in a given social field. The becoming-illegitimate of all but 
the one language (in this instance, English) is a lengthy but decisive process. Speaking the legitimate language 
accrues benefits to the speaker (in the form of cultural capital, linguistic capital, social capital, etc.) to be spent 
on the so-called market. Gaining ‘competence’ in the legitimate language through national schools provides 
marketable skill sets, such as, for example, the increasingly reflexive ability of the speaker to modulate her 
usage depending on the level of capital held by the person with whom she is interacting (more, less, or roughly 
the same amounts).  
‘Illegitimate’ languages, conversely, come to be associated with ‘peasant values.’ Indigenous 
languages in colonial contexts would appear to become permanently evacuated of all capital, so that even after 
formal independence they maintain their taint of illegitimacy, despite the sometimes protracted struggles of 
nationalists to boost the capital indigenous languages may command. The line of inquiry into such language 
change should not centre on why the Irish people chose English. In Bourdieu’s terms, ‘choice’ would be too 
simplistic an ascription. Rather Bourdieu asks what interested violence has transpired and called itself a random, 
arbitrary result of modernity? As compelling as it is, Bourdieu’s paradigm is constructed around the installation 
of official French in France and as such, it is not designed to account for the charged interface between an 
imperial language and an indigenous one. While a parallel could usefully be drawn between Bourdieu’s official 
language/ déclassé dialect(s) and imperial language/ indigenous language, there are elements that escape this 
paradigm. For instance, the increasingly erratic disconnect between efforts meant to boost the national language 
(which I refer to henceforth as the ethos of preservation) and those which would confine its use literally to the 
farthest margins of the island.  
Lacan would have called this disconnect a symptom. The symptom appears as something isolated, 
random, disruptive but self-contained, when in fact it gestures not toward an accident but toward a more 
fundamental, i.e., structural, ‘malaise.’ Slavoj Žižek defines the method of symptomal reading thus: ‘[It] 
consists in detecting a point of breakdown heterogeneous to a given ideological field and at the same time 
necessary for the field to achieve its closure, its accomplished form’.117 In other words, Irish is the disavowed 
element which does not fit in the present world, yet it cannot be exorcised altogether, nor even approached 
directly, because its suppression is that which holds the post/colonial social field in place. 
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The symptom refers to those instances of disjuncture, of unresolved and unresolveable contradiction, 
which are disruptive of, but also ineradicable from, social reality itself. They provoke disproportionate gestures 
meant to contain them, though rather than outpace the symptoms, these gestures tend to make them worse. This 
is because resolving the contradiction once and for all would mean confronting the ‘error’ or ‘lapse’ at the 
foundation of the social order itself. Doing so would cause the social structure to collapse, because it relies for 
its own coherence on this unacknowledgeable ‘point of exception’.118 
Moreover, symptoms proliferate, but they are experienced as isolated events, blips, autonomous 
disturbances, and thereby disguise the fact that they are necessary. The standard narrative suggests that Irish is 
enfeebled through a combination of its own internal deficiencies and the unsentimental, socio-cultural 
conjuncture in which we find ourselves. Such enfeeblement registers as a ‘local problem’ and a ‘random 
aberration’. Yet the disavowal of Irish, of which the ethos of preservation is a symptom and not a remedy, is not 
a ‘marginal malfunctioning’ of the postcolonial social order, but rather its ‘structural necessity’.119 In other 
words, the destruction of Irish is not accidental to, but constitutive of, the post/ colonial social order itself. If the 
brokenness of Irish is not a ‘contingent error but a structural necessity’, then the correction of this problem is 
therefore unthinkable, because to truly correct the demise of Irish would be in effect to undo the social reality on 
whose corpse it is erected. In that sense, Irish revival efforts have not so much failed, as they are already 
precluded at the point of their inception.   
The post/colonial state attempts to ameliorate and occlude its own structural antagonisms—for example 
its alignment with, and reinvestment in, extant colonial structures. It does so by means of over-large gestures 
meant to convey post/colonial rectification. For example, consider the bold language of Bunreacht na hÉireann: 
‘The Irish language as the national language is the first official language’.120 This must be weighed against the 
fact that almost no one speaks it. As Ruth Lysaght reports, ‘After 3186 hours of instruction over thirteen years, 
most school-leavers, according to the 1996 census, are unable to express themselves in Irish’.121  
But it is a gesture, comes the response. It isn’t really the first language. Everyone knows it isn’t to be 
taken literally. According to Žižek, such symptomatology involves a knowing which is not-knowing, a 
diversionary short-circuit, such that at some level we do ‘know’, but we continue to behave as if we did not. A 
knowing which is not knowing is the basis of the ideological conundrum at the centre of the ‘post-ideological’ 
society, subverting as it does the normal parameters of epistemology.
122
 We ‘know’ at some level that Irish has 
been unceremoniously surrendered to a prosperous post/colonial social order. So why all the energies toward 
preservation?
123
 Arguably so that Irish does not find its way back—in some unruly, unforeseen way—and thus 
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threaten comfortable, Anglophone social reality. This knowledge-as-non-knowledge is thematised throughout 
the short films of Daniel O’Hara (of whom more later).     
Irish is preserved (which is not to be mistaken for the more anarchic, spoken) in order to satisfy not me 
or you, but the subject-supposed-to-believe. A Žižekian formulation,124 the subject-supposed-to-believe is a 
figure for whom we keep up appearances, lest she be surprised and disturbed by the real reality in which we 
knowing agents move but which would be a source of contamination and upset for her. Žižek gives the example 
of Santa Claus. Parents invest in the innocence of the child, take pleasure in her enthusiasm and belief, and 
protect her from contact with the truth of Santa’s inexistence. The child, meanwhile, believes in order to 
encourage her parents’ obvious fulfilment and also, of course, to get the presents. The subject-supposed-to-
believe in post/colonial Ireland is herself cushioned from the knowledge of which we bear the burden: Irish isn’t 
really the official language. We maintain this seemingly benign fiction for the benefit of the subject-supposed-
to-believe:  I don’t believe, I know better, but I won’t let on for her sake. Such a figure need not actually exist—
she probably doesn’t—and if she does, she likely already knows. We will call out the stops on the Dublin bus in 
Irish as well as in English, not because there will be Irish speakers on board who will require such direction, but 
in case she happens to be there. We will similarly include Irish names on street signs in order to appease and 
protect the subject-supposed-to-believe.  
The Official Languages Act of 2003 legislates the inclusion of Irish words on all street-signs in the 
Republic.
125
 In respectable script, their presence is meant to signify ‘parity of esteem’ with English, if not 
primacy,
126
hence the relevant wording of the act: 
(a) the text in the Irish language shall appear first, (b) the text in the Irish language shall not be 
less prominent, visible, or legible than the text in the English language, (c) the lettering of the 
text in the Irish language shall not be smaller in size than the lettering of the text in the 
English language, (d) the text in the Irish language shall communicate the same information as 
is communicated by the text in the English language, and (e) a word in the text in the Irish 
language shall not be abbreviated unless the word in the text in the English language, of which 
it is the translation, is also abbreviated.  
Here we have the projection of linguistic redress and the illusion that Irish can be willed into Bourdieu’s 
legitimacy without actually having to speak it. In symptomatic fashion, the bold occasion of Irish emblazoned 
on public signage is undercut by the fact that each sign is always-already translated into English. Does not the 
bilingual signage, with its apologetic translation, make a gesture only to retract it? Isn’t Irish permitted to appear 
alongside the English, only because it need not be read or even noticed and because it becomes, effectively, a 
decorative hieroglyphics? The Irish does not interfere with transmission in the ‘real’ language. It does not 
complicate or block meaning (as all-Irish signage might). Instead a kind of visual vacuum, an amnesiac ‘dead 
zone’, opens up wherever the Irish words occur. The eye simply trains itself to skip past the Irish in order to 
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reach the ‘meaning’ of the sign, which as everyone knows (apart from the subject-supposed-to-believe) resides 
in the English.  
   To collectively agree to, and even insist on, Irish words on public signage is at once to proclaim, this is 
important, but then to carry on, to live, as if it were not important in the least. In a similar way, Žižek invokes 
the subject/ object who acts in my place. He gives the example of the TV laugh track which is delighted instead 
of me. Despite the fact that I do not laugh myself, I feel relieved and relaxed after an evening of such diversion. 
Žižek also convokes ‘weepers,’ (known as keeners in the Irish tradition) who are hired to mourn the dead. 
Keeners ululate, and statues and commemorations ‘remember’ the (Irish-speaking/ Famine) dead, so that I don’t 
have to. The objects of preservation, such as street signs with Irish words alongside the English ones, are 
effectively like a laugh track, chortling and applauding, so that I myself needn’t. Irish street signs and public 
transport announcements will speak Irish in my stead. They preserve the language so that I don’t have to. 
Preservation is a kind of embalming; even as it purports to be an extension of life, it cannot elide its funerary 
function.  
    It would be unthinkable that public signage was only in Irish, as this would come within dangerous 
proximity to social ‘undoing’. Bilingual signs guard against the ‘chaos’ which would engulf an all Irish- 
speaking Ireland—the thought of which provokes horror, because it would involve a ‘return’ to that atavism and 
disorder which occasioned colonialism in the first place. Ngugi describes the ‘cultural bomb’ of English in 
relation to African languages—and the internalization of colonial norms—thus: ‘It makes [the colonised] see 
their past as a wasteland of non-achievement and it makes them want to distance themselves from that 
wasteland. It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, 
with other peoples’ languages rather than their own’.127 If an Irish-speaking Ireland automatically signals a 
transmogrification to the awful thicket of unknowability, it is because this is how it first appeared to those with a 
civilising mission. The restoration of Irish is intolerable because it would be experienced as a retrogression to a 
kind of degree zero—hundreds of years of colonial ‘work’ radically unmade, a starting from scratch. To be 
precise, it would usher in a version of colonial year one. The instinctive recoil from ‘year one’ implicitly 
assumes that colonialism was/is, at some level a warranted—even largely beneficial—process. No one, not even 
Douglas Hyde, wanted an all-Irish speaking Ireland. 
The proximity to undoing, announced as it is in the vigour of the symptom, makes for social 
‘correctives’ that are increasingly contortionist and absurd. In a related way, we can see preservation dispersing 
the spectres of use. The efforts of the state to preserve Irish become not a trajectory lurching toward colonial 
year one as they may first appear, but a rather fevered attempt to avoid it at all costs. By way of his short film 
work, Daniel O’Hara has contributed to unravelling these uniquely post/colonial phenomena.  
The Irish Film Board/Bord Scannán na hÉireann was closed between 1987 and 1993. Short film 
production, as opposed to the costlier venture of feature film, took over as the means for a film community to 
maintain itself, to continue working and to train newcomers.
128
 Young filmmakers honed their craft with 
increasing skill at one of several programmes now gathered under the auspices of the Dublin Institute of 
Technology, of which Daniel O’Hara is a graduate. After 1998, the Oscailt (and Lasair) short film schemes 
(funded by Bord Scannán na hÉireann and TG4) were established to support indigenous talent and to meet 
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legislative demands for Irish language material. Numerous filmmakers availed themselves of such support and 
many high quality short films were produced in this way, though the schemes created a continuing situation in 
which, as Fidelma Farley points out, ‘Strategic use [is] made of the schemes by filmmakers who have little 
interest in or knowledge of the language but wish to advance in the industry’.129 
What is striking about O’Hara’s productions is that they enfold this conundrum into the narratives 
themselves, adding a dimension of self-awareness that enlivens their satirical humour. As Farley notes, many of 
the Oscailt films are in Irish as if by chance, but could as easily have been in English or any other modern 
language. By contrast, O’Hara’s work comments on the contradictions of modern Irish from the point of view of 
someone who both benefits from the promotional funds and critiques their incongruities. His widely 
acclaimed
130
 Yu Ming is Ainm Dom (‘My Name is Yu Ming’)131 tells the story of a young Chinese man whose 
dull life prompts him to strike out on an adventure. Quite impulsively, he decides to move to Ireland. He looks 
up the official language (Gaeilge) and teaches himself with cassette tapes before packing his things and flying to 
Dublin. Encouraged by the signage in Irish, he navigates the city with ease but becomes confused and depressed 
when no one can understand him. Ultimately, he relocates to the Gaeltacht.  
The film explores what happens when someone appears who, quite ignorant of the protocols of 
linguistic preservation because he has been raised elsewhere, engages in unabashed, unembarrassed use. Yu 
Ming, unlike native Dubliners, does not ‘know’ how things really work. He therefore launches his Irish on the 
unsuspecting Anglophone
132
 zone of contemporary Dublin and is quickly made to feel his error. In fact his 
containment and ultimate ostracism, while experienced as friendly enough, are nevertheless definitive.   
O’Hara has created a postmodern Ireland in which the Irish language is all but entirely extinct. It is so 
postmodern that it features an Asian protagonist who relocates to Dublin, a true child of globalisation (he enjoys 
‘Taxi Driver’ and borrows the language programme ‘Gaeilge agus Fáilte’ from his local Beijing library.) He is, 
as Fidelma Farley points out, a figure of transnational mobility. The ubiquity of the commodity form and the 
unrivalled dominance of the English language would appear to be complete, which is why Yu Ming’s Irish (and 
simultaneously his not-English) both protrudes and discomfits. Symptom-like, it causes tremors in the social 
field in which he moves and tries, unsuccessfully, to integrate.  
This is not an immigration tale in the traditional sense in which a newcomer seeks to negotiate the 
bigotry or racism around him. The fact that Yu Ming is a recent immigrant from China has no bearing 
whatsoever except inasmuch as the ‘Irish’ Other masquerades as an Asian Other. That is, O’Hara suggests that 
the Othering of Yu Ming is a species of self-loathing rather than xenophobia. Conflicts arise because Yu Ming is 
an Irish speaker, though his alien tongue is miscoded as Chinese. The subtext of self-loathing is especially 
noticeable in the second film, Fluent Dysphasia, and both films include the suggestion of internal colonisation. 
Yu Ming’s Irish produces anxious responses from the Dubliners, who must extend themselves uncomfortably in 
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order to grasp, interpret, and situate him. He unnerves them, and they visibly work to neutralise whatever echoes 
or threats his unexpected Irish might augur in terms of Lacanian undoing. The film is a meditation, in other 
words, on how the post/colonial social order attempts to ‘accommodate’ Yu Ming’s linguistic errancy. 
Yu Ming is listless and bored in his job as a corner-store attendant in Beijing. We see him too bored 
even to produce correct change. He plays a game of chance one day involving a globe in order to imagine and 
then enact a livelier fate for himself. The friction from his fingertip stops the spinning orb at Ireland, and never 
having thought of the place before, he visits the library to consult an atlas. ‘Ireland,’ it says. ‘Population: 4 
million’. ‘Capital city: Dublin’. ‘Official language: Irish’. 
The conceit, of course, is that of an innocent who takes the state at its word. He is a version of the 
subject-supposed-to-believe. Yu Ming accepts at face value the notion that Irish is in fact the first official 
language, hence his statement: ‘D’fhoghlaim mé an teanga mar ba mhaith liom a bheith i mo chónaí in Éirinn.’ 
(‘I learned Irish, because I wanted to live in Ireland’).133  
The youths who work at the Dublin hostel are welcoming enough. They too are embodiments of 
transnational mobility. One is from Australia and the other Mongolia, and they have understood and assimilated 
to the requirements of a global capitalism in a way that Yu Ming has not: their English is adequate, largely 
unstilted and appropriate to their work situations; they are moderately skilled but not very; they are cheerful and 
considerate but not overbearing; and they have grasped at opportunities in the Celtic Tiger-era service sector to 
good personal effect. They have achieved Bourdieu’s competence134 which Yu Ming is in the midst of bungling. 
This encounter with other comparatively more successful transnational figures quickly degenerates into 
a series of illogical compensations for the fact that a cavernous communication gap opens up when Yu Ming 
makes the simple but incomprehensible request: Ba mhaith liom leaba anseo. (‘I would like a bed here’.) They 
include increased volume and exaggerated pronunciation: ‘HOW. . . WAS . . . YOUR . . . FLIGHT?’ and so on. 
Yu Ming looks blankly on the Australian youth who flaps his ‘wings’ to signal air travel. A lesser filmmaker 
might rely on the clichéd comedics of miscommunication alone, but O’Hara goes further. He presents Irish as a 
symptomal irruption in both the bafflement it creates and the impulse to contain it that ensues. 
The Mongolian is recruited to ‘translate’ but he does not understand the language either. Ba mhaith 
liom leaba anseo must be Chinese, he opines, whereas ‘I’m Mongolian’. Therefore, ‘Sorry, Mate, I don’t speak 
Chinese’ is the cordial but concluding pronouncement imposed on the scene by the hostel worker(s). After a 
glimmer of panic, all is well again. The symptom of Yu Ming’s Irish is successfully drained of virulence as the 
hostel workers interpret and ‘translate’ him. They deduce his intentions—‘He probably wants a bed,’ says the 
Mongolian youth, the sharper of the two—and integrate him thus, while at the same time expunging the Irish 
language altogether.  
      The subsequent scenes dramatise Yu Ming’s isolation. Dinner becomes a lonesome failure. The 
indecipherable knife and fork mark him out further, materialising his ostracism. He is forced to turn them upside 
down, creating makeshift chopsticks and clumsily trying to negotiate the roasted vegetables on his plate. After 
walking alone on the streets of Dublin, he arrives at the banks of the Grand Canal and sits on the bench beside 
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the statue of Patrick Kavanagh. It is thus with a mute companion in compounded silence that he lingers; O’Hara 
‘amplifies’ the absence of language. Yu Ming looks at Patrick Kavanagh and is powerless to provoke a 
response. Still he improbably channels Travis Bickle for the second time in the film: An bhfuil tusa ag leabhairt 
liomsa?, he asks. (‘You talkin’ to me?’) 
The cosmic/comic refusal that follows (statues don’t speak and the Irish don’t speak Irish) is further 
redounded in the fact that the Monaghan poet, for a series of complex reasons, was unsympathetic to the 
language revival movement. As one biographer writes, ‘Some are unwilling to junk the Irish language and its 
historical associations as Kavanagh did: he was opposed to the requiring of Irish in the schools, and he felt that 
if misguided people wished to study the language, they should be free to do so, but it was their own problem’.135  
        These instances of failure contrast sharply with Yu Ming’s Dublin airport experience, in which he 
needs only to ‘interact’ with signs, signs he finds instructive and reassuring because they are (half) in Irish. In an 
inversion of the previous discussion of bilingual signs, Yu Ming reads the Irish. For him, it is the English words 
which are ‘invisible’, or if visible only strange, Derridean glyphs. It is not until Yu Ming must speak to another 
person that his edifice of language proficiency collapses. This inability to sustain linguistic proficiency with 
people suggests in itself a dissonance within the logic of preservation. It also returns us directly to the concept of 
Irish as a symptom (rather than as functioning language.)  What the state’s ethos confuses is the difference 
between preservation and usage, encouraging slippage between the two, which despite a seeming overlap are in 
fact quite different. 
      O’Hara deploys a quasi-Wittgensteinian subtext regarding the inescapable sociality of language.136 Yu 
Ming enacts the impossibility of maintaining a language that is socially incoherent and confined to an interior 
space of mere self-reflexivity. Indeed O’Hara constructs an implicit argument against linguistic privacy, since 
‘language’—without any criteria of external corroboration or any reference outside itself—can neither endure 
over time nor generate ‘meaning’ in the usual sense of the word. The Irish of the ethos of preservation works as 
an impossible private language in O’Hara’s films (that is, one not spoken; effectively disavowed socially; and 
incomprehensible to most everyone), and therefore cannot really be called a ‘language’ at all. According to 
Derrida, a language needs at least three people to achieve ‘iterability’—the sender, the receiver, and a third party 
outside the first two. It appears to Yu Ming in post/colonial Dublin, that there is only him.
137
  
     At this point, Yu Ming ventures into a neighbourhood pub in search of a job. Consider O’Hara’s 
satirical ferocity: the sage Irish speaker Yu Ming meets there—the only other Irish speaker in the film—is an 
old man, drinking Guinness at midday, who goes by the name of ‘Paddy’. When Yu Ming first arrives, he is met 
by the barman with the same pantomiming and over-loud words as before: ‘What? Do You? Want to drrrink?’ 
 He utters sweet and incongruous phrases in response, such as ‘Tá brón orm nach bhfuil mo Ghaeilge 
níos fear.’ (I’m sorry my Irish is not better’). And as if in explanation, ‘Tháinig mé go hÉirinn inné.’ (‘I just 
arrived in Ireland yesterday’). Recognising the language, Paddy calls Yu Ming over and orders a couple of pints. 
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He proceeds to explain to the despondent Yu Ming why he has failed to fit into his adopted country. The 
ensuing dialogue unfolds in a kind of phenomenological slow motion, as O’Hara telegraphs the depths of the 
absurdity therein. Yu Ming despairs to Paddy that it was a mistake to come, that he speaks Irish terribly, and that 
no one can understand him. 
 
PADDY: Tá Gaeilge níos fearr agat ná an cuid is mó daoine sa tír seo. 
(‘You have better Irish than most people in this country’.) 
YU MING: Ní thuigim. (‘I don’t understand’.) 
PADDY: Labhraítear Bearla anseo. (‘English is spoken here’.) 
YU MING: Bearla? (‘English?’) 
PADDY: Bearla . . . ó Shasana. (‘English. . . from England’.) 
YU MING: Ní labhraítear Gaeilge? (‘Irish isn’t spoken?’) 
PADDY: Ní labhraítear. (‘It isn’t’.) 
YU MING: Ach gach fogra—  (‘But on every sign—’) 
PADDY: Bhuel, tá an teanga ann ach ní labhraítear í ach i gcúpla ceantar 
in Éirinn. (‘Well, the language is there, but it’s not spoken . . . except for a 
few regions in Ireland’.) 
  
The scene ends when one barman says to the other: ‘Who knew that old Paddy could speak Chinese?’ 
Paddy, in this pivotal scene, is important for several reasons. Firstly, he disabuses Yu Ming of the 
notion that his Irish is poor, ungrammatical, too unschooled. He discounts the notion that Yu Ming’s experience 
of himself as a deviation is somehow the result of ‘a local problem’ rather than a structural complaint; secondly, 
Paddy and Yu Ming come remarkably close to ‘articulating the inarticulable’ in this scene because they 
dialogically unravel those deflected knowledges, the sublation of which has been the basis of Yu Ming’s 
symptomatology all along; and finally, Paddy informs Yu Ming about the existence, far away, of zones of 
permissible Irish, the Gaeltachts. The existence of the Gaeltachts works to subvert any epiphanic assimilation of 
those unraveled, deflected knowledges that might threaten the social order with disintegration. (‘If we come to 
“know too much”, to pierce the true functioning of social reality, this reality would dissolve itself’.)138 O’Hara 
implies that this is broadly the case, as well as the case for Yu Ming. The Gaeltachts function rather like 
aboriginal reservations. They provide the ultimate quarantine of the symptomatic, Irish-speaking body and its 
indigenous speech acts. 
    In fact, the indigenous speech act that was disruptive in Dublin can be assimilated to a touristic-
imperative in the Gaeltachts that is not only made harmless there but lucrative. This is how Yu Ming’s 
ungovernable Irish is assimilated to a programme of (p)reservation and also how the symptom is subordinated to 
the requirements of capitalist post/colonialism, which prove to be one and the same thing. Yu Ming is personally 
willing to accept his aberrations as a local problem rather than a structural necessity, and this is why he is 
vulnerable to a pressure toward self-expulsion, to voluntary self-exile. 
    Finally apprised of the geographies of authorized Irish, the final sequence features Yu Ming’s journey 
to the unsullied West. It is the first time we hear the sounds of traditional music. The last shot tracks a couple of 
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tourists, probably American, milling into a pub. Yu Ming is behind the bar, from where he exclaims in 
previously unusable Irish, ‘Fáilte romhat á Connemara. Conas atá sibh?’ (Welcome to Connemara! How are 
ye?’) 
In her article on the Irish Film Board shorts, of which ‘Yu Ming’ is by far the most successful, Farley 
reads the scene as a felicitous resolution to Yu Ming’s lonely troubles. Indeed, he appears to be in his element, 
and the film ends on that cheerful note. Yu Ming is able to find ultimate solace, a zone of consolation, in the 
Gaeltacht. However, O’Hara is ambivalent about the reification of the Gaeltachts as sources of tourist revenue 
and sites of cultural consumption. A true fringe, the Gaeltacht is curated as it were from the far remove of 
Dublin. Sequestered in the great museum space of the West, Irish and Irishness become part of the 
(p)reservation effort, and Gaelgeoir and Gaeltacht alike are made over as part of an elaborate set-piece with the 
Irish language as its central curiosity. And again, the Gaeltacht is the ultimate amelioration of the Irish 
symptom, because it not only contains the language but is generative of tourist dollars. Yu Ming avoids causing 
further disruption and even makes himself useful, dispensing Irish phrases to eager foreign visitors. 
Yet O’Hara transmits his unease about Yu Ming’s resettlement. This option only presents itself as 
compelling because Yu Ming cannot assimilate in Dublin. In that sense it is a consolidation, and not a 
correction, of his ostracism. By removing Irish to the literal margins, where ostensibly it belongs, the post/ 
colonial social order may produce and reproduce itself in peace. 
 I want to shift now to another Irish-speaking figure in contemporary Dublin, the protagonist of 
O’Hara’s second short film, Fluent Dysphasia (2004).139 Michael Murphy, unlike Yu Ming, is well aware of the 
protocols of ‘preservation’. Having been brought up in post/colonial Ireland, he has internalised them to a 
degree of unthinking reflex. There is no confusion in Michael Murphy’s mind: Irish is the illegitimate cousin to 
the properly legitimate English. Which is why he is utterly mortified when after a night of hard drinking he 
awakens to find he can only speak Irish. He ‘knows’ only too well that such unfettered use is tantamount to 
social suicide, but because of a random misfortune (a blow to the head, as it happens), he is left desperate but 
unable to auto-translate. Accordingly, he cannot adjust or assimilate, so he persists in his weird social excess 
(i.e., his symptomatic Irish), like the pariah he effectively becomes. Michael Murphy, cum Mícheál Ó Muirchú, 
ceases to function almost entirely, until he is ‘delivered’ unto another language. 
Mícheál is much more neurotic and unruly in his Irish-speaking than Yu Ming. He thrashes and flails 
against his unenviable state, physically enacting contemporary anxiety about the Irish-speaking body. Mícheál 
channels the hysteria of Anglophone Ireland, of which he himself is a complacent part. The comedy is partially 
derived from the fact that he is still anxious and hysterical, even though it is his own body doing the (Irish) 
speaking, and not that of an Other. It is self-loathing that he plunges into upon finding he can no longer speak 
English. Mícheál, the Irish speaker, becomes more and more socially disabled until he finally degenerates into a 
kind of child-like helplessness.  
In the opening scene, the teen-aged daughter of Michael (not yet Mícheál at this point) asks for help 
with her Irish homework. ‘Sure, I never had a word of Irish’ is his reply. Having thus established his ignorance 
of the language, it is all the more comedic when, half-blinded by a hangover the next morning, he staggers to the 
ringing phone. Not knowing anything is wrong until he actually speaks (either his thoughts are not in Irish or he 
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doesn’t have any – another Wittgensteinian nod to the non-interiority of language), he lifts the receiver and says: 
‘Dia duit. Mícheál Ó Muirchú anseo.’ He jerks the phone away from his face as if it has burned him. 
Mícheál is panic-stricken, as Irish keeps escaping from his open mouth. Upon a cautious second try, he 
gets the same result: ‘Dia duit’ (‘Hello’) and then ‘Cé atá ansin?’ (‘Who is it?’). Horrified, he clicks off the 
phone and throws it onto the kitchen table. Irish manifests as a true excess here. It is almost as if it were a 
spillage, overcoming the bounds of his mouth. He speaks again: ‘Is mise Mícheál . . . Cad é a thainig orm?’ 
(‘I’m Michael . . . What’s become of me?’) 
As Mícheál shuffles to the train station, reeling in the fog of sore head and confusion, the viewer has 
time to appreciate the magnitude of his sudden symptomatology and all its social ramifications. As with Yu 
Ming, it is when the protagonist must deal with someone outside himself that his problem is fully aggravated: 
  
  DART CLERK: Where are you going to? . . . Hello?! Pal? Where to?’ 
  MÍCHEÁL: (muttering) Bothar Chlontarf. (Clontarf Road). 
  DART CLERK: Where? 
  MÍCHEÁL: (under his breath) Bothar Chlontarf. 
  DART CLERK: Do you want a ticket or not? What station are you going to? 
  MÍCHEÁL: (shouting) Bothar Chlontarf!! 
  DART CLERK: Ohhhhh, you’re Gaeilgeoir . . . . I love the Irish, me.  
 
 He says this last as if admiring its twee quality. An exasperated Mícheál snatches up the ticket, pays for it, and 
hurries away. ‘Go n-éirí an bóthar leat!’ (‘May the road rise to meet you!’) and all that,’ the DART clerk calls 
after him. ‘Céad míle fáilte!’ (‘A hundred thousand welcomes!’) The language is humorously but squarely 
confined to its form of mass-produced, greeting-card banality. The clerk repeats a common strategy of 
containment which is to circumscribe the language to a tourist phantasm, a mediocre commodity of rurality and 
kitsch. Irish has no place in the real world.  
Ultimately, Mícheál arrives at the house of Sean—with whom he’d been on a drinking bout the 
previous night—and from whom he must extract information about what events precipitated his personal 
disaster. Predictably, though, they cannot negotiate a meaningful exchange. The viewer sees a close-up of 
Sean’s face out of which English is spouting like gibberish, as the camera represents Mícheál’s point of view. 
His speech is a garbled anti-language, a contorted blah-blah-blah, which is followed by Mícheál’s dawning 
realisation that not only can he just speak Irish, he can no longer understand English. ‘Ní thuigim Bearla,’ he 
pronounces gravely. 
Despite our view of Sean’s jabbering mouth, it is Mícheál who is actually the figure trapped in 
glossolalia, he who is speaking ‘a meaningless sequence of non-words’.140 This is the case even though he is 
speaking grammatical Irish, because he is unintelligible to everyone around him. O’Hara suggests that 
glossolalia is precisely the state of Irish in contemporary Dublin. Meaningfully, it would seem, glossolalia either 
manifests in schizophrenic breaks or else trance-like religious ecstasies.
141
 The first is an appropriate 
description, since Mícheál has become, for all intents and purposes, mad and babbling. He repeats in blind 
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panic: ‘Ní labhairt ag ceart’ (‘I can’t speak properly!’) and ‘Cad é a tharla dom?’ (‘What happened to me?’). 
Sean’s stunned remarks similarly measure Mícheál’s increasing social debility, as when he says, ‘Talk proper, 
will you, Murph?!’ ‘Murph’ answers with the pleading: ‘Ní focail Bearla agam.’ (‘I haven’t a word of English’.)    
After Mícheál, in a burst of desperation, manhandles Sean whilst shrieking—‘Cad é a tharla aréir? 
Cad é a tharla dom?’ (‘What happened last night? What happened to me?!’)—Sean runs inside his flat and 
locks the door. In an inversion of the religious mode (from beatific ecstasy to satanic possession), Sean decides 
Mícheál’s glossolalia is a kind of devil-speak. He says from the letter slot: ‘I don’t know what’s wrong with 
you, Murph. But you’re scaring me. I think you might be possessed. You need to get professional help. I’d like 
to help you, but . . . I’m not a professional’. Sean pushes a crucifix out, brandishing it as best he can within the 
limited dimensions of the letter slot, saying ‘Devil be gone!’. Mícheál, meanwhile, incants: ‘Cad é a tharla 
aréir?!’ 
‘The power of Christ compels you!’ creaks Sean. ‘The power of Christ compels you!’ 
Ultimately, Mícheál is forced to turn to his school-aged daughter, Jane, the representative of that 
reluctant demographic upon whom the language is more or less totally displaced. He seeks her help; she is the 
only (other) Irish speaker in the film. Mícheál’s further descent is depicted in an impromptu lesson on a park 
bench, where she decides that with her assistance he will re-learn English. There is playground equipment in the 
background and tinkling music plays. Mícheál balances a toddler’s board-book on his knees while Jane looks 
on. She points at the pictures:  
 
               JANE: Apple. 
  MÍCHEÁL: Aaabbel. 
  JANE: Balloon. 
  MÍCHEÁL: B’looon. 
  JANE: Cake. 
  MÍCHEÁL: C-C-Caay. . . ke. 
    JANE: Maith an Fear! (‘Good man!’) 
 
It is not until Mícheál turns the page and is surprised by a triangular pink pop-up that he remembers himself. He 
throws the book on the ground and shouts ‘Chan fhuil sé go leor! Cha dtig liom é seo a fhoghlaim ó thús arís. 
Cad é a dhéanfaidh mé? Níl mé ábalta labhairt le daoine!’ (‘It’s not enough! I can’t learn this from scratch. 
What will I do? I can’t speak to anyone!’)  
He storms off. Mícheál grows increasingly dependent on his bilingual daughter to mediate between 
himself and the wider world. When he sits depressed, almost immobile, at the kitchen table in the final scene, 
the viewer gets the sense that he has not ventured out-of-doors since the playground incident. The ‘problem’ of 
Irish is somewhat self-correcting at this late stage. With enough negative reinforcement, Yu Ming and Mícheál 
have removed themselves from their crippling situations, either to the Gaeltacht or the confines of a dark, 
Dublin flat. They do not have to be carted away, in other words, despite the ‘madness’ to which their positions 
consign them. Mícheál endures the ultimate containment, which is complete social breakdown.  
 ‘Dysphasia’ is categorised as a pathology, a malfunction in the ability to use or understand language. 
But O’Hara suggests that it is not Mícheál but post/colonial Irish society that is dysphasic. The Irish symptom is 
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displaced in numerous ways, as we see in regard to Yu Ming, often to the margins of the far West, effectively 
banishing Irish speakers to rural locales. Fittingly, Pierre Bourdieu writes that the word ‘patois,’ which came to 
be associated with the peasantry, originally meant ‘incomprehensible speech.’ 
In a similar vein, Patricia Palmer explains the derivation of the word barbarism: ‘Barbarism itself, 
etymologically rooted in barbarous, the babbling outsider unable to speak Greek, is a concept grounded in 
linguistic difference’.142 Of the representation of the Irish language in early colonial discourse, she writes: 
 
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the Elizabethan texts make Irish-speakers 
mute. But what remains when speech is denied is not necessarily silence. The mute 
are not noiseless and these texts are full of strange, disturbing sounds: cries, yelps, 
groans, strangulated shouts, whispers. . . . There is nothing casual about downgrading 
words into cries, transforming the meanings of another language into babble. The 




What might have foundered—an over-stretched colonial dream of an English-only island where barbarous 
tongues ceased to erupt—would appear to have been realised in the post/colonial present. The Irish themselves, 
these films suggest, are the ones who find the indigenous language offensive and strange, impossible, and even 
suggestive of barbarism. Indeed,in O’Hara’s postmodern Dublin, spoken Irish is mistakeable for Chinese, 
Beelzebub-spew, glossolalic babble,  a preserve of geriatrics and at the same time, socially infantilising. 
To conclude, I return once more to Žižek and this time to his Lacanian notion of phantasy. Phantasy in 
the Lacanian lexicon is not a screen sweetening and obscuring reality. Rather it is the supplement that supports 
and maintains reality; it plays a crucial ideological role in propping up the ‘public symbolic order’. Phantasy 
often emerges in the form of rules which though unwritten are still coercive:  
 
The need for the phantasmic support of the public symbolic order (materialised in the 
so-called unwritten rules) thus bears witness to the system’s vulnerability: the system 
is compelled to allow for possibilities of choices which must never actually take 
place, since their occurence would cause the system to disintegrate, and the function 
of the unwritten rules is precisely to prevent the actualization of these choices 




Theoretically, we could all speak Irish at any time and in any situation. That possibility remains, 
despite the fact that we will not speak Irish when what is called for is English. The example of the ‘public 
symbolic order’ here requiring a supplement to maintain its integrity would be the official declaration of Irish as 
the first language of the Republic, whereas the phantasy would be the unwritten rule saying a collective eye-roll 
where Irish is concerned is much more appropriate than actual use. In cases such as this, Žižek argues, it would 
be more radical to follow the letter of the law, instead of the unwritten dictates of the phantasmic support, and 
thereby perform what Lacan called a ‘traversing of the phantasy’. The thing to do, according to this paradigm, is 
to take the state at its word as did Yu Ming, rather than yield to the cynical distance afforded by the phantasy. 
Žižek writes: ‘In accomplishing this act, the subject suspends the phantasmic frame of unwritten rules which tell 
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him how to choose freely  – no wonder the consequences of this act are so catastrophic’.145 It is arguably 
disruptive in itself to speak Irish in unauthorised, unexpected contexts. Speaking Irish when you would normally 
speak English is a provocation, in part because it disrupts the transparency on which capitalist post/colonialism 
relies. People cannot start speaking Irish instead of English without an edifice cracking. While a single person 
will be marginalised in her Irish speaking (as Yu Ming and Mícheál are), many people speaking Irish is another 
matter. In accordance with Žižek, the meaningful choice then is to follow the law to its letter: if Irish is the first 











                                                          
145





2. Bad Subjects: Language and Interpellation in the Irish Post/Colony 
On an evening in 2007 outside a South Belfast pub, a 24-year old woman, Máire Nic An Bhaird, was 
arrested and charged with disorderly conduct because she addressed the officer on patrol in the Irish (Gaelic) 
language. He would later claim that she had spoken in an abusive manner, and that he had mistaken her words, 
‘Tiocfaidh bhur lá’ (‘You will get your chance’—presumably, to speak) for ‘Tiocfaidh ar lá,’ (‘Our day will 
come’) a slogan associated with republican sympathies and even support for the provisional IRA. Nic An 
Bhaird’s defence rested on the argument that she should not be penalised for speaking her own language in her 
own country. Language activists demonstrating outside the Belfast Magistrate Courts at her trial deployed a 
similar vocabulary: as Nic An Bhaird was a Gaelscoil
146
 teacher living in a Gaeltacht community, and as her 
daily language was Irish, she could therefore not be punished for communicating in the language in which she 
was immersed. After admitting there was nothing criminal about speaking Irish in itself, ruling Magistrate Fiona 
Bagnall shifted emphasis from the language to the manner in which it was spoken. She stated, ‘I’m satisfied that 
the defendant continued to address police officers in a loud and aggressive manner. I therefore find her guilty of 
disorderly behaviour’.147 Whether or not she spoke Irish politely or aggressively is beside the point; whether or 
not Irish, as a ‘lesser spoken’ or minority language protected by the European Charter,148 was insulted is also not 
the issue. The ordeal of Nic An Bhaird is symptomatic of broader concerns. Nic An Bhaird was ultimately 
acquitted on appeal, but her case hints at unresolved tensions peculiar to the (Northern Irish) post/colonial 
context.  
There is something disorderly—even violent, though in a highly deflected way—about an Irish speaker 
speaking in a vigorously Anglophone setting. One could suppose that Nic An Bhaird spoke to the officer in Irish 
because it was disruptive—disruption and confusion being not accidental to the exchange but central. 
Otherwise, we would have to assume that she misunderstood the context in which she was speaking, i.e. she 
accidentally spoke Irish to an English-speaking officer, which is unlikely. What Máire Nic An Bhaird was guilty 
of was speaking Irish in what J. L. Austin would have called ‘conditions of infelicity’,149 – that is, Anglophone 
South Belfast. We know what language to speak and how to speak it depending on the social capital of the 
person with whom we are interacting. Pierre Bourdieu called this ability ‘competence’ and that environment, in 
which we are steeped from birth and which gives us such ‘automatic’ knowledge, our ‘habitus’.150 The 
boundaries between conditions of felicity and conditions of infelicity are no less clearly drawn in the 
post/colonies than elsewhere, though they are more likely to be contested there, especially insofar as an imperial 
language has rendered the indigenous language arcane and offensive.
151
 There are no more monoglot speakers in 
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Ireland, and there would almost never be an occasion in which speaking that language to someone, especially a 
person with more social capital than one’s own, would be a ‘competent’ move. Speaking Irish is almost always 
brought to bear against one’s habitus, then, and thus requires special effort. If it is very nearly always ill-advised 
to speak it, then why does Nic An Bhaird feel compelled do so? It cannot benefit her in any way. On the 
contrary, it will cause her extreme difficulty, including arrest, trial, conviction, and only later acquittal. The 
conditions of felicity in South Belfast, and more so the constitutive role of English in consolidating those 
conditions, were perhaps an impetus, however conscious or not, for Nic An Bhaird’s ‘protest’. Yet an improved 
minority-rights status would do nothing to change the conditions themselves through which Irish was made 
obsolescent or ‘lesser spoken’ in the first place. Though her defence and the media depoliticised the incident and 
worked it into a neoliberal vocabulary of rights discourse, Nic An Bhaird’s act still retains a performative echo 
of previous strategies that were more overtly political and which drew on the indigenous language as a means to 
disrupt the everyday social relations of militarised imperial-capitalism under which its subjects laboured. 
How should we understand spoken Irish in such hostile contexts? In the following, I explore three 
cultural products (a poem and two film clips) that depict a similarly structured interchange between an English-
speaking officer and a non-compliant Irish speaker. The first two scenarios display the pitfalls of this linguistic 
strategy inasmuch as what is being attempted is resistance for its own sake rather than the more radical goal of 
rupture and transformation. It is only the final scenario that aspires to this further objective. While it ends in 
violence and tragedy, it constructs the most fruitful paradigm, I will argue, for developing a linguistic praxis in 
the post/colonies and beyond.  
Each scene might be taken as an allegory for nationalist politics as they have so far been practiced.  
The first allegorises the way in which the identities (‘ethnic’, ‘authentic’, etc.) championed by any nationalist 
politics are always-already commodified and so serve to eclipse the act of rebellion. The same interconnections 
between militarism, the state and the market continue to manage threatening discontent even after independence 
is granted. The second piece depicts the post/colonial ‘dependence’ on identarianism and the concomitant 
translation of restless energies into games of cat-and-mouse wherein both parties indulge their jouissance for 
urban battle and for playing the ‘bad’ subject. The final scene is the only one that embodies what David Lloyd 
has called ‘nationalism against the state.’152 It is arguably the only postcolonial politics that works to negate the 
colonial legacy rather than think emancipation through it.
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Irish-speaking may not be disruptive in itself but may become so under certain circumstances—for 
example, when what has been demanded by a British soldier of an unruly indigene is evidence of a reformed 
subjectivity. This is not far removed from Louis Althusser’s famous ‘scene of interpellation’ because what is 
being tested, so to speak, is the individual’s willingness not only to defer to the law—to turn when it calls, to 
honour its judgments, to accede to the place it holds out—but also the willingness to demonstrate that deference 
variously, repeatedly, and at any time. In other words, to become a subject. The subject inaugurated by the 
interpellative hail of the British soldier is a subject who behaves according to certain reproductive dictates of 
capital and the colonial state, central to which is that she speak English, and not an abyssal tongue, a linguistic 
black hole, such as Irish. Irish then is precisely what the disaffected youths of Belfast, Derry, (and colonized 
Cork in 1920) utter in the place of English in these texts.  
In what Althusser called his ‘little theoretical theatre’,154 the mise en scene of interpellation is 
inaugurated by a hail from the voice of Law. (It) says, “Hey, you there!” and I stop. As I recognise myself as the 
addressee—recognise that it is indeed I (and no one else) who is being hailed—I turn around. It is in my turn to 
face the Law that I am interpellated as a subject, and I clinch the process (oftentimes eagerly) with the linguistic 
suture, “Yes” (It is I). This process of subjectivation (assujettissement) bears the double register of the term 
‘subject’, since it refers both to one who is subjected (subject to the rules, subject to the Crown, etc.) and also to 
the ‘subject’ as the seat of volition, the centre of initiatives. Althusser’s theoretical intervention ably stages the 
paradox that one must make the free choice to submit to her non-freedom; she must subject herself in order to 




The 1990 film by Margot Harkin, ‘Hush-a-Bye, Baby’, produced by the Derry Film and Video 
Workshop, chronicles the life of Goretti, a young woman who becomes pregnant but cannot secure an (illegal) 
abortion. Her obscure eponym, that of a Catholic saint, has marked her from the beginning with an inescapable 
and apparently suffocating relationship to religion. Her boyfriend Ciarán, the child’s father, has indeterminate 
Republican leanings but no clear IRA connections. Ultimately, though, he disappears into the bowels of the 
British military apparatus and thus from Goretti’s life. Prior to his indefinite internment, however, Ciarán has 
several encounters with British soldiers, the first of which contains no language at all. It is a hurried body search 
in the night, followed by a wordless dismissal. In his second encounter with the troops, he attempts to perform a 
linguistic (rather than physical) resistance to the soldier’s interpellation, a behaviour which Harkin presents as 
an analogue to Republican violence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
North and those very conditions in which the first two protagonists are caught. Yet neither is the South 
‘redeemed’ by independence. In the current conjuncture, it is true that the Irish language bears a different 
affective register in the North than it does in the South. In the North, it can still carry a political charge, a quality 
of defiant indigeneity that it lacks in the contemporary South. Despite being named the official language in the 
Irish Constitution, Irish is consistently a matter of indifference to the overwhelming majority of Southern Irish 
people. In some ways, its illicit status in the North would seem to make its use in a confrontational setting all the 
more transgressive and by that measure, more effective. This is certainly the case in some instances—for 
example, amongst Republican prisoners in the H-Block protests during the late 70’s and early 80’s. 
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Neither Ciarán nor Goretti speak much Irish, though they meet in an adult education class where 
flirtation and innuendo dominate the language lessons. A friend of Goretti’s, also in the class, refers to women 
Irish speakers as ‘Gael-whores’ instead of the rhyming ‘Gaeilgeoirs’, presumably to impress upon the viewer 
the ironic distance with which young people participate in ‘nationalist’ activity in the postmodern statelet. 
Ciarán is walking Goretti home from Irish class when they are stopped by the soldier on the street. Harkin 
renders the scene as a kind of cockfight between the two males who try to win the attentions of the female 
onlooker.  
Althusser’s ‘Hey, you there,’ becomes in the mouth of the British soldier, “Can I take your name 
please?” and then ‘How do you spell it?’ The unlikely amiability of the soldier is such that Ciarán’s annoyance 
with the situation comes off as unwarranted. Ciarán responds to his demands for identity thus: ‘Bord Fáilte agus 
Sinn Fein agus AerLingus agus Bord na Móna—Cead Míle Fáilte, Tiocfaidh Ár Lá,’ enunciating the last phrase 
with particular vitriol. What he has replied to the interpellating soldier then is, ‘Irish Tourist Board, Sinn Fein, 
Irish Airlines, Irish Peat Board, A Hundred Thousand Welcomes and Our Day Will Come’. The soldier answers, 
unexpectedly of course: ‘Ni thiguim, mate. Abair arís, le de thoil.’ [‘I didn’t get that, mate. Could you say it 
again, please?’] 
 The British soldier is a ‘real’ Irish speaker (and thus a bizarre historical anomaly) and therefore shows 
up Ciarán’s attempts both to derail the policing procedure and to show off in front of the girl. Ostensibly Goretti 
cannot follow the Irish they have exchanged, but she can sense that her man has been profoundly emasculated; 
she even smirks while the ‘castration’ is taking place. Ciarán attempts to use the Irish language as a material 
force, a kind of smothered violence against his interlocutor, but within the confines of the film, he is always 
already ‘out-forced’. Even the individual soldier he confronts is more personally ‘forceful’. He is better looking, 
more virile (he holds a standard issue assault rifle); he is charming and his Irish is better (i.e., he can speak it). 
The displacement of the indigenous speech act to the mouth of the agent of occupying power—who masters it, 
knows it better and returns it utterly neutralised—could have proven highly disturbing. However, Harkin 
chooses to play the scene as more reminiscent of comedic tropes of the Irishman who cannot speak his own 
language.
156
 The director’s sympathies are clearly with the girl who stands watching with no ‘language’ of her 
own (neither English nor Irish) and no opportunity to participate in the symbolic scene. ‘Hush-a-Bye, Baby’ is at 
least in part a comment on the appropriation of women’s bodies by the Roman Catholic church—hence 
Goretti’s failure to obtain an abortion—which is construed as parallel to, or in Harkin’s eyes, worse than, the 
appropriations of (mostly) men’s bodies by the punitive apparatus of the British state. In other words, it is 
through the lens of gender politics that the film is meant to be read, but readings against the grain are also 
possible and perhaps more compelling.  
For instance, what of the fact that Ciarán must cull his ‘Irish’ from the linguistic ruins? His pseudo-
language amounts to reified bits, fragments of logos and catchphrases. His is a second-degree borrowing – the 
first borrowers being the corporations, government institutions, and resistance organisations who use Irish 
‘phrases’ toward an appearance of ‘authenticity’. At this historical conjuncture, Ciarán’s access to a radically 
obsolescing language is indeed more or less confined to TV slogans, the occasional advert, and a less than 
rigorous night course. His instinct to bundle together these sclerotic shards and to use them would seem to be 
politically salient, but his colossal failure is indexed to the figure of the flíocha soldier. We might read the 
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person of the dashing soldier—who speaks the indigenous language better than the native—as a measure of the 
extent to which identity politics and related identarian commodities (Irish objects, slogans, collectables, phrases) 
are always-already accommodated to regimes of colonial capitalism. David Lloyd has written of ‘the apparent 
inevitability of the devolution of “authentic national culture” into kitsch. The commodification of certain styles 
and the mechanical reproduction of standardized forms of affect that have traditionally been the hallmarks of 
kitsch have their close counterparts in cultural nationalism’.157 Though assumed to have rebellious properties 
and thus wielded as weapons of resistance, these identity-markers are rather neutralised by that same market 
which gives them their raison d’etre, their demographic of consumers (the disaffected Irish), as well their power 
to materialise and circulate. In other words, they do not disrupt the workings of the market, but instead function 
as potential occasions for new consumption.  
The ability of colonial capital to contain if not eliminate the seemingly unincorporable excess of the 
Irish language is further evinced by the soldier’s complete indifference to what was once a battle-cry: Tiocfaidh 
ár lá. As opposed to the furore with which Máire Nic An Bhaird was met when she was thought to have uttered 
the phrase, Ciarán’s interrogator does not bat an eye. The scene is instructive because it depicts the way in 
which identarianism haunts all such post/colonial interchanges. The seductions of ‘identity’ threaten to swallow 
the politically wielded indigenous speech act into a behaviour more or less consistent with, rather than anathema 
to, the imperatives of Anglophone capital and the state.  
 
Teacht i Méadaíocht/ Rite of Passage
158
 
The second text is a bilingual poem, a semi-autobiographical work that relates a formative moment in 
the speaker’s childhood, set against a blighted urban landscape (West Belfast) with its petrol bombs and 
ubiquitous foreign soldiery. The rite of the title is not the likelier (but less interesting) Catholic sacrament, but 
rather the boy’s first confrontation with the British troops. Daydreaming on his way to school, he is interpellated 
by the patrolling officer. That is, he is partly mistaken for but also inaugurated as a fledgling republican. The 
young poet, Gearóid Mac Lochlainn, goes on to describe this initiation into the semi-adult street life of 
‘Troubles’- era Northern Ireland. As rites do, it marks a change of status from potency to actuality, from 
childhood to adolescence, adolescence being the demographic from which the majority of ‘Troubles’-makers 
will arise. The passage from a threat which is yet to take shape to a threat which is all but imminent, even at 
hand, is effectuated by the soldier’s hail. Althusser’s time of the toujours déjà takes on provocative dimensions 
here, because the young protagonist does not awaken one day a criminal having gone to sleep an innocent. But a 
rite is always staged at an arbitrary time in one’s development, usually at a certain age, because its meaning 
inheres in its ritual enactment alone and not from any correspondence with ‘reality’. We can only assume that 
the dawdling speaker has initiated a new dimension of threat to the soldiers on patrol in the form of his maturing 
person, simply by inhabiting his body and animating it (walking to school) on the tremulous streets of Belfast. 
What the poem captures then is the boy in the midst of assuming a social role which the presence of the soldiers 
prompts, permits and consolidates, and which happens in spite of his marked lack of interest in political 
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violence. (He dreams instead of a Bohemian writer’s life). In other words, the moment of his passage from 
unimpressive child to (proto-)terrorist does not exist. But for some reason which is not offered in the poem—
probably because unknowable to the speaker or to the soldier himself– today will be the day.  
Like Ciarán in ‘Hush-a-Bye, Baby’ the schoolboy has little Irish. He chastises himself for being 
underprepared for the spontaneous ritual in which he is suddenly embroiled. He thinks: ‘Classic resistance 
technique./ If only I’d listened harder in Irish class/I could even have refused to speak/ bloody English. Next 
time./  This wouldn’t be the last.’159 As Mac Lochlainn is himself a ‘member’ of the West Belfast Gaeltacht 
whose work thematises the disjunctive place of Irish in the Anglophone context of the post/colony, we can 
assume that he remedies this youthful error. And yet the poem communicates a level of resistance that more 
closely resembles sport than emerging political commitment. This has partly to do with the speaker’s youth and 
partly to do with the sheer jouissance of performing rebelliousness. However, his rebellion is undermined by his 
desire for the law and the identity it will confer. In that sense such unruliness has already been accounted for—
the protocols for dealing with it are already in place. (The soldier calls for backup, he becomes physically 
coercive, and so on). Judith Butler has written a provocative article on this desirousness for the law which 
makes the individual at the scene of interpellation willing to turn and accept the hail, a willingness which 
actually (necessarily) precedes the hail, and which prompts the individual to heed that hail as addressed to 
herself and none other.
160
 (Althusser invokes Moses’ peculiar, tautological phrase: I am that I am.161)  
  And yet the boy’s desire, while understandable, is clearly perverse. The predicates attaching to him in 
‘Troubles’ Belfast, circa the 1980’s, have distinctly negative connotations in terms of his future life prospects to 
the extent that they doom him in advance. Among them are class: he is from ‘a half-built housing estate’ (l.21); 
religion: he is a Catholic taught by ‘soutaned Brothers’ (l. 4); political background: he is steeped in republican 
lore, spelling his name with an ‘H as in H-Block’ (l. 60); de facto delinquency: his details are logged at the 
military base while he is yet ‘pimpled pubescent’, (l.1) and so on. He does not stand a chance. And yet for the 
boy, the scene of interpellation has the pull of the carnival: the English translation of the poem alludes variously 
to Jackie Chan (l. 35), Harry Houdini (l.87), spaghetti westerns (l. 62), and The Wizard of Oz (l. 90). There is a 
dimension of dramatic irony in that the boy remains good-humoured throughout the scene, even when it 
becomes heated, such as when the soldier shouts: ‘—Keep your fuckin’ ‘ands on the wall, Paddy!/’(l. 92). In 
other words, the speaker cannot fully appreciate the trajectory which has just been set in the way that the 
audience can. Better he remain an invisible child, an innocent, we might think. Except that he was always-
already ensnared in these patterns, even before he was born, and it would only be a matter of time before this 
latency emerged. 
 Irish may have the potential to derange the interpellative process, though this is clearly not the boy’s 
desire. Rather, he is interested in prolonging the conflict in order to further indulge his ‘bad subjectivity’ upon 
the British troops. This would be, moreover, a culturally sanctioned if not overtly encouraged activity amongst 
the boy’s support community. The problem lies in the fact that Althusser would say, in effect, that there is no 
‘bad subject’. He uses the phrase only once to refer to those individuals at the scene of interpellation who 
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‘provoke the intervention of one of the detachments of the (repressive) State apparatus’.162 That is, those who 
become momentarily unruly and require the bodily restraints that most people voluntarily self-impose. For 
Althusser, ‘bad subject’ is a kind of oxymoron: as long as one becomes a subject full stop, then being a ‘good 
one’ or a ‘bad one’ is ultimately beside the point.163 A good subject (working by itself, i.e, by ideology) or a bad 
subject (requiring the intervention of the RSA) is effectively indistinguishable from the vantage point of 
successful subjectivation, i.e., social reproduction.  
The pre-scripted quality of the scene and the inevitability of its future repetition, is shown in such lines 
as ‘Sin an chéad uair a stop saighdiúir mé/.’164 The poet’s English translation—(‘for it was my first time--/’)—
has a sexual hint, and this is in keeping with the seduction inherent in the scene of interpellation. Denise Riley 
has used the phrase ‘dulcet interpellation.’165 It seizes the boy on his way to school, arriving like a siren’s call: 
dulcet and impossible to resist. The poem acknowledges this desire (what Judith Butler has called the 
‘passionate attachment’ to the Law, or the complicitous ‘desire for the Law’)166, as the desire to be recognized 
by the authorities in one’s given social formation. Even if the identity on offer is saturated with misgiving, it is 
still preferable, it would seem, to not being recognized at all.  
A derogated personhood is personhood nevertheless. The eagerness to turn around and comply with the 
voice of authority can be explained by an anticipation of the promise of identity, which is not resisted because 
the alternative is literally unfathomable (though we approach something like this in the following text). Butler 
argues that the recompense of identity—being recognized within the social and symbolic order (of law and 
language)—is the great enticement to assujettissement that never fails. This goes some way toward explaining 
why the scene of interpellation, despite some foreboding, still has such magnetism for the boy. It is as if he has 
only to hear the beginning of the hail, the mere suggestion of the glottal fricative, and he has already ‘turned’. 
The boy uses Irish simply as a prop, a supplement to support his theatrical debut. And though Harkin and Mac 
Lochlainn’s texts gesture toward the use of indigenous language as a political resource, we will have to go 
further in order to envision a linguistic praxis.  
 
The Wind that Shakes the Barley
167
 
Whether or not Ken Loach’s 2006 Palme D’Or winning film, The Wind that Shakes the Barley, is an 
adequately ecumenical representation of the Irish War of Independence, whether or not it overstates the 
coherence or legitimacy of the Left at that time, is not of our concern.
 168
 Loach’s nefarious (read Marxist) 
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motives and his portrayal of the savagery of certain British troops in Ireland (namely the ‘Black and Tans’) has 
garnered considerable ire amongst the British media and Ireland’s revisionist historians. Early in the film, the 
Black and Tans demonstrate astonishing brutality when they beat the life out of the character, Mícheál, and such 
scenes are used against Ken Loach (who has never been a subtle film-maker) as proof of his gratuitousness and 
warped historical sensibility. Yet I would argue that the scene supplies us with an astute measure of the threat 
Mícheál introduces when he will neither produce a legible identity nor speak in English.   
Mícheál is an unusual kind of malcontent. He is not interested in language rights, in masculine 
strutting, or in the jouissance of rebellion. That Mícheál has altogether different objectives is communicated 
effectively by Loach from the beginning, and this gravity imbues the scene with a sense of impending 
catastrophe. Does Loach exaggerate the dangers or the stakes in rural Ireland during this time of upheaval? Yes 
and no: the handheld camera careers around and adds to the sense of chaos. Fragile old women and their 
daughters and granddaughters mill around the farmhouse yard, scared stiff by the soldiers who materialise as if 
from nowhere shouting obscenities and who, quite unprovoked, point rifles at their heads. Has Loach’s 
combination of the panic of the vulnerable juxtaposed with the seething blood-thirst of the special-forces 
manipulated the audience? Perhaps, though he also captures the inescapable reality of arbitrary brutalism during 
war. Moreover, as in the case of Máire Nic An Bhaird, spoken Irish is correctly configured as a problematic and 
disconcertingly opaque behaviour, a ‘disorderly conduct’, despite the fact that Nic An Bhaird did not own it as 
such.  
How does this (linguistic) disorder differ from the more predictable disorder of (terrorist) violence? 
David Lloyd draws on Walter Benjamin to answer this question, writing: ‘What the state fears . . . is an 
alternative system of legality or rationality, rather than the unbridled and formless motion of force which is yet 
to be subordinated’.169 Mícheál broaches a borderland beyond good and bad subjectivity. He overreaches his 
own animal ‘perseverance-in-being’—assuming a liminal condition that Badiou calls ‘disinterested 
interest’170—and this is sensed by the soldiers (quite rightly, I think) as inherently destabilising,  hence the 
escalation of tension unto a final act of savage violence.  
Of what does Mícheál’s ‘alternative rationality’ consist? Firstly, a note on what it is not. Seamus Deane 
characterises many anti-colonial nationalisms as akin to a collective declaration of ‘internal independence’. He 
writes, ‘As in the case of India, but also in keeping with many colonised territories, Ireland had claimed for 
itself a kind of internal independence predicated on a spirituality (‘National’, ‘Irish’, ‘Celtic’) that distinguished 
it from the oppressor British system and even, in some of its more overheated supporters, was said to distinguish 
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it from the rest of the world’.171 In other words, Irishness would be maintained on the inside, while other modern 
economic processes would continue unabated on the ‘outside’. This independent interior would function as a 
(rather piteous) recompense for the continuing destruction wrought on the ‘exterior’ by a ‘rationalising’ 
capitalist modernity. In fact Irish identity functions as a place-marker, an alibi, for those practices that would 
actually provide some sort of demonstratively Irish cultural difference, i.e., distinctive material practices, 
alternative regimes of ownership, and so on. Interpellation in this context then can be understood as a means to 
introject that which it seeks to recover. As Foucault wrote of confession, (a similar form of the demand for 
narrative), it is not a revelation of the interior and its recesses, but rather their constitution.
172
  
Subsequently, Mícheál makes no recourse to a spiritual interior. He does the opposite of brandish an 
independent Irish inside, since as Jean-Jacques Lecercle argues, ‘The effect of this process of interpellation is to 
create an inside, a psyche’.173 The ‘Irishness’ demonstrated by Mícheál is not an ethnic inner realm but a 
material practice he utilises because it has the power to disrupt other (oppressive) material practices. To put it 
another way, Mícheál, does not share the same illogical enthusiasm for the law as, for example, the boy-speaker 
in the previous text. Neither does he reject the specific identity which has been imposed upon him by 
colonialism (seditious, backward, ‘mick bastard’, and so on) in favour of another, because neither is it the case 
that he has a ‘truer’ identity hidden inside that colonialism has made recessive. It is the very idea of an interior 
identity more ‘real’ than external practices—i.e., of land tenure, communal holdings, affective networks and 
obligations, labour, play, and so on—that is itself the corrupt idea. It is as a series of acts against this idea that 
Mícheál’s behaviour must be read.  
The scene opens as the quasi-mercenary Black and Tans arrive at the farmhouse where a group of 
young men has just returned from playing a hurling match. As Gaelic games were banned at the time
174—they 
were thought to signify nationalist sympathies—the soldiers descend upon the site to reassert control: 
 
CAPTAIN: (shouting) How many times have you bastards, you mick bastards, been told? 
Defense of the Realm Act! All public meetings are banned and that includes your culchie little 
games. Do you understand? 
When the captain orders his men to ‘take the details’, it has little to do with information gathering. 
Rather as Althusser implies, there is a twofold function to the structure of the hail: firstly it requires the yes, I 
recognise my ‘self’ as the one being addressed, and secondly it requires the yes, I accept the terms by which I 
am hailed and the authority of the one who so addresses me. Or as Althusser puts it, it is a solicitation of assent 
along the lines of: ‘it really is true that it is so and not otherwise’.175 
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COMMANDER: I want names. I want addresses. I want an occupation. 
SOLDIER: (to first boy) Name! 
 FIRST BOY: Connor O’Sullivan. 
 COMMANDER: Louder! 
 FIRST BOY: Connor O’ Sullivan . . . Ballingeary . . . Ironmonger. 
 
 
Loach’s camera pans the line of ‘suspects’, i.e., insurgent sympathisers, actual volunteers, apolitical farmhands; 
it is almost beside the point. They stand arranged in front of the house in a kind of identity parade: 
 
 SOLDIER: (to second boy) Name! 
 SECOND BOY: Chris Riley. 
 COMMANDER: Louder! 
 SECOND BOY: Chris Riley. . . Rives Estate, by the crossroads . . . Farm Labourer. 
  COMMANDER: More like a prick. . . . Don’t grin at me, you bastard. 
 
The third young man responds to their questions, but he will only do so in Irish:   
 
SOLDIER: (to third boy) Name! 
 THIRD BOY: Mícheál Ó Súilleabháin. 
 
The commander is quick to intervene. The fourth boy, Damien, intervenes as well: 
 
COMMANDER: What’s that shite?! He doesn’t want riddles. He wants your name. In 
English. Tell him! 
 FOURTH BOY: (to Mícheál) Tell him! 
 COMMANDER: (to Damien) Shut the fuck up! 
 THIRD BOY: (in Irish) Is Gaeilge m’ainm. Mícheál Ó Súillebháin fós é. 
  COMMANDER: (to Mícheál) Bit of a comic, are we, boy? Do you see me laughing? 
 
A determinate refusal would more closely resemble a defiant muteness, an obscene gesture or perhaps an 
attempt at flight. Mícheál does not, strictly speaking, refuse. By speaking Irish, (already a fading  indigenous 
language by 1920), he calls forth a series of problems that from the perspective of colonial-capital would be 
better left consigned to the grave.
176
 To pronounce words in a near-dead language—moreover, to do so in 
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conditions of extreme infelicity—creates uncanny reverberations, in the sense that all ‘hauntings’ do. As restless 
ghosts more often than not bear witness to the unjustness of their own deaths, so too does spoken Irish announce 
the violence inherent to its own effacement. 
‘Bit of a comic, are we, boy?’, the commander says. His momentary miscalculation in the heat of the 
moment—he is trying to be funny—betrays the slippage, however slight, in the captain’s mastery over the 
course of events. Míchaél’s unexpected form of non-complicity has caused them all to lurch beyond the usual 
script. The perception of this flicker of unexpected fragility in the law prompts the commander to an over-
compensatory display, a reconsolidation of his own power. He shouts, ‘Well laugh at this. Strip off, the lot of 
you’.  
All of them immediately fumble with their clothes except Mícheál. The other boys peel off their layers 
and braces, exposing their undershirts, while Mícheál stands perfectly still. Damien, perhaps the older of the 
two, tells Mícheál to do it, to deliver his name, his identarian coordinates, into English. (In effect, he advises 
him to right the (linguistic) wrong and take off his clothes as a gesture of submission, otherwise he will surely 
die). Mícheál is impassive and what takes place next forms the crux of the scene. The others attempt to rescue 
Mícheál from the impending wrath of the soldiers by trying to answer the hail for him: ‘He lives with me. His 
name is Michael O’Sullivan’. But this is a strategy bound to fail. Only Mícheál himself can do it; only he can 
answer the hail. The efforts to ventriloquize him, his ‘self,’ his ‘I am that I am’ by the people who care for him 
indeed proves futile. Still, they feverishly repeat: ‘Michael O’Sullivan’.‘He’s seventeen years of age’. ‘He’s not 
involved in anything’. They are verbose, unrestrained, even extravagant in their use of English, as if to make up 
for the aberrance of Mícheál’s Irish. They are all ‘translating’ for him; translating him to the commander whose 
rage is palpable. The translations of him, of his Irish, come as gestures of spontaneous affection and protection 
from those who suspect what is coming. They (and surely Mícheál himself) have surmised the consequences of 
this act. Indeed the speed and reliability with which a transition is sparked from what was an ideological 
scenario (‘working all by itself’) to one working by pure force is remarkable. The tenor of the scene changes 
little but its operating procedure—the shift from implicit to overt violence—is almost instantly transmuted. As 
the rituals of ideology become insufficient, so does the commander invoke outright coercion. Mícheál is dragged 
into the shelter where he will be beaten to death, and the chorus of shouts is repetitive and even incantatory, 
issued forth as (verbal) talismanic protections that do Mícheál no good. Damien cups his hands so that his voice 
will carry: ‘He’s not involved in anything. Michael O’Sullivan is his name. He’s not involved in anything. 
Seventeen years of age. Micheal O’Sullivan. Seventeen years of age’. 
The critical charge against Loach is that he cheaply overstates the nastiness of the Black and Tans by 
suggesting they would kill a boy for refusing to speak in English. My contention is that on the contrary, in some 
very real sense the response is befitting of the threat—even Damien and the other boys are ‘threatened’ by 
Mícheál’s behaviour. While their protectiveness toward him is real, it is not entirely selfless, because Mícheál 
implicitly invites them to do the same thing. His behaviour throws up an instant contrast to their own ‘rational’ 
willingness to comply. Indeed the panic surrounding Mícheál’s acts, and the perceived need for excessive force, 
has less to do with what he individually does than the fact that those acts can easily be generalised. What if all 
the boys present suddenly became opaque in this way and unpredictable? What if they were to turn their potency 
into an actuality? Walter Benjamin had a special name for this radical potential of the relatively powerless—the 
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farm labourers, ironmongers, and so forth—a potential which requires only a spark to set off the conflagration, 
of which they are, and always had been, resolutely capable. He called it our ‘weak Messianic power’. 
The law cannot proceed without subjects. As Mícheál moves to cancel himself-as-subject, it causes a 
flash of violability, of destructibility, in the previously inviolable, indestructible, law. The scene suggests that 
Mícheál transgresses in a way that is outside the known bounds, and that this makes the transgression more 
egregious and more threatening than his membership in any band of militants. By answering only in Irish, 
Mícheál in effect calls into question the legitimacy of the social order whose agent has hailed him, pointing out 
the spuriousness of its presence, confronting power with ‘the situation of its enunciation’.177 By highlighting the 
situated nature of this particular enunciation of power, he points out its profound contingency and in its 
contingency, exposes its pretence to universality. Moreover, Mícheál embodies the notion that the violence to 
which they are being subjected is a result of (the English) language working a kind of social magic.
178
 It is only, 
his acts imply, an elaborate trick of language which has thus transformed thuggery into Law. 
His spoken Irish is not merely a negative behaviour. Its simple enunciation provokes a subjunctive 
space, subjunctive because it bears witness not to what is but rather what might have been, what theoretically 
might still be. What is only implicit in the previous texts and what becomes explicit through the person of 
Mícheál, is an invocation of counter-order. Mícheál’s counter-interpellation gestures toward, and metonymically 
comprises and belongs to, this counter-order. In speaking to the agents of British law in Irish Mícheál actually 
enacts the counter-order. He demonstrates that this counter-order needs only to be performed in order to bring it 
about and thereby cause the dominant order to falter. (Similarly, Benjamin writes of a ‘past charged with the 
time of the now [Jetztzeit]’ with which we may ‘make the continuum of history explode’.179) Temporal 
dislocation is made actual when Mícheál conjures a subjunctive space in which he and others like him would not 
have recognised the authority of English—not the English language, nor English common law, nor English 
agents of the State, and so on.  
As Mícheál introduces a possibility that did not exist before, (Ireland as never having been colonised), 
he retroactively inserts it as such. Žižek explains this ‘circle of changing the past’ with reference to Henri 
Bergson’s thought. He writes ‘Of course one cannot change the past reality/actuality, but what one can change is 
the virtual dimension of the past—when something radically New emerges it retroactively creates its own 
possibility, its own causes or conditions. A potentiality can be inserted into (or withdrawn from) past reality’.180 
For a split second and in a single (but potentially multiplicitous) incarnation, the counter-order is. Radically, 
unstoppably, it is. To be ‘blasted out of the continuum of history’ is described by Žižek in terms of the “futur 
antérieur:” [in which] overtaking oneself vis-a-vis the future, one acts now as if the future one wanted to bring 
about were already here’.181 This is precisely what Mícheál does. Perhaps the real tragedy is the fact that the 
others do not follow him as they might have. Benjamin lamented just such failures to act—those revolutionary 
possibilities which we have seized fumblingly, ineptly, or more so not at all. Loach characterises these historical 
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oscillations, charts these openings and subsequent closings of possibility as they arise and pass away, arise and 
pass away. 
 The narrative function of the scene to the film as a whole is to trigger Damien into joining the fight for 
independence. But in order to do this, Damien must actually turn against (Mícheál’s invocation of) ‘weak 
Messianic power’ and replace it with the more identifiable recourse to revenge. That is, he will join the struggle 
in order to avenge his friend’s grisly death—the principles of an abstract nationalism made ‘personal’. When the 
others say to him, What about Mícheál?, he responds matter of factly: ‘Mícheál died because he refused to give 
his name in English. Not much of a martyr, is it?’ This discursive closure apparently had to be performed; it is 
supplement to the physical one dispatched with Mícheál’s death. In the same way that Damien nominated him to 
the ‘Black and Tans’(‘His name is Micheal O’Sullivan; he’s seventeen years of age’), so does he impose on 
Mícheál post-mortem a narrative to replace the void where it should go. But it is decidedly not as a martyr, 
because it would be unthinkable that others should emulate him or aspire to repeat his actions. Damien absolves 
them all of the anxiety and burden of doing so, but so too has he foresworn the potential of which Benjamin so 
eloquently spoke.  
Žižek writes, ‘Once a legal order is installed, its contingent origins are erased. Once it is here, it was 
always already here, every story about its origins is now a myth, just like Swift’s story of the origins of 
language in Gulliver’s Travels: the result is already presupposed’.182 The beauty of the Irish language, and many 
an indigenous language in an Anglophone (Francophone, Lusophone, etc.) post-colony, is that it materially 
belies this notion of the state as springing from a misty eternality and instead marks it with a bloody date. 
Spoken Irish is a jagged, disjunctive refutation of this myth. Spoken Irish in unauthorised contexts recalls the 
fact that there were other life-worlds operating in the not so distant past, other successful ways of relating to 
property and people that had very little, if anything, to do with contemporary market relations. The impetus to 
speak it can thus remember and re-constitute those other social formations, while still maintaining the critical 
distance required to approach and remedy their inadequacies constructively.  
The first thing to do is to break with what Celia Britton has called the ‘language-identity equation’.183 
Thinking of the language as a means to bolster identity is the opposite of what I have proposed. Indigenous 
language needs to be used almost as a form of anti-identity, especially inasmuch as ‘identity’ has provided an 
ideological bulwark against radical change. This is ultimately the difference between the first texts (the ‘bad 
subjects’) and what Mícheál enacts in the final text, an anti-identarian, ‘subjective destitution’. Only Mícheál 
has produced the kind of alterity that ungrounds the soldiers and their edifice of unlimited authority; it unmakes 
them if only for an instant. Unlike land and labour power, which were turned to the exigencies of colonial 
capital, the Irish language was better eradicated and replaced by English, because it could not be made over as a 
functional resource (except perhaps as a pacifying identity-marker). This means not that it has remained in some 
kind of pristine state—that it is ‘pure’— but rather that it is immediately discordant with contemporary relations 
of production. In Loach’s scene, it is the persistence of Irish through the person of Mícheál which wrenches all 
of the actors (historical, literal) out of the forward march of (homogenous, empty) time and affords a 
Benjaminian reclamation of the past, in the interests of a renewed and ‘redeemed’ futurity.  
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3.  Toward a Semiotics of Capital: on Brian Friel’s Translations 
--‘An old linguist’s joke: What is a language? A dialect with an army’.184  
 
i. 
No pre-capitalist social formation ever existed in which clusters of agents abided with nothing at their 
disposal except for their own labour power. Just as no pre-capitalist social formation had managed to structure 
itself upon agglomerations of wealth that were, so to speak, self-augmenting. Yet ‘self-augmenting’ wealth 
requires aggregates of labourers with nothing but their labour power, and because they do not exist, they will 
have to be created. How is it possible to translate relational sites of land, community and language into the 
autonomous, embodied occasions of labour power, who come ‘voluntarily’ before the market to sell this labour 
power? The short answer is to expropriate the land, dismantle the community, and suppress the language—so 
that there will be no other choice. Marx writes of ‘those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and 
forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled onto the labour-market as free, unprotected and 
rightless proletarians. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil is the basis of 
the whole process’.185 We see the same process from Ireland to Kenya, from South Asia to the Caribbean islands 
and so on. Only by effacing the violence that went into their installation can such social relations proceed as if 
‘fair’, ‘equal’ and even mutually beneficial.  
 Capital employs the algorithm of exchange value in order to ‘translate’ the world. It succeeds in 
subsuming everything under this rubric by a production process that defines all objects in the social field in 
terms of socially necessary labour-time. (Marx describes how Aristotle could not see labour-time as the means 
by which to compare unlike things, because different types of labour had not yet become ‘homogenous’ in his 
time, and thus the problem of value remained a mystery).
186
 At the same time, labour-power itself is one 
commodity among others. What distinguishes labour—and so makes it the vehicle for rendering all goods 
commensurate—is the fact that its use value, upon consumption, occasions new exchange values. Such 
occasions require in turn a class that has the means of production at its disposal and so is in a position to realize 
those new exchange values, and so extract surplus value from the process as a whole. 
 And this process, though operating under highly specific constraints, knows no end. In that sense, 
capital as code begins to show itself as ‘structured like a language’, since language too is confined to specific 
conventions (langue) though it is, technically speaking, infinitely generative (parole). Deleuze and Guattari 
recall how Marx’s formula ‘M-C-M’ similarly ‘points to the position of a relation without limitation’. When 
introduced into places where it does not exist (i.e., pre-capitalist social formations) it has the devastating effects 
of destroying ‘the very basis of codes’: ‘The introduction of money as an equivalent . . . makes it possible to 
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begin and end with money, [and] therefore never to end at all’.187 The tension between use value and exchange 
value—like signs in a signifying chain—is due to its appearance as a differential relation, though neither exists 
prior to or apart from this (differential) relation itself. Labour-power as a commodity that discharges itself upon 
its consumption, but which generates new exchange values and thus new surplus values, is that which drives this 
machinery of the ‘never-ending’, this frenzied expanse of the code that destroys all other codes.    
 In capital’s outward trajectories, its criss-crossing of the globe, it appears to be ‘universal’ but this is 
simply because it never stops proliferating its code. In fact it points to a highly particular set of circumstances. 
The production of new exchange values and the universality of the commodity form can only take root in a 
historically specific context (which it then duplicates across the rest of the world). Above all it requires the 
presence of a class so stripped of resources that it has no means of maintenance beyond selling its labour-power. 
Capital succeeds in translating the world only when it makes this contingent context appear natural, universal—
and inevitable. And this it can do only when it manages to erase the legacy of violence that first engineered this 
context. As Marx implies, violence appears to dissipate in the staging of contractual exchange, the meeting of 
‘equals’, who are the capitalist with wages to offer and the labourer with his labour power to sell.   
In the peripheries, there must literally be no other way to survive. Clachans, or clans or ethnic groups, 
etc., cannot be allowed to maintain a culture based upon subsistence agriculture, because this dilutes the need 
for wages and thus considerably shrinks the available labour pool. This tension is apparent in David Lloyd’s 
description of the dismantling of rundale, a land-tenure system of communal holdings predominant in pre-
Famine Ireland: ‘The very vehemence of the desire to extirpate the clachan as the basis of “Irish contentment” 
indicates the extent to which it was recognised, even by its antagonists, as an all too viable and insistently 
contemporaneous alternative to capitalist social relations that were not yet themselves securely established’.188 If 
there were alternatives, the dismal and violent social relations of capital would likely be abandoned en masse, or 
as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, they would have been avoided in the first place. It is not that capitalist relations 
are unknown, they argue, outside their historical consolidation in the ‘West’. Rather they comprise the dark 
undercurrent, the corrosive potential—“the negative”—of all social formations,189 which as such signal utter 
annihilation: ‘In a sense, capitalism has haunted all forms of society, but it haunts them as their terrifying 
nightmare. . . . It cannot be said that previous formations did not foresee this Thing . . . that at all costs had to be 
prevented from rising’.190 
Capital feels varied and multiplicitous because it never ends—is everywhere, extends to all corners of 
the globe—but in fact it drastically narrows the universe it overcodes to a basic equilibrating matrix (A=A). 
Brian Friel shows this narrowing of the life-world into the equilibrating function of colonial-capital in his 
popular play, Translations, but it is an unwitting display, I will argue. That is, for Friel equilibration—i.e., 
translation—is as eternal as it is ultimately neutral. His characters, like the agents on the market who assume 
contractual obligations, come to each other at the point where ‘human equality has already acquired the fixity of 
a popular prejudice’ (Marx), and antagonism is subsumed beneath the guise of mutual need.  
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As Pierre Bourdieu reminds us, even the most ‘rigorously rationalised law is never anything more than 
an act of social magic which works’.191 What social magic is this, what elaborate conjuring trick, that adds a 
veneer not just of legitimacy, but more so inevitability to what is highly contrived, historically peculiar, and 
almost inconceivably violent? How does capital create aggregations of atomistic subjects who have nothing 
except their labour power and make it appear as if they had always been that way, as if they had emerged 
spontaneously in such a form? With what (linguistic) algorithm does it make its own violent translations seem 
benign and even desirable? Since not only do alternatives to the logic of capital cease to be liveable (no one can 
live without some species or configuration of wage-earning) but so do concepts of alternatives become almost 
impossible to articulate.  
Considering that language precedes me, that I am born into and ever immersed within it, and that it 
founds the parameters of my reality, it is reasonable to concur with Wittgenstein that ‘the limits of my language 
mean the limits of my world’.192 Hence language can never be of secondary or purely instrumental concern, 
because it is what the human animal consists of –not simply what it employs to certain ends. ‘The human animal 
is what it is because it literally constructed itself around language . . . .Not only are we human animals to the 
extent that we are linguistic animals; not only, that is, is the linguisticity of our being (the fact that the 
peculiarity of man is to talk) what differentiates us from non-human animals: “the environment of the human 
animal is language itself; the human animal is adapted to language, is made for and by language”’.193 In its 
collusion with the logic of the sign, capital itself attempts to become the environment of the human animal and 
to render anything else as unsignifiable, beyond signification. 
Once we understand how the logic of the sign informs the structure of colonial-capital, we will see 
more clearly how the capitalist mode of production functions as an inscribing, translating, equilibrating, 
overcoding machine—that is, as itself, a language. Hence Guattari’s concise account: ‘Capital is not an abstract 
category: it is a semiotic operator at the service of specific social formations’.194 Capital is obliged to translate 
and absorb that which eludes its logic, that which is [not yet] commensurable with its exigencies.
195
 But it is not 
a respectful or sensitive enterprise, it is an enterprise of ‘foreclosure’ and ‘abolition’.  
Capital arcs back upon itself, and through its hijacking of language encodes this process in its own 
terms such that it cannot help but appear natural, unavoidable, inevitable. Non-capitalism can appear as either 
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wretched and miserable, in dire need of the improvements of modernity, or it can appear as already harbouring 
the tendencies and logics of capitalism in germ. In effect, we can conceptualise either ugliness or basic 
similitude. Both of these responses are a projection of capital itself. They both express the vantage point of 
capital awaiting its own actualisation. Both suggest that colonial-capitalist modernity is required to overcome 
misery and to realise those desires that pre-exist and anticipate its coming. Reflection on the spread of capital 
from the ‘centre’ to the ‘peripheries’ is necessarily post festum, ‘after the feast,’ of plunder and of primitive 
accumulation. ‘Reflection,’ Marx writes, ‘begins post festum, and therefore with the results of the process of 
development ready to hand’.196  
This chapter is concerned with this power of capital to fix its own horizon as the horizon of ‘reality’ 
itself (and thus to either naturalise its violent genesis as accidental rather than essential, or better still, through its 
seizure of the linguistic field—to make its violence unpronounceable, inarticulable, and unavailable to memory). 
Thus when violence erupts, it appears, for example in Friel’s play, as peripheral, disconnected, and always off-
stage. The incursion of the British army at the play’s end is not understood as related to the over-coding taking 
place in the hedge-school room—the translation—but as its unfortunate, unforeseen opposite. In the first section 
of this chapter, I analyse the specifically linguistic aspects of capital’s movement of overwriting, a fundamental 
dimension of colonialism that has been neglected in post/colonial studies, but which has been noted elsewhere. 
For instance, Guattari uses the words ‘translatability’, ‘syntax’, ‘code’, and ‘semiotics’ all in regard to 
capitalism and speaks of ‘capitalist modes of writing’ and the ‘semiotic machine of capitalism’.197 Baudrillard 
also acknowledges the striking homologies between the workings of capital and the workings of language in his 
trilogy on the (metaphysical) confluence of political economy and semio-linguistics. He writes,  
 
It is because the structure of the sign is at the very heart of the commodity form that the 
commodity can take on, immediately, the effect of signification—not epiphenomenally, in 
excess of itself, as ‘message’ or connotation—but because its very form establishes it as a 
total medium, as a system of communication administering all social exchange. Like the sign-
form, the commodity is a code managing the exchange of values.  It makes little difference 
whether the contents of material production or the immaterial contents of significations are 





I also look at the presuppositions about the neutrality of translation in the Friel play, with the aim of 




Marx himself wrote on the substitutability of values in ways that Saussure would later use to speak 
about the sign.
199
 On the linguistic features of capital, Marx expounded at some length in the first volume of 
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Capital. Elaborated in remarkably proto-semiotic terms, he likens the commodity form to a chain of signifiers 
endlessly circulating by way of their total substitutability. Within the development of the capitalist mode of 
production, the ascension to the money form allows all commodities to become not merely exchangeable with 
other commodities in localised terms, but to achieve universal exchangeability with every other commodity in 
the chain, indeed with every possible commodity in every possible chain.
200
 Marx speaks of ‘an endless series of 
equations’ which becomes a ‘socially given fact in the shape of the prices of the commodities’.201 He goes on to 
say: ‘Price is the money-name of the labour objectified in a commodity. Hence the expression of the 
equivalence of a commodity with the quantity of money whose name is that commodity’s price is a 
tautology’.202  
Most linguists prior to Saussure would have supposed a correspondence between the ‘essence’ of an 
object and its appellation—or between the price of a commodity and its value, for that matter—a ‘suitability’ 
between referent and signifier, a natural connection because one ‘expresses’ the other. Saussure writes, ‘For 
some people a language, reduced to its essentials, is a nomenclature: a list of terms corresponding to a list of 
things. This conception is open to a number of objections. It assumes that ideas already exist independently of 
words. . . . Furthermore, it leads one to assume that the link between a name and a thing is something quite 
unproblematic, which is far from being the case’.203 This is analogous to Marx suggesting that the bourgeois 
economists assumed value was an a priori category that simply found itself actualised in various commodities 
and the prices they commanded, rather than that the concept of value itself was the effect (and not the cause) of 
a social system. Similarly, Saussure contends that meaning is not pre-formed, ‘out there’ or dwelling in objects, 
awaiting the appropriate designation that language exists in order to provide. Rather Saussure’s major 
contribution is in showing how ‘meaning’ is an effect of a langue, emerging through the relationality of signs 
and not prior to them. The meaning of a sign resides in the difference between itself and all the other signs in a 
system that it is not. Derrida remarks on the Saussurean thesis of ‘difference as the source of linguistic value’ by 
affirming: ‘By definition, difference is never in itself a sensible plentitude’.204 Value is highly context specific, it 
exists at the intersection of social relations, and hence is never intrinsic to an object itself. Only when the object 
is converted into an exchange value—and thus commensurable with all the other commodities in circulation—
does its value coalesce.  
Again Marx’s description is resonant. He writes, ‘The bodily form of the commodity becomes its value 
form. But, mark well, that this quid pro quo exists in the case of any commodity B, only when some other 
commodity A enters into a value relation with it, and then only within the limits of this relation. Since no 
commodity can stand in the relation of equivalent to itself, and thus turn its own bodily shape into the 
expression of its own value, every commodity is compelled to choose some other commodity for its 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Joshua Clover, ‘Value | Theory | Crisis’, PMLA, Vol. 127, No. 1 (January 2012), 109. Relative value and its 
associated forms are very much present in Marx’s Capital as well. 
200
 Baudrillard writes, ‘The entire strategy of the system lies in this hyperreality of floating values [. . .]. Value 
rules according to an ungraspable order: the generation of models, the indefinite chaining of simulation’. 
Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Sage 1993), 122. 
201
 Marx, Capital, 189. 
202
 Ibid., 196. 
203
Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in 
collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1983), 65. 
204
 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1998), 53. 
60 
 
equivalent’.205 Price does not name the intrinsic value of a commodity any more than a sign reflects an intrinsic 
meaning of a referent.  
In fact an object which is not circulating in the chain, which is unable to circulate for whatever 
reason—is defective, for example—is quite literally without value: value-less. When Friel opens his play, he 
surveys the disused farm implements, all of which are objects out of circulation (‘Around the room are broken 
and forgotten implements: a cart-wheel, some lobster-pots, farming tools, a battle of hay, a churn, etc’). The 
characters who inhabit the disused barn, either as makeshift hedge school or place of residence, would also 
appear to be ‘defective’ or broken. None of them ‘circulates’ on the market either, and it is difficult not to read 
this brokenness (Sarah is mute, Manus is lame, Jimmy Jack is practically autistic, Hugh is never sober, and so 
on) as already cast by a pall of worthlessness. Furthermore, Friel is not suggesting that there is some alternative 
value-structure at play which exists or could exist outside the logic of capital’s translations or even that it should 
exist. The most famous lines of Translations readily dispense with this idea and it is, after all, a play about 
equilibrations. On the ‘failure’ of the rural Irish-speaker to adjust to modernity—to become viable on the 
market—Hugh says ‘It can happen that a civilisation can be imprisoned in a linguistic contour which no longer 
matches the landscape of . . . fact.’206 It would seem the saturation of the linguistic field by the logic of 
equivalence and exchange has already been completed. 
Parole cannot meaningfully signify except within the social conventions of langue and neither can a 
commodity actualise its ‘value’ except through the prior institution of a general exchangeability (i.e., a capitalist 
mode of production). A value is calculated relative to all the other commodities in the chain of exchanges which 
it is not, in the same way that a sign derives ‘meaning’ only differentially or in a negative relation to all the other 
signs in the language: ‘The number of such possible expressions [of value] is limited only by the number of the 
different kinds of commodities distinct from it. The isolated expression of A’s value is thus transformed into the 
indefinitely expandable series of different simple expressions of that value’.207 The homology between 
economic value and linguistic value is striking; both issue from the diacritical relations that obtain between a set 
of free-floating terms: ‘Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term results 
solely from the simultaneous presence of the others’.208 Suitably enough, Saussure himself uses the term ‘value’ 
interchangeably with ‘meaning’. Just as Saussure argues that there is no preformed meaning residing in a sign 
which the word-name gleans and expresses but only a relational value, (‘Instead of pre-existing ideas then, we 
find . . . values emanating from the system’)209 so Marx writes, ‘The commodity never has this form [of 
exchange-value] when looked at in isolation, but only when it is in a value-relation or an exchange relation with 
a second commodity of a different kind’.210  
Marx described the ways in which the suffusion of the social field by this logic of general equivalence 
was such that objects came to appear as if they naturally expressed an intrinsic value that political economists 
merely gauged and ‘priced’ accordingly. Similarly linguists once assumed that meaning was the revelation of an 
inner content, already dwelling in a referent, requiring a ‘suitable’ name that would mark and do justice to this 
meaning. On this rather mystical, inherent comparability of one commodity (or sign) to another, Žižek writes,  
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‘A seems to relate to B as if, for B, to be an equivalent of A would not be a “reflexive determination” (Marx) of 
A—that is as if B would already in itself be the equivalent of A; the property of ‘being-an-equivalent’ appears to 
belong to it even outside its relation to A’.211  
‘Being-an-equivalent’ recalls Jean Laplanche’s ‘to-be-translated’.212 Friel’s play opens upon the to-be-
translated that is Ireland. It is as if the Irish and their place-names had always-already anticipated the being-an-
equivalent of their English replacements. It is as if they had been waiting all along for capital to come and 
actualise their (otherwise inexpressible?) value. But this is of course not what happens. 
The activity of translation projects an illusion of two languages (a target language and a matrix 
language) vacillating and negotiating on relatively equal footing (much of Friel’s play is given over to such 
scenes of mutual vacillating and negotiating). Yet in the context of the cultural translations of colonial 
capitalism, there is only one language engaged in the process of augmenting itself and enlarging its remit. As I 
have pointed out elsewhere in this dissertation, the English language is only accidentally coextensive with the 
code; it is not the code itself, though in this conjuncture, neither is it always or even often distinguishable from 
it. The colonial dream of absolute commutability comes to bear in Friel’s play, where even the representation of 
the Irish language has to be done in English and even the most ‘un-worldly’ persons are autonomous subjects in 
germ. Lines from the inhabitants of Ballybeg, such as ‘You’ll learn to decode us yet’ suggest the already given 
commensurability that the act of translation will express or activate. 
Quine has made the pertinent argument that an impression may be produced during translation in which 
the target language appears to be somehow more capacious, more subtle, better than the matrix language. That 
Irish is being translated into English, instead of vice versa, suggests a greater depth to English than Irish can 
apparently attain. But this is an illusion. As Quine reiterates, the target language does not have ‘a wider 
universe’. He writes, ‘One is tempted, as I said a little while back, to suppose that it [does]; but one is then 
wrong’. 213 Yet the illusion of a wider universe in the target language casts a corresponding smallness on the 
matrix language. This sense of diminution in the home language (Irish) and the semblance of universality 
brought on by the rapid multiplication of the code (Anglophone colonial-capital) can only work to reinforce 
repressive power relations.   
  Quine famously asserts the (im-) possibility of ‘radical translation’. He constructs a thought-
experiment, a scene in which a ‘native’ and a foreign linguist have an encounter. The ‘native’ points to what 
appears to the foreign linguist to be a rabbit and utters, ‘Gavagai’. Quine proceeds to show that what seems to be 
a simple matter of semantic equivalence (determinable by way of ostension) is not an adequate means of 
handling individuation, much less translation. Does the native mean ‘rabbit’ when she points, or does she mean 
‘undetached rabbit parts’, ‘rabbit stages’, or something else entirely? Quine’s point is simply that we cannot 
know, and neither can we assume correspondences based upon our own ‘cuttings’ up of the world, a thesis 
called the ‘indeterminacy of translation’ or the inscrutability of reference. (Moreover, it makes no sense to speak 
of knowing outside of the constellations of inter-subjective corroborations that make up a language.) Quine 
writes, ‘If a certain linguist finds his translation of a foreign language into English a success, he might thereby 
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affirm his maxim on the existence of “linguistic universals or traits of all languages”. But he would be wrong; 
the maxim is his own imposition, toward settling what is objectively indeterminate’.214 Such impositions are 
consistent with the sort of grafting of intelligibility upon the social field so characteristic of capital.  
  Impositions upon what is, in any event, objectively indeterminate, lead Guattari to refer to capital in the 
terms of linguistics, of forceable meaning-making. That is, above all else, it is the primary task of capital to 
translate: ‘All of [Capital’s] “mystery” lies in the fact that it is thus able to connect, within the same general 
system of equivalency, entities which at first sight seem radically heterogeneous. . . . The function [of Capital] is 
always ultimately. . . . to connect heterogeneous domains and asymmetrical potencies and powers’.215 It is why 
he designates Capital not merely an ‘abstract category’ but rather, ‘a semiotic operator.’216  Only in the capitalist 
mode of production, he explains, does a ‘general procedure of semiotization’ become autonomous.217 
When Quine argues that the referent is inscrutable, so does he suggest, alongside Baudrillard though 
with different emphases, that there is no referent (or as he famously writes, ‘There is nothing to scrute’).218 This 
is uniquely evident in the following scene in which Owen and Yolland translate (or rather phonetically 
anglicise) the otherwise uncoded and haphazard toponyms of rural Ireland. This scene portrays what Baudrillard 
argues about the primacy, indeed the exclusivity, of the play of signifiers alone—the signified or referent 
appearing as mere phantom or ‘satellite’.219 Consider the inscription of signifiers here and also the ideological 
investment in the display not only of ‘subject matter’220 (Quine) but also in the performance of sensitivity and 
accuracy:  
 
OWEN: Let’s get back to the job. Druim Dubh—what’s it called in the jury lists? (Consults texts) . 
. . Dramduff—wrong as usual. . . And it’s Drimdoo here. What’s it called in the registry? . . . 
Dramduffy! Nobody ever called it Dramduffy. Take your pick of those three. . . . Now every Dubh 
you’ve come across we’ve changed to Duff. So if we’re to be consistent, I suppose Druim Dubh 
has to become Dromduff. . . You can see the end of the ridge from where you’re standing. 
But D-r-u-m or D-r-o-m? Do you remember –which did we agree on for Druim Luachra? . . . We 
used D-r-o-m then. So we’ve got to call it D-r-o-m-d-u-f-f—alright?221  
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The brief mention of a referent (‘You can see the end of the ridge. . .’) does little to dispel the meta-linguisticism 
and sense of recursion that imbues this scene of the code imposing itself, almost as if the scribes were helpless 
to stop it from doing so. As Baudrillard postulates, ‘Signified (and referent) are only an effect of the signifier. . . 
. Neither is [there] an autonomous reality that either exchange value or the signifier would express or translate in 
their code. At bottom, they are only simulation models, produced by the play of exchange value and of 
signifiers’.222 In other words, it is not that there is an Irish reality that the code warps and misconstrues. The 
imposition of the code itself is the (violent) problem, not its ability or inability to render a ‘faithful’ translation. 
Another scene reflects a bit more awareness of arbitrary imposition (hence, ‘but somehow that’s neither fish nor 
flesh’), rather than the ‘fidelity’, of their choices:  
 
OWEN: What is it called in the church registry?   
YOLLAND: Let’s see . . . Banowen. 
OWEN: That’s wrong. The list of freeholders calls it Owenmore—that’s completely wrong: 
Owenmore’s the big river at the west end of the parish. And in the grand jury lists it called—
God!—Binhone!—wherever they got that. I suppose we could Anglicise it to Bunowen; but 
somehow that’s neither fish nor flesh. 
YOLLAND: I give up. 
 
The theatre scholar Lionel Pilkington argues appropriately that ‘The difference between languages in 
Translations is presented simply as a matter of signifiers’.223 He refers to the fact that the play is entirely in 
English, though the audience is made to understand that the inhabitants of Ballybeg are speaking in Irish. 
Pilkington argues that had the play been staged in both Irish and English, there would have been a greater sense 
of strain and discontinuity or at least difference between the languages. As it happens, however, the greater 
sense is on continuity than on rupture, that is, inevitability rather than violence. Friel makes himself rather an 
easy target for my arguments about the imposition of a self-validating code by staging the whole play about the 
loss of Irish in English, so I will not dwell on this dramatic choice, but only echo Edna Longley’s feeling that 
‘Friel’s clever device in Translations of making the audience believe that English is Irish may imply more 
irrevocable loss than he intended’.224 Pilkington makes the point that instances of supposed alterity, that is, the 
place-names that are going to be translated, are already translated from Irish: Baile Beag is already ‘Ballybeg’, 
Eóin is already ‘Owen’ and so forth. What alterity might have been posited is already diluted and domesticated 
before we have even begun. This lends the play an even more apologetic tone than it already bore, suggesting, in 
effect, that we are not so different after all. Pilkington writes,  
That Irish appears in the play exclusively in terms of place-names [which are already 
anglicised] and that spoken English represents the Irish vernacular conveys an impression that 
the two languages are semantically equivalent. Indeed, so successful is this technique that 
David Rabey’s recent survey of contemporary British and Irish political drama contends that 
Translations demonstrates the reassuring existence of an “all-encompassing understanding” 
between the two nations since it involves the audience in both Irish and English communities 
“by enabling them to understand the language of both, as does Owen.” Indeed, the Irish 
vernacular is strikingly absent. 
225
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The ‘reassuring’ illusion of unity spontaneously occurs in Translations—or the projected possibility of unity as 
the result of the overcoming of linguistic/cultural mis-understandings. But this possibility appears tenable only 
because there is just one language at play; there will indeed be a certain kind of ‘unity’ once capital successfully 
overcodes the whole of the ‘primitive socius’. Indeed, one of the ways in which capitalism accomplishes first 
‘inexorable growth’ and then the ‘closed perfection of a system’226 is as a language that overcodes all other 
languages. Capital as code translates the known and knowable world into its own idiom and renders unthinkable 
that which is not itself. By articulating the knowable as itself, it successfully projects the terms and bounds of its 
own violent perambulations as the speakable horizon. (This is why such quips as Fredric Jameson’s ring true: ‘It 
is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism’.) Capitalism comprises a 
meta-language in that it is ever speaking of itself in reference to itself. Its movement is both expansive and 
recursive; it combines a ceaseless spread with a specular reflexivity; entrenching itself as absolute reference 
point and as boundary-marker of the perceivable. Capitalism, as a global and globalising formation, can admit 
nothing else.
227
 It is obliged to asphyxiate everything which is not itself, that cannot be translated, or that 
confounds its equilibrating operations.  
In that sense, capital’s mode of operation and inscription can best be described as tautological. As 
Wittgenstein argued in the Tractatus, 'A tautology has no true conditions, since it is unconditionally true. 
Tautologies [thus] . . . lack sense'.
228
 Tautologies cannot be argued with, because they are always true. One can 
gain no foothold against tautologies, because tautologies can never be ‘untrue’: ‘A tautology is a form of 
thinking whose truth cannot be tested because it is always true'.
229
 And as Baudrillard emphasises, ‘Tautology is 
never innocent’.230 The code of capital produces a ‘gigantic tautology’ in which ‘It is always a question of the 
same magical copula, the equal sign in A=A’.231 The code becomes unassailable because it cannot be logically 
refuted. Once this logic is extended to the social formation generally, i.e. the social logic of universal 
equivalence—then there is, in effect, what Derrida calls cloture, closure, a rigorous circularity. The ‘naive 
anthropology’ of homo economicus produces not analyses but an ‘immense tautology’, according to Baudrillard, 
who writes, ‘“I buy this because I need it” is equivalent to the claim that fire burns because of its phlogistic 
essence’.232 Tautology already contains its conclusions within its premises. Arguably Brian Friel’s vision of 
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colonial change (with its conclusion of ‘inevitability’ already in its opening premise) is a dramatised version of 
this logic of tautology, or the social form of the general equivalent.  
Capital circumscribes. Circumscription must be taken literally to mean ‘marks out/ inscribes’ as well as 
encircles. A circle has no beginning and no end, it has no exit, its path is always-already marked and it always 
returns to itself. It and nothing else is its own limit. When Spivak speaks of ‘epistemic violence’ she renders it 
as a ‘circuit’.233 When Derrida seeks to describe the stranglehold of Western logocentrism, he refers to the 
‘metaphysical orb’.234 When it comes to the logic of the sign, Baudrillard writes, ‘The circle that legitimates the 
sign by the real and which founds the real by the sign is strictly vicious; but this circularity is the very secret of 
all metaphysical (ideological) operationality’.235 And finally Quine states, ‘What makes ontological questions 
meaningless when taken absolutely is not universality but circularity. A question of the form “What is an F?” 
can be answered only by recourse to a further term: “An F is a G.” The answer makes only relative sense: sense 
relative to the uncritical acceptance of “G”’.236   
As we know, the structure of the sign according to Saussure consists in the duality of a signifier and a 
signified—‘The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept [signified] and a sound-image 
[signifier]’.237 These dual terms, Saussure argues, ‘have the advantage of indicating the opposition that separates 
them from each other and from the whole [the sign] of which they are parts’.238 Emile Benveniste will criticise 
Saussure’s model and construct his own, making the operative separation that between the signifier and the 
referent rather than the signifier and signified. Baudrillard argues, however, that both the signified and the 
referent fulfil a similar ideological function, which is to create an illusionary place-holder for what is no more 
than the free play of signifiers. Though referent and signified seem to provide reassuring fixities for the 
otherwise disconcerting vacillations of the signifier, seem to ‘anchor’ or ‘ground’ the signifiers, for Baudrillard 
they are alibis, standing in so that the signifier is given freer reign to create whatever truth conditions it may 
require in order to endlessly reproduce itself. Referent (and signified) do not strictly speaking exist, but are 
projections of the logic of the sign. (‘It is the world such as it is seen and interpreted through the sign’).239 
Capitalism maintains the fiction of the referent and the signified, of which it need have only a passing 
acquaintance, at the same time that it effaces both in the interest of its own self-referential looping. It needs to 
maintain some link to the concrete because of its dependence on labour-power, that is, the conversion of use 
value into new exchange values. (Some have argued that this link between abstraction and concretization may 
become obsolete with the expansion of immaterial labour. For the purposes of colonial map-making, however, 
we can surmise the need to maintain an illusion of Irish referents or signifieds.) The referent/ signified entails 
enough plasticity to contain either anything or nothing. 
The possibility of ‘criticism or judgement’ is foreclosed by the ‘lack of sense’ available (Wittgenstein) 
in such tautological sequences as structure the code.
240
 In tautologies, truth content remains unverifiable 
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(tautology is always true because it asserts nothing other than itself). If there is a ‘reality’ to which it refers, it is 
only a reality-effect of the code. Such epistemological closure is precisely what capitalism relies upon to 
entrench its ‘stakes and interests’, to saturate the spectrum of the thinkable. If there are links to the concrete, 
they are insubstantial, ambiguous—even mirages. Capitalism, according to Baudrillard, creates conditions in 
which ‘the code no longer refers back to any subjective or objective “reality”, but to its own logic. The signifier 
becomes its own referent. . . . The sign no longer designates anything at all. It approaches in its truth its 
structural limit which is to refer back only to other signs. All reality then becomes the place of a semiurgical 
manipulation, of a structural simulation . . . .The code becomes the instance of absolute reference’.241  
We are left with an endless proliferation of code. The free play of signifiers (‘the simulation model’) 
has no internal imperative to self-limit; in fact, it has the opposite, which is to expand. When reality is an effect 
of the imposition of the sign, the ability to articulate alternatives becomes accordingly remote: ‘It is the very 
genius of political economy, a genius that makes it immune to traditional Marxist critiques, that the signs 
exchanged in communication have no referent. Capitalism detaches the signifier from the signified, making the 
signifier its own signified. . . . There is no referent against which to define a finitude of needs because the code 




The aptly named, Translations,
243
 chronicles the Anglicisation of the toponymic life-world of rural 
Irish speakers by way of the historical Ordnance Survey of Ireland. Set in 1833, it dramatises the interactions 
this exercise of empire provokes between the inhabitants of Ballybeg and the cartographer-soldiers who would 
‘rename’ them. The tensions in the play arise from the return of the prodigal son, Owen, who successful in 
Dublin, has come back to Ballybeg in the employ of the British army as a translator of Irish. His brother, Manus, 
has stayed behind. Manus’s unofficial fiancée falls in love with Yolland, the soldier who is hired to oversee the 
translations despite the fact that they cannot communicate (he only speaks English, she only speaks Irish). When 
Yolland disappears, probably at the hands of the fringe nationalist element, ‘the Donnelly twins’, the British 
army moves in to raze the town-land. Despite all this, the bulk of the play is given over to friendly, amicable 
linguistic negotiations in which both parties are interested in the ‘truth’ of Irish place-names, such that they may 
be ‘standardised [. . .] as accurately and as sensitively as possible’.244 The Irish-speakers of Ballybeg display 
either an enthusiasm for English (Maire, etc.) or a dignified resignation to its ‘inevitability’ (Hugh, Owen, etc.). 
Only Manus seems distrustful of English and what this overcoding will mean. 
    The specular pairing of Owen (the cosmopolitan indigene) and Yolland (the Hibernophile who seeks to 
learn Irish, called by Friel an ‘accidental soldier’) constitutes the play’s pivot. Within the character of Owen 
resides the cool intellectual pragmatism normally associated with the English, whereas the soldier Yolland 
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displays the sentimental romanticism to which the Irish are thought to be prone. One mouths the longings 
purportedly characteristic of the other and vice versa: ‘YOLLAND: Do you think I could live here? . . . It’s 
really heavenly. OWEN: For God’s sake! The first hot summer in fifty years and you think it’s Eden. Don’t be 
such a bloody romantic. You wouldn’t survive a mild winter here’. When Yolland expresses anxiety over the 
‘eviction of sorts’ in which he is engaged, Owen responds, ‘We’re making a six inch map of the country. Is 
there something sinister in that?’ Suzy Clarkson Holstein has argued that Owen’s pseudonym, or mistaken 
name, ‘Roland’, is an echo, almost a duplicate, of ‘Yolland’.245 Friel’s stage is the space upon which these 
supposed English and Irish cultural proclivities and tensions meet, mingle and cancel each other out. Clearly this 
liminal harmony is an expression of the ideal ‘fifth province’ of which the play is meant to be demonstrative.246 
That this mutuality and cultural equivalency falls apart (Yolland is abducted by the proto-IRA, and Owen’s 
‘neutrality’ falters when the army responds with a retaliatory invasion) is the result of an unfortunate error. The 
subtext is that but for these gratuitous misunderstandings, the fifth province would become a reality. But this too 
quickly overlooks the much more profound translations at work of which the historical loss of the Irish language 
is merely a symptom. That is, the play takes as a given that capitalist modernity is that which one, to use 
Spivak’s phrase, ‘cannot not want’.247 Though its effects are traumatic, it cannot not be wanted, and this already 
betrays something of the fundamentally tautological character of its logic.   
Spivak’s words are to some extent what Friel’s play allows us to analyse—that is, what appear to be a 
number of responses to capitalist modernity which are actually variations on the same response—i.e., the 
inevitability of the code. Shaun Richards and David Cairns argue, ‘Friel’s dramatic objective is then not to 
elegize that which has passed, but to evaluate the viability of responses to that inevitability’.248 Hugh, however 
forlornly, also uses that word: ‘Yes, [Irish] is a rich language, Lieutenant, full of the mythologies of fantasy and 
hope and self-deception—a syntax opulent with tomorrows. It is our response to mud cabins and a diet of 
potatoes; our only method of replying to . . . inevitabilities’.249  
  Translations depicts the fact that modernization has to some extent mangled the life-world of the rural 
Irish, but it also suggests that such mangled, ineffectual people could not hope to survive modernization. The 
world about to be subsumed at the opening of the play is feeble and ready for extinction; because it is feeble and 
ready for extinction, it will be thusly subsumed. Pilkington remarks on ‘the play’s forceful impression that the 
loss of the Irish language is a regrettable, but insuperable, necessity’.250 The signs are available for reading: the 
opening of the National School is on the horizon: (‘And every child from every house has to go all day, every 
day, summer or winter. That’s the law [. . .] And from the first day you go, you’ll not hear one word of Irish 
                                                          
245
 Suzy Clarkson Holstein, ‘Carrying Across into Silence: Brian Friel’s Translations’, The Journal of the 
Midwest Modern Language Association, Vol. 37, no. 2 (Autumn, 2004): 1-10. 
246
 Friel writes, ‘You can’t deposit fealty to a situation like the Northern situation that you don’t believe in. Then 
you look south of the border and that enterprise is in so many ways distasteful. . . . Someone has suggested, 
maybe it was Paulin suggested, that [Field Day Theatre Company] is a kind of an attempt to create a fifth 
province to which artistic and cultural loyalty can be offered’. ‘“The Man from God Knows Where”: an 
interview with Brian Friel by Fintan O’Toole’, In Dublin (28 October, 1982), 23. 
247
 Spivak uses this phrase in varying contexts throughout her body of work. See The Critique of Postcolonial 
Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UP, 1999), 84. 
248
 David Cairns and Shaun Richards, Writing Ireland: colonialism, nationalism and culture (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1988), 147. 
249
 Friel, Translations, 42. 
250
 Pilkington, ‘Language and Politics’, 298. 
68 
 
spoken. You’ll be taught to speak English and every subject will be taught through English’).251 The potato 
blight is also fast approaching: (‘They say that’s the way it snakes in, don’t they? First the smell; and then one 
morning the stalks are all black and limp’).252 The characters are maimed and without-a-future. Everyone is 
speaking effectively dead languages: ancient Greek, Latin, and Irish. As Richards and Cairn argue, the critics 
who accuse the author of a nationalist apologetics, effectively ‘ignor[e] the extent to which the play contains an 
auto-critique of such backward looks’.253 Indeed it is difficult to reconcile accusations of a stylised Gaelic idyll 
with the pitiable state of rural Ireland in Translations.  
‘Inevitability’ and ‘nostalgia’ only become really emergent or visible, on this side of a process already 
undergone. (We can speak perhaps of ‘tendencies’, even ‘probabilities’ but only a true inevitability after it has 
already been fulfilled as such. And nostalgia, of course, denotes a longing for that which has already passed 
away.) Now the subject position of this-side-of a global capitalism that goes unacknowledged produces the 
effect of galvanising the ‘tendency’ or ‘probability’ in retrospect and thus affirming a sense of ‘inevitability’. 
Friel circumscribed his possibilities accordingly when he announced the apolitical nature of his artistic 
undertaking. When Fintan O’Toole asked how likely ‘the power of art [was] to affect society’—especially a 
beleaguered society such as Northern Ireland—Friel replied, ‘You can’t suddenly say “To hell with all those 
middle-class fur coat people”—fuck them out we want the great unwashed. You’ve got to take the material you 
have. If you’re into agitprop or if you’re into political theatre or if you’re into street theatre—that’s their 
enterprise’.254   
From this side of a system of the ‘generalised exchange of signs’255 looking upon a partially coded 
formation, it can look ugly (i.e., delusional, withering, and over-due to pass). Or it can look essentially like a 
modified form of what we have now, suggesting that it had been practically the same all along. That with or 
without the ‘translations’, which only hasten the process, Ireland and other ‘peripheries’ would ‘naturally’ have 
migrated into a version of the current configuration on their own.  
Violence (or harbingers of violence, such as killed animals) erupts in the play, but it only arrives as a 
part of reported speech, hence it is doubly displaced from the main drama on-stage. This is a prankster’s 
violence which will escalate into the suspected murder of the soldier, Yolland, by the Donnelly twins. The only 
actual physical violence is indigenous violence. Though the British military threaten to move in and overwhelm, 
even raze, the town, this is merely a response to an act of indigenous violence, which albeit extreme is 
nevertheless seen as a justifiable response under the circumstances. Violence in Translations is removed—seen 
as peripheral or accidental to overcoding—and not as integral to it. 
Baudrillard argues that insurgency will come from the excess produced by the institution of the 
sign/commodity and not from any of its elements: ‘Any basis for a crucial interrogation of the sign must be 
situated from the perspective of what it expels and annihilates in its very institution, in the respective emergence 
and structural assignation of the signifier and the signified’. Yet as a remainder from the process of signification 
it cannot be ‘named except by allusion, by infraction’.256 And indeed, we encounter enigmatic traces of 
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insurgency, disaffection and loss throughout the play, though they are deflected to the textual perimeters and are 
only partially explained or treated. A child spits on a soldier. The violent Donnelly twins haunt the margins 
without ever appearing; they are simultaneously owned and disowned by the villagers. Two horses fall to their 
deaths. A baby is born, circulates without a name, and then dies. An old man with a grotesque facial growth 
accidentally drowns himself in ‘holy’ waters. The Famine is foreshadowed by the ‘sweet smell’ and the rotting 
stalks. These, it could be argued, gesture toward the phantasmatic remainder. Insurgent violence would appear 
to be the way in which persons who have a ‘non-marked’ place in the code (Irish peasants, for example, but any 
subaltern or marginal group)—those who are positioned at the ‘zero point’ of the code—would best position 
themselves to ‘oppose not simply an inequality in the code, but the code itself’.257 The difficulty with insurgent 
nationalism is that it may well find itself—it overwhelmingly does—in opposition to an inequality in the code 
rather than the code itself. Tautology and circularity only amplify the effect, indeed are responsible for, this 
consensus on the inevitability of overcoding. In other words, ‘the signifier is the sign that has become the sign of 
the sign’.258  
Manus is the only one who understands, perhaps, that violence does not call itself by name. He 
questions the necessity of a military installation, though he understands that cartography and taxation (even a 
supposedly improved code of taxation resulting from the maps) are not without violence, hence he says: 
 
MANUS: ‘What’s “incorrect” about the place-names we have here? 
OWEN: Nothing at all. They’re just going to be standardised.  
MANUS: You mean changed into English. 
OWEN: Where there’s ambiguity, they’ll be Anglicised.259   
 
Baudrillard writes, ‘The logic of ambivalence on the one hand, of difference on the other, are incompatible with 
the logic—sacred to economics [and linguistics]—of equivalence’.260 The multiplicity of meanings and names 
that the soldier and translator(s) must confront suggest a congenital Irish disorganisation rather than an 
alternative social configuration that is unaccustomed to the ‘terrorism of the sign’.261   
Glimpses of non-capitalist remainders do not cease to appear, but they are de-cathected and abrogated, 
made strange by their failure to conform to the reality principle of capital. The patriarch and school-master, 
Hugh, says, as though the real tragedy would be to persist in the Irish language rather than to see it obsolesce: ‘It 
is not the literal past, the ‘facts’ of history, that shape us, but images of the past embodied in language. . . we 
must never cease renewing those images; because once we do, we fossilise’.262 He ultimately agrees to teach 
Maire English.  
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Friel’s play projects a metaphysical reality that ‘holds still’ regardless of the language into which it is 
translated. On their successes, the soldier and the translator boast, respectively: ‘Each name a perfect equation 
with its roots’ and ‘A perfect congruence with its reality’. And when Manus points out that the British soldiers 
have mistaken his brother’s name Owen for Roland, Owen says: ‘Easy, man, easy. Owen—Roland—what the 
hell. It’s only a name. It’s the same me, isn’t it? Well, isn’t it?’ 263 Pilkington writes ‘The theory of language in 
Translations derives from George Steiner’s idea that language is inextricably related to an essential privacy. . . . 
That the Irish language in Translations appears only as place-names is not fortuitous, but is crucial to the play’s 
conception of identity as existing outside of language and social relations’.264 Despite the fact that as Baudrillard 
argues, ‘The very concept of the individual is the product of this general system of exchange’,265 the characters 
in Friel’s Translations are already autonomous agents, who self-regard as discrete units with discrete 
‘privacies,’ who speak of ‘hermetic’ ‘private cores’266 and ‘interpret[ing] between privacies’.267 Indeed, the play 
opens on the act of Sarah uttering her own name for the first time. An instance of self-performed baptism 
(‘I=I’),268 it is at the same time her entry into speech. Manus assists at her (self-) birth: ‘We’re doing very well. 
And we’re going to try it once more—just once more. Now—relax and breathe in . . . deep . . . and out . . . in . . . 
and out . . .’. She finally manages ‘My name is Sarah’ to which Manus responds, ‘Soon you’ll be telling me all 
the secrets that have been in that head of yours all these years’. The most fundamental of all tautologies is the 
metaphysical subject; it is no surprise then that Althusser located the basis of ideological interpellation in the 
strange words of Moses: I am that I am. 
In the character of Maire exist desires that are presumed to be (universal) general social desires: the 
desire for English, for a rationalised political economy, and a solvent place from which to express one’s 
individual proclivities. The suggestion is not that these desires are produced by the apparatus of modernity, but 
that they are realised and actualised in it. As might have been expected, these assertions emerge as purely 
tautological. We must learn English because it is necessary to learn English; Irish is outmoded because it is 
outmoded. Maire states 
 
We should all be learning to speak English. That’s what my mother says. That’s what I say. 
That’s what Dan O’Connell said last month in Ennis. He said the sooner we all learn to speak 
English the better [. . .]. I’m talking about the Liberator, Master, as you well know. And what 
he said was this: ‘The old language is a barrier to modern progress.’ He said that last month. 
And he’s right. I don’t want Greek. I don’t want Latin. I want English.269 
  
Ireland, and its inhabitants, it would seem, hardly need overcoding. It, and they, are already basically the same 
in the ‘periphery’ as their counterparts in the ‘centre’. As Scott Boltwood writes, ‘In short, by the time the 
English arrive to supplant the hedge school with their colonial education system, there is little difference 
between the two. The English intend to replace an Irish system that teaches the rudiments of geography and 
mathematics, while emphasizing the study of Classical literature, with an English system that teaches the 
rudiments of geography and mathematics, while emphasizing the study of Classical literature. Thus, Hugh 
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comes to accept the necessity to teach in English because he realises that only the language of instruction will 
change. Indeed, he states his belief that he will be able to run the national school as “[he has] run this hedge-
school for the past thirty-five years’.270 
iv. 
 
Language, in its Saussurean form, requires the same metaphysical appurtenance as the commodity, in 
order to secure meaning and value, respectively. This dream of a total commutability of all values and signs, the 
dream of a closed system from which nothing escapes (and that which inevitably does is ‘barred and negated’) is 
not only a particularly colonial articulation of the spread of capitalism but it requires a mooring in metaphysics. 
What is remarkable about the code of capitalism is that what would have been required originally as an 
unshiftable alibi, a metaphysical guarantee—i.e., ‘the face of God’—becomes unnecessary after the ubiquity of 
the social form of the general equivalent and the commodity is complete. It is enough for the code to refer back 
not to God, to value, or to the ‘transcendental signified’—it has become sufficient to refer back only to itself. 
Though it could be argued that these are all but variations on the same theme of (metaphysical) closure.  
 ‘The nostalgia for lost origins’—i.e, the metaphysical closure—is what we are in. Closure, tautology, 
circularity, the alibi of the signified and the referent, universal meaning unconfined by context, the 
imperturbability of the logic of the commodity and the sign—these are the ‘nostalgic’ yearnings in which all of 
Western philosophy and culture are tangled and which Derrida sought to expose and deconstruct.
271
 As Spivak 
writes in her introduction to the Grammatology,  
Derrida mentions the “cloture” of metaphysics. We must know that we are within the 
“cloture” of metaphysics, even as we attempt to undo it. It would be an historicist mistake to 
represent this “closure” of metaphysics as simply the temporal finishing-point of metaphysics. 
It is also the metaphysical desire to make the end coincide with the means, create an 
enclosure, make the definition coincide with the defined, the “father” with the “son”; within 
the logic of identity to balance the equation, close the circle. Our language reflects this desire. 
And so it is from within this language that we must attempt an “opening”.272 
 
When David Lloyd, for example, looks to the Irish past for glimpses of alternative ecologies or instructive 
flickers of a ‘non-capitalist’ life, he is not indulging in nostalgia. He is prying open the circle of inevitability and 
self-reference. As Derrida writes, ‘To exceed the metaphysical orb is an attempt to get out of the orbit’.273 When 
Deleuze speaks of the ligne de fuit, the line of flight or the line of escape, it is precisely this that he means. 
When ‘the exchangist conception finds it necessary to postulate a closed system, statistically closed’,274 then it is 
up to the militant to seek out and forge new openings and new lines of flight. But its results will be somewhat 
unforeseeable, the movement unguided and the path poorly lit. Baudrillard writes, ‘Of what is outside the sign, 
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of what is other than the sign, we can say nothing, really, except that it is ambivalent, that is, it is impossible to 
distinguish respective separated terms and to positivise them as such’.275 Somewhat similarly Derrida writes, 
‘What exceeds this closure is nothing: neither the presence of being, nor meaning, neither history nor 
philosophy; but another thing which has no name, which announces itself within the thought of this closure and 
guides our writing here’.276 
Without the imperative of a ceaseless extraction of surplus value, the code stops proliferating. David 
Lloyd writes, ‘Irish resistance, or at least indifference, to accumulation, to individualism and to any wage labour 
not obliged by the ever-present coercive force of the rent, was sustained by the space and the values of the 
clachan and represents not some endemic idleness but a profound attachment to a material and moral culture 
that capitalism negated’.277 A de-translation of the code is in some ways a reconstitution of a culture so 
dismembered. Translations is largely missing such inflections. Manus is perhaps the only character who bears 
these traits. He does not work for wages and shows interest in fiduciary matters only when Maire insists that a 
solid income is the price of her hand. Of Manus’s ‘worth’ Owen says to Yolland, ‘What salary? All he gets is 
the odd shilling Father throws his way—and that’s seldom enough. I got out in time, didn’t I?’ When Manus is 
offered a salary, a permanent position, a home and his own hedge-school to run in Inis Meadhon, he does not 
want it, will not turn up to accept the position. When it becomes clear that Manus is set on flight, Owen says, ‘I 
can give you money. I’m wealthy’, but Manus declines the offer. He may well be tracked down by the British 
army and killed, suspected as he is of murdering Yolland, though the likely culprits are the Donnelly twins. 
Manus, furthermore, is the only character in the play who is able to speak English but almost never does. Owen 
says: ‘Can’t you speak English in front of your man?’ to which Manus answers, ‘Why?’278 On behalf of the 
confused (monolingual) British soldier, Owen pleads, ‘Come on, man—speak in English.’ ‘For the benefit of the 
colonist?’ asks Manus. ‘He’s a decent man,’ Owen responds, to which Manus answers, ‘Aren’t they all at some 
level?’  
What happens to Manus is a mystery because he exits from the parameters of the text. He literally 
becomes non-narratable because he walks off its edge, so to speak. He neither means himself harm nor does he 
show strong signs of self-preservation. His motivation for flight is overdetermined and he offers no explanation. 
The audience does not know what will become of him or if he will survive. He is going nowhere and he has no 
money. His ‘story’ is cut abruptly and becomes unknowable. Yet so he has escaped the metaphysical orb of the 
play. He is no longer compelled by the imposition of the English language or the constraints of modern political 
economy. He is neither backward, nor modern – he is no longer condemned to either obsolescence or relevance. 
He subverts the colonial gaze in which he is either ugly or already English. The final mention of Manus comes 
in the form of Doalty’s imagined picture of him ‘limping along the coast’.279 Such is the melancholy image, 
somehow so appropriate, of Manus—his self-talk almost certainly as Gaeilge—tracing his line of flight, and 
‘limping along the coast.’ 
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4. Of Scatology and Eschatology in a Northern Irish Prison 
 
                ‘What might a politics be that does not stem from the will to realize an essence?’ 
--Jean-Luc Nancy280 
 
‘Il n’y a pas de grand Autre.’ 
   --Jacques Lacan281 
i. 
What is the Gaelic language in a thoroughly Anglophone post/colony—Ireland—if not excrescence, 
excess, a remainder? And what are we to make of the concerted use of the Irish language under conditions of 
extreme penal duress—indeed, of the re-appropriation of this obsolescent language, self-taught and phonetically 
shared with little concern for conventions or correctness, accompanied as it was by a grammatology of 
excrement? What of the confluence of Irish and shit in a complex and politically wielded cryptolect? Perhaps 
most remarkable of all is the persistent good humour—at times a borderline ecstasy282—consistently reported of 
those immersed in their putrescent state. And finally what is the legacy of this strange episode (there is no 
known precedent) in Irish history, this Dirty Protest, conducted increasingly as Gaeilge, if not a “lesson” in both 
radical political endeavor and the poetics of anti-imperialism?  
By April 1978, between 360 and 400 inmates at Long Kesh, a high-security correctional facility on the 
outskirts of Belfast, had begun to smear their own excrement on the walls of their prison-cells. Most commonly 
this tactic is seen as a means to an end—its severity an index of the threat the IRA inmates purportedly 
perceived in the Thatcherite government’s campaign to depoliticize the ‘Troubles’ and reclassify offenders as 
ordinary criminals rather than as prisoners of an anti-colonial war. The standard interpretation of the protest is 
that the prisoners sought to force Special Category status from the British state in recognition of their interstitial 
and politicized place. The brief tenure of ‘political status’, which some had carried in the Cages, would not be 
extended to those entering the newly-built H-Blocks. In less generous terms, the Dirty Protest is seen as 
testimony to British misrule, Irish animalism or both. Doomed in advance, it appears as a grotesque series of 
rites better left forgotten: an unsettling prologue to the main drama of 1981 Hunger Strikes.  
The Dirty Protest neither garnered widespread community support nor achieved its stated aims of the 
restoration of political status. It is considered an overwhelming failure, a failure from which the protesters 
would have to be delivered by the Hunger Strikes. Otherwise they risked remaining mired in the pointless and 
repugnant stasis of life in one’s own excrement. Against this interpretation, the following paper will argue that 
the Dirty Protest not only formulated but also managed to enact an alternative sociality, a sociality which would 
be attenuated, not realized, by the change in strategy toward hunger striking.
283
 The Hunger Strikes would 
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reintroduce a more mobilizing politics of representation and sympathy and thus lay the groundwork for the 
phenomenal rise of Sinn Féin. But I will argue that the efforts of the H-Block prisoners were not redeemed by 
the return to legibility that was the Hunger Strikes, but profoundly diminished. Instead of the usual silence or 
mortification, this paper will go some way toward elaborating an analysis of the semiotics of revolt and the 
accomplished sociality that arose in the scatological season of the H-Blocks. 
ii. 
Maud Ellmann has suggested—quite reasonably, but incorrectly, I will argue—that in order for a 
protest to cohere as such, it must have declared intentions. It must provide an accompanying text with which to 
decipher its motivations and desires, lest it risk a ‘failure of signification’ and thus presumably, a failure of the 
protest itself. Because the Dirty Protest lacked a decipherable explanation that was adequate to the actions 
themselves, so is it understood to be a failure. Nominally, the five demands supplied this text—the right to wear 
civilian clothes, to be exempted from prison labor, to assemble with other inmates, to regain remission time lost 
as a result of participation in the ‘Blanket’ and ‘No-Wash’ protests, and the right to visits, parcels and 
educational and recreational facilities
284—yet even the prisoners themselves were wont to regard it as a pretext 
rather than an explanation. The ‘real’ text is the fecal one, and collective writing is its protestant activity. In that 
sense, the protest and the ‘explanatory’ text are one and the same thing. But because the text is 
incomprehensible—it registers as a shock and an embarrassment to the British, Irish and Northern Irish 
establishments alike—so is it abortive, according to Ellmann’s thesis. Indeed, this is commonly how it is 
regarded. 
Even the author of the fecal text is undecidable, making the intentions even more elusive. The text 
began to proliferate throughout all the cells without having originated in any one. The inmates responded to 
increased brutality from the guards by refusing to leave their cells to use the toilets and showers, hence the ‘No-
Wash’ protest. In retaliation, the guards emptied the overflowing chamber pots onto the prisoners’ mattresses. 
When the prisoners threw their excrement out the windows, the warders boarded them up. The only way to keep 
the feces away from the bedding, or to keep it from accumulating in the corners, was to spread it on the walls. In 
the end, duration and community became more important than authorial intention. 
The fact remains that within the usual protocols of intelligibility, the Dirty Protest has no satisfactory 
explanation. Without a more suitable analytic framework, it will remain opaque. Once the ‘tactic’ had exceeded 
its novelty, how can we account for the fact that the prisoners persisted in such a state? The radical outstripping 
of the ends (political status) by the means (living in shit for periods between nine months and four years) 
indicates not that the protest was simply perverse, as some will argue, but that the struggle for (political) 
recognition has been the wrong interpretation all along. The Irish language and excrement combine in the H-
Blocks to produce a disordering of the accepted relationship between language and politics. The Dirty Protest 
operates at the level of a dis-integrated semiotics. It confuses the usual associations between signifier and 
signified by interrupting the structure of metaphor or substitution on which the sign is said to rely. That is, it 
excludes itself from a mechanics of representation thought to be ‘natural’ to both signs and politics. Politics 
represents the interests of the (absent) constituency, while signs ostensibly represent the (absent) referent. Yet 
                                                          
284 
Allen Feldman, Formations of Violence: the Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), 218. 
75 
 
the introduction of human excrement into the political arena constitutes the undoing of this paradigm. Shit as an 
‘untransposable unspeakable’285 breaks down the transmission function of language. Moreover, shit enables the 
use of the Irish language to encode sociality itself, not facilitate the transmission of a ‘message’ of sociality. By 
so collapsing deferral, it does not restore the fullness of presence, but simply discharges itself completely 
through its own performance. In other words, it enacts the thing it ‘describes’ until description is no longer 
necessary. Meaning is not hidden in the excremental text, awaiting interpretation. It resides in the production 
itself. The production and reproduction of the fecal text day by day and cell by cell—i.e., the commitment its 
adherents demonstrated to the repeated inscription of community across time—is the only ‘meaning’ available.  
To put it another way, the Dirty Protest privileged metamorphosis over metaphor, metamorphosis being 
the process through which ‘language is no longer representative’ but rather ‘tends toward its own limits, and 
becomes non-subjective’.286 It bears repeating that if the Dirty Protest did not mean anything, it was because it 
had no message to impart. Shit in the H-Blocks was not a metaphor; it did not stand for the objectionable state 
of Catholics in the North of Ireland. Nor did it symbolise the cloacal nature of militarised colonial-capitalism 
there. It sought a means to intervene in those fecal states, it did not seek to represent them. Furthermore, 
language in the H-Blocks was not used to articulate specific goals, as noted above, despite the rhetoric of the 
five demands. In fact, the Dirty Protest marked the abandonment of political language as a medium through 
which to ‘express’ discrete objectives at all and became instead a means to bring them about. The unique (anti-) 
semiotic system developed at Long Kesh must be thought of not as the symbolic means to transformation, but as 
the transformation itself. That there was no message, and that this did not abort the efficacy of the protest, contra 
Ellmann—if anything, it may have intensified it—can be summarised in reference to a problem Lacan detected 
in Freud’s theory of ‘acting out’.  
iii. 
Freud originally developed the concept of ‘acting out’ in order to describe a subject’s inability to re-
collect something traumatic—that is, to symbolize it in language. The ‘act’ of ‘acting out’ compensates for this 
failure, it is staged in the place of language and itself functions as an encrypted message,
287
 calling out to be 
interpreted. The operative feature of ‘acting out’ is that ‘it shows, it appeals to the gaze and calls for attention—
doubtless in a provocative way’.288 Showing, demanding that one be seen, is more or less guaranteed to be 
‘inducing, aggressive, and challenging’.289 Indeed, Ellmann highlights the theatrical aspects of the protests, 
arguing that they are calculated to bring ‘shame on their oppressors’,290 staged as they are for the eyes of 
Margaret Thatcher, though she ‘keeps them intransigently shut’.291 Analyses of the Dirty Protest employ just 
such a framework of disruption and attention-seeking. The smearing of dejecta—shit, urine, and in the case of 
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the women at Armagh, menstrual blood—on the walls of their prison-cells would seem an unmistakable 
instance of Freudian ‘showing’. ‘Acting out’ may even appear as a reversion to frustrated, pre-linguistic infancy 
and the antagonistic scene of toilet training. An ex-Prison Welfare Officer confirms this dynamic by invoking 
humiliation and the fraught childhood drama of the regulation of the orifices when recounting his time in the H-
blocks.
292
 The protest could even be seen as a severe form of petulance: though specialist sanitation crews 
scraped the excreta from the walls and chemically decontaminated them every ten days, the prisoners promptly 
re-soiled the clean cells. 
Begoña Aretxaga’s valuable ethnographic work makes similar recourse to a strategy of ‘showing’ when 
she suggests that the protesters chose excreta because of its capacity as a ‘primordial symbol’ to provoke intense 
disquiet. ‘Primordial symbols’ are those that make use of ‘physiological material of great psychological 
significance and that are elaborated in one form or another in all cultures’.293 Accordingly they may be deployed 
to achieve extremes of affective resonance. In other words, the prisoners sought to work at a level of affect and 
disturbance that simply could not be ignored (by the State), thereby proving an extremely effective means of 
‘showing’. The noxious stench and intense visibility of the fecal cell were impossible to avoid.  
Yet there is a marked tension, both irresolvable and unacknowledged, that runs throughout Aretxaga’s 
account, and which hints at the limits of the paradigm of ‘acting out’. The Dirty Protest creates an aporia, a deep 
contradiction between what cannot fail to be recognized (i.e., primordial symbols) and that which is totally 
unrecognizable (abiding for years in excrement). In accordance with the latter, Aretxaga writes, ‘This action . . . 
resonated with notions of savagery, irrationality, and madness’.294 So are these behaviours unrecognizable or do 
they, in their trans-cultural significance, demand to be recognized? Unable to answer this question, Aretxaga 
shifts from Long Kesh to the scene at Armagh, where the presence of blood incurs the additional frisson of 
sexual difference.
295
 Still she persists in the idea that the marginalized state of Catholics in Northern Ireland had 
created in the prisoners a fervid need to ‘figure’: ‘The claim to political status was so important to them 
precisely because it implied a deep existential recognition, the acknowledgement that one’s being-in-the-world 
mattered’. 296 If in fact the desire for this kind of spiritual clemency from the coloniser/Other ever existed, the 
prisoners had long since dispensed with it in the H-Blocks. Had the protests advanced from a deep desire to be 
recognized by the British state, then the protesters would always-already have failed miserably. This is because 
they would always-already have gone too far—that is, become unrecognizable—at that point where they tried 
most intently to force recognition. 
The Dirty Protest has generally been situated in terms of ‘acting out’, as a strange but nonetheless 
discernible piece of ‘dialogue’ between the Thatcher government and the inmates, a process of negotiation for 
better conditions, ones which reflect the distinction between political prisoners and so-called ODCs, or ordinary 
decent criminals, and so on. Lacan would object that ‘acting out’—no matter how violent or disruptive—is still 
a message for the Other, the Symbolic order of Language and Law. As a result, a politics of ‘acting out’, though 
consisting perhaps in undeniably rebellious or problematic behaviours, must still be confined to coordinates laid 
out by the Other. That the Other must be able to recognize these acts as ‘political’ (i.e., orderly demonstrations, 
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determinate ends with appropriate means, discrete objectives which language is there to express and negotiate, 
and so on) will accordingly narrow the scope of possibility. This is because a political ‘acting-out’ has to remain 
nominally legible if the big Other is to register and heed it. Though it may be encrypted, the expectation, 
conscious or no, is that it will be decoded. Hence Aretxaga calls feces both a weapon as well as ‘a symbol of 
utter rejection’. However if I symbolize that I reject you, I have not really rejected you, since I remain beholden 
to your reception of my symbolization: whether or not you ‘get it’, for example, and what you will do next. My 
symbol can always be misconstrued. Symbolization connotes exchange rather than extrication. Yet if I bypass 
the ‘symbolization’ and simply reject, my action is impervious—indifferent, even—to your correct or incorrect 
interpretation. ‘Acting out’ always involves a more or less direct communicative relationship to the big Other. 
What is more, it presumes the existence and integrity of the Other by the simple fact that one addresses it and 
seeks a more solid re-inscription there. ‘Acting out’ works to consolidate the Other since it ‘asks the Other for 
symbolic restitution’.297 Aretxaga argues explicitly that the Dirty Protesters are engaged in a desperate struggle 
for symbolic restitution, or as she puts it, ‘existential recognition’, from the British state.  
Lacan, conversely, introduces the notion of the ‘passage to the act’ to distinguish those acts which seek 
not to adjust the subject to the Symbolic order and thus reinforce the order itself, but which strive rather to 
undermine and negate it. Unlike ‘acting out’, the ‘passage to the act’ is not the ‘bearer of a ciphered message’.298 
Instead it forces a dissolution of that bond of dependence which would confine the political to a dialogic 
messaging with the Other and entails rather ‘an exit from the symbolic network’299 altogether. It is drastic and 
irrevocable. An unambiguous exit and dissolution are apparent in the Dirty Protest by way of a quick look at its 
basic units: there is the indigenous ‘non-language’, Irish; 300 there are naked bodies;301 and there is human 
excreta. These are deployed as the opposite of message carriers—that is as cryptolects—the primary function of 
which is to avoid detection. Cryptolect communities avoid symbolic restitution, they do not seek it.   
As Lacan makes clear, there is no big Other. The Other derives its consistency simply by way of the 
fact that we invest it with belief. The Other guarantees the meaning-to-come, is this guarantee, and we suppose 
that it does, in fact, know. The Dirty Protest worked by systematically annulling the big Other through a radical 
withdrawal of what sustains and upholds it (respect, belief, fear, etc.). The protesters did not presume that they 
could bring a case for recognition before a ‘neutral’ tribunal, because that tribunal does not exist. Neither could 
they negotiate with the British state to force better conditions within the prison or for that matter, outside it. 
Instead they reconciled themselves to the fact that this would neither be sufficient, nor even particularly 
desirable in the long run. They disentangled themselves from the Other rather than address it. The Dirty Protests 
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are the culmination of a collective realization that it is only by suspending the big Other—that is, exposing it as 
illusory and contingent, as non-existent—that alternative modes of sociality302 can finally begin to emerge.  
iv. 
From September 1976, convicted paramilitaries entering the H-Blocks would do so without political 
status. Imprisonment under political status had been characterised by ‘communal dwelling’ and a ‘prisoner of 
war psychology’.303 Inmates had been housed in Nissen huts, informally known as the ‘Cages’. Plainclothes had 
been worn, paramilitary hierarchy had been maintained, movement had been freer, and Gaeltacht (Irish-
speaking) wings had been established. Cage 11, in particular, was well known for its left-wing liberationist 
ethos. Unlike more traditional nationalisms, the accepted thinking was that Irish struggle was theoretically and 
concretely analogous to revolutionary undertakings in other parts of the colonized world. Political education 
classes in Cage 11 included readings by Frantz Fanon, Ché Guevara, George Jackson, Camilo Torres, and others 
who were guided by a commitment to ‘the downtrodden, the wretched, the forgotten’.304 Both Gerry Adams and 
Bobby Sands participated in a lecture series in Cage 11 entitled ‘Celtic Communism’, based on Marxist analyses 
of early indigenous social formations.
305
 
The Gardiner Report was commissioned in 1975 to investigate Special Category status, the relatively 
brief tenure of which had been a concession born of the international embarrassment of internment and ongoing 
torture in Northern Ireland. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Gardiner Report concluded that the granting of 
“political status” constituted a grievous error and had to be rescinded. Despite the lower recidivism rates 
associated with Cages-style incarceration, Gardiner maintained that communal dwelling encouraged political 
violence, ‘[inmates being] more likely to emerge with an increased commitment to terrorism than as reformed 
citizens’.306 The British state policy known as ‘Ulsterisation, Normalisation, Criminalisation’, would work in 
concert with the findings of the Gardiner Report to produce prisoners who were spatially separated and 
otherwise depoliticized. By interpellating political prisoners as criminals, guilty of individual deviance, the state 
officially negated membership in a politically engaged collective. As political status is one which presupposes 
collectivity, so is criminality imposed in order to recodify the prisoners as individually aberrant. Feldman argues 
that depoliticization corresponded with ‘extreme individualization’.307  
The profound isolation of the prisoner is the more intuitive modern disciplinary arrangement, though 
David Lloyd has shown that far from being a spontaneous strategy, isolation is both an historically conditioned 
response, refined over many generations of prison resistance and containment in British and Irish institutions, as 
well as an ideological project that can be located as far back as the reform movements of the mid-1800’s. The 
                                                          
302 
I borrow this phrase from David Lloyd; it is used throughout his oeuvre. 
303 
Feldman, Formations of Violence, 152. 
304 Padraig O’Malley, Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair (Boston, 
Beacon Press, 1990), 47. 
305 
David Beresford, Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Hunger Strike (New York, 1987), 42. He  
continues, ‘But it was an exciting group to be in, its members regularly cramming themselves, up to thirty at a 
time, into the small wooden “study hut” for lectures which usually turned into heated debating sessions. [Bobby 
Sands] read voraciously – his favourites including Frantz Fanon, Camilo Torres, Che Guevara, Amilcar Cabral, 
George Jackson and, of Irish writers, Connolly, Pearse, and Mellows—keeping a fast-growing pile of exercise 
books full of political analyses, quotations and notes’. Ten Men Dead, 43. 
306 
Lord Gardiner quoted in Tim Pat Coogan, On the Blanket: the Inside Story of the IRA Prisoners’ “Dirty” 
 Protest (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 73. 
307 
Feldman, Formations of Violence, 152. 
79 
 
prevailing wisdom at the time maintained that the prison sentence should not simply involve punishment but 
should also ‘facilitate the absorption of the well-intentioned convict into the labour market’, such that the 
rehabilitative penal process in its entirety would culminate in a personal shift from ‘anarchic association to the 
economic individual’.308  
The logic of individualisation at Long Kesh is duplicated in every possible register: spatially, by 
removing the inmates from huts to singular cells; visually, by encoding each individual body into a criminal’s 
uniform with a unique identifying number;
309
 coercively, (in the intense solitude of the humiliated body in pain) 
by gauntlet-style beatings and cavity/mirror searches; and ideologically, by erasing every means of recalling 
organization. The prison initiation discourse included pronouncements by the guards to the effect that there is no 
IRA and ‘Each one of youse is an individual’.310 A number of the disciplinary techniques in the H-Blocks would 
appear to be directly imported from the notorious Castlereagh detention facility, in which all remainders and 
reminders of sociality or organisation were almost ritually revoked. One detainee said of the interrogation 
process: ‘They’re trying to make you feel that people outside don’t want you – that you are not a member of an 
organisation, that you are a basic criminal, that you’re only out to do this for yourself’.311  
If it is axiomatic of penal institutions (and counter-insurgency operations) that the primary objective is 
to break the individual down, to splinter the personality or to smash the will, then the exact opposite is the case 
in the H-Blocks, where the aim is to combat collectivity.
312
 The denial of membership in a collective, the denial 
of even the existence of (an) organization, characterises this dynamic. The thematic refrain insists that there is 
no group and even if there were, they would not claim you. This, and the words ‘isolation’ and 
‘individualization’, recur throughout the oral histories. The individual—already neutralised by the 
architechtonics of power, humiliation, and isolation— is not threatening to the penal apparatus, whereas a 
concerted being-in-common of two, three, or four-hundred men may be. 
v. 
Aretxaga decries the ‘divestment of individual identity’ in the H-Blocks. But arguably it is the 
increasing willingness to divest of such boundaries that readies the prisoners not for an avowal of pre-existing 
identity—an avowal secured by the extension of additional rights, privileges, or recognitions to this identity—
but rather for acts that precipitate a state of affairs in which this identity (indeed, identity as such) no longer has 
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any currency. ‘Identity’ thinking is a classic example of ‘acting out’ because it seeks a better (more respectful, 
appropriate, equal) inscription in the Other. Within the context of late anti-colonial struggle in the North of 
Ireland, the discourse of Irish identity presents a problem in that it converges all too neatly with the requirement 
of post/colonial capital to produce an aggregation of autonomous subjects. The interests of the bounded, 
economic subject (and thus its relatively predictable behaviour, patterned as it is on self-maintenance and gain) 
are presupposed by the category itself. Identity facilitates the universal subject of capital, on condition that it is 
permitted to appear in ‘traditional dress’, so to speak. By the same token, the concept of an Irish identity may 
contain within it the potential content and traces with which to forge a being-in-common, but the form itself 
prevents this content from ever being realised. The being-in-common of Gaelic communalisms typified by such 
land tenure systems as rundale or clachan and the rich cultural formations that attended them were precisely that 
which had to be forcibly dismantled in order for capitalist rationalisation to take place.
313
 Identity is duplicitous, 
because it holds forth the promise of being-in-common while ensuring that it is never achievable. 
In order to explode the constraints of identity, it may first be necessary to exaggerate that identity as a 
means to achieve this being-in-common. Jean-Luc Nancy refers to being-in-common as the state of ‘no longer 
having . . . a substantial identity and sharing this . . . lack of identity’.314 Using a language brought back from the 
brink of extinction, then, the speaking of Irish-Gaelic performs a certain intensification of Irish identity in order 
to overcome it, that is, to make its structure of representation redundant. The addition of shit to indigenous 
language allows migration from the particularity of Irish nationalism into an assumption of what is not particular 
but general: the excremental position. Borrowing from Rancière, Žižek associates the ‘part of no part’—that part 
of the social order that does not count, hence ‘has no part’, but which remains essential to the functioning of the 
whole—with the so-called excremental position. He cites the realities of the Dalits in India, more commonly 
known as Untouchables, who by their handling of human waste also inhabit the social role of excrescence. Žižek 
maintains that the excremental position is the one which must be generalized as the vantage point of ‘infinite 
judgment’.315 It is the point where shit and universality merge in a radical politics. Otherwise, caste systems of 
all kinds will be endlessly perpetuated, in the sense that ‘so long as there are castes there will be out-castes’.316 
Just as certain rights or recognitions conferred upon the Dalit population would not change their systemic 
position as filth, neither would the concessions of the five demands change the position of filth that was the 
disaffected, working-class Catholic of 1970’s Northern Ireland. Bobby Sands appeared to have realized as much 
when he stated (in anticipation of his likely death): ‘It’s not about a suit of clothes or a food parcel. I’m dying to 
make sure that the struggle continues . . .  It had fuck all to do with the uniform. For anyone to believe I died for 
five demands is madness!’317  
The ‘passage to the act’ is disorienting to those outside of it because it does not adhere to the logic of 
the bounded subject. We assume that all behaviour will ultimately reveal its internal logic or implicit 
motivational structure, because that is how we come to ‘read’ it. Yet the Dirty Protesters would seem to be 
operating against their own immediate and even long-term prudential interests. (But so do they point out the 
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poverty of those interests so construed.) The journalists who visit Long Kesh linger over and describe in detail 
the contrast between the filthy wings and the conforming wings, so unfathomable are the depths of the 
difference. The conforming wings suggest as normal a life as is possible, a life not so different from that of the 
warders. Almost all the conforming prisoners are Protestant Loyalists. Guards and prisoners enjoy ‘congenial’ 
relations, often sharing ‘casual and non-political conversation’ about such topics of mutual interest as 
handicrafts and physical exercise. The facilities are considered ‘top-notch’ and the conforming wings are 
‘extremely neat and tidy’, with an abundance of what Lacan called poetically, ‘the goods that solicit us’, ‘the 
goods of the city, etc.’318 These goods—a bed with clean linens, writing and study materials, the paraphernalia 
of hobbies, Elvis posters, pin-ups, family photographs, novels and newspapers—are still available to the 
‘conforming’ prisoner. It is a wonder that the inhabitants of the filthy cells, meanwhile, do not either ‘crack up,’ 
says one visitor, or ‘come down with disease’. 319 The Dirty Protesters even look frightful: a journalist describes 
his impressions of the appearance of very young men who look very old, with long beards and long hair above 
the shocking whiteness of their naked skin. Their Gaelic is likened to shouts of ‘abuse and slogans’. It is a 
bestial regression being detailed.
 320
  
All they have to do, to paraphrase a commentator in the Guardian, is conform to prison rules, and they 
will immediately get back all the entertainments and basic comforts enjoyed by their conforming 
counterparts.
321
 That what Lacan called the ‘repose promised by the service of goods’ no longer has any allure is 
what confounds the observers. The service of goods cannot compete with the accomplished social cohesion of 
which immersion in the Irish language became a measure. Excerpts from the following oral history capture a 
portion of the productive and even ecstatic nature of the H-Blocks event (and, perhaps, the ‘passage to the act’). 
This inmate describes the first time he hears Irish shouted across the wing. The relayed information is 
simultaneously manifest and covert: ‘We were all sort of amazed: “That was good!” It was like a magician’s 
trick to get a message across from one wing to another. We got up and started shouting, “Talk some more!”’ As 
the impetus to self-educate increases, so does the corresponding desire to avoid English. ‘The more you heard 
the more incentive you had to learn it. There was something magic about listening to these guys waffling away 
with each other in a tongue that was once ours’. The acquisition of Irish does not just break the relentless tedium 
of prison life, but adds a dimension of hopeful progression, of ‘eschatology’ to the scatology. Every Irish word 
added to one’s repertoire becomes a step further through that passage (to the act) where the timorous dare not 
follow. More practically speaking the cryptolect obstructs the guards’ ability to intercept messages, since Irish 
has no ‘etymological inherence’ in English, making it doubly hard to decode.322  
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Added to, appended, and studied by each in turn, textual production in the cells creates immediate 
compendia of radical political knowledge: 
It was like a massive jigsaw puzzle. We were getting a piece of the puzzle now and again. 
You got another verb and the picture was starting to fill in. We were spending hours on it just 
writing everything on the walls. The men were using nothing but a piece of metal or a piece of 
lead to scrape on the wall. There were no textbooks; everything was just shouted out of the 
door. You always left a patch away from the shite on the wall for the Gaelic. . . . Everything 
else but that was covered with shite. 
 
Meanwhile, the wing shifts became occasion for the discharge of excessive violence upon non-
conforming prisoners by the frustrated guards. The specter of the wing shifts provoked a constant dread. 
Encountering foreign fecal material in the new cell—i.e., that which ‘belonged’ to others and that one had not 
yet grown accustomed to—was also a recurring trial. Yet the acquisition of new Irish appeared more than 
compensatory: 
You would get shifted into a new cell, and there was this massive amount of Gaelic on the 
wall. You got a whole new vocabulary that you didn’t have before. You were expanding your 
Gaelic every time you were moved. And you would add your Gaelic on the wall for the next 
guy who was getting all that combined. There was scéal (news) and whole stories written on 
the wall in Gaelic. Some cells were like a big book. You had nothing to read, no books or 
newspapers, no TV, you had all that time to sit at that wall trying to figure the Gaelic out. You 
would check with the rest of the wing, does anybody know what a word means. Before I knew 
it I was able to communicate, to waffle. 
  
The inmate describes the movement from confused bilingual code-switching to an increasing fluency in 
Irish and the corresponding disuse of English. Until this point, learning the Irish language had been considered 
an upper middle class intellectual pursuit. Through an appropriation of the language by the least, that is, the 
Northern Irish part-of-no-part, and its combination with an excremental (anti-)semiotics, we arrive at the 
remarkable place of an ‘Adamic’323 renaming of the world: ‘The cell door was no longer a door but a doiris 
[sic]. It was no longer a window but a fuinneorg [sic]. There were four guys . . . who were fluent Gaelic 
speakers in the whole prison at the start. And from those four guys it went out and out. Within two years 
everything that was said out the door was in Gaelic’.324 
The simple act of speaking the indigenous language in an ‘unauthorised context’ is already a strike 
against the Other. The language itself may be said to contain alternative social logics and a cultural store to 
which the Other has no point of entry. Even if we approach the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis with scepticism, the 
Irish language still erects an opacity that the Other is at pains to penetrate. Irish as well as excrement are 
cryptolectal because they simultaneously bind the group and block the violent incursions of the guards, if not 
from the physical body, at least from the oral, imaginative space of the lived community. Irish and excrement 
form an insurmountable barrier. Through the cryptolect, the community repulses the violent vectors of Law. It 
has historically been the out-law communities that deploy cryptolects in order to protect themselves from 
exogenous violence.  
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 ‘Acting out’ bears a ‘demonstrative accent’. 325 As a modality of showing, it requires the attention of 
the Other. The ‘passage to the act’, on the other hand, is not directed toward the Other but is performed in order 
to suture community, i.e., it is directed to the other inmates, who construct their own parameters of ‘meaning’. 
In the H-Blocks, excrement requires Irish in order to provide a ‘utopian vocation’326 and to protect against 
nihilism and despair. Irish, meanwhile, needs excrement in order to affect a rupture with the ‘decolonised’ 
present, that is, the eternal present of post/colonial capitalism. As a kind of vanishing mediator, the excremental 
coating protects and enables the fragile being-in-common. Likewise, the spoken Irish—pejoratively called ‘Jail-
talk’ after Gaeltacht—is a kind of shit. Even standard Irish is already the waste product of an almost complete 
Anglophone colonial-modernization. Its corrupted form in the H-Blocks compounds this ‘degradation’ still 
further: Jail-talk Irish is apparently unrecognisable even to speakers of Irish. Tim Pat Coogan, a largely 
sympathetic journalist, misunderstands the dialect and asks the guard if he can make out what the men are 
saying. The guard replies, ‘I don’t know, sir. They have an argot of their own’.327  
What remains of Irish in the present day Republic is harnessed, perhaps unavoidably, to largely 
ineffectual government sponsorship, in many ways a nuisance to be ‘funded’. For political and ideological 
reasons, it is even more marginalised in the North. Though only four of the hundreds of inmates at the start of 
the protests spoke it with any competence, it became critical to the sociality that crystallised in the H-Blocks.
328
 
In fact, more and more, it was English that became the ‘contaminant’, English which had to be sloughed off as 
so much waste. Shit and the ‘debased’ Irish dialect permit what might be thought of counter-intuitively as a 
‘purification’ of the Irish social body from the ravages of colonization. Feldman argues indeed that as a 
language of purification, Irish negates colonization. English, meanwhile, can more easily encourage its quiet 
perseverance.   
That a radical inversion of this kind, a reversal, takes place in the H-Blocks is unmistakable. Despite 
financial incentives and leave allowances, the guards on the wings experienced ‘extremely high’ rates of marital 
breakdown.
329
 Their own ‘promise of repose’ became tainted by their daily proximity to the protests. Female 
guards at Armagh were reported to have spent more time and elaboration on their hair and make-up as if to 
shore up their personal boundaries and avoid their own fall into a fecal abyss. Defilement, moreover, continued 
outside the confines of the prison. The smell lingered on the clothing, skin, and hair of the guards which they 
then took home to their families. After a twelve hour shift, it could take upwards of four hours for the smell to 
leave the uniform and body, though they had to return twelve hours later. The protesters began to see the guards 
as their uncanny and symbiotic doubles, since their lives resembled the inmates’ in striking ways. Both spent 
their waking hours in the spaces of the H-Blocks, separated only by cell doors. The guards were there when the 
protesters woke and they were there to close the wings at night. The primary difference, according to one 
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inmate, was that the guards went home to sleep while the prisoners did not. One said, ‘I used to wonder what did 
they spend the money on. By the time they get home, there’s no pub, there’s no craic, just straight to bed’.330 
Furthermore, the guards had no totality they were working toward, no continuity to ameliorate the 
horror, as the inmates did. The ex-Welfare Officer said of the guards, ‘They didn’t understand it. They didn’t 
understand the group solidarity; they didn’t understand the culture, the Gaelic. They didn’t understand how 
group morale could be kept so high. They couldn’t understand the conviction’. As if in a kind of mockery, the 
relationships appeared to be stronger and more fulfilling amongst the prisoners than those in the deteriorating 
personal lives of the guards: ‘Some of the relationships of the men who shared cells together were closer than 
what they [the guards] had seen in their own marriages. There was very close bonding through the suffering, and 
the prison officer didn’t understand it. I personally saw the merging of entire personalities based on that 
sharing’.331 The inmate had to choose between being-in-common and the repose of the service of goods. In the 
H-Blocks, they were mutually exclusive, yet in important respects, they came to appear as mutually exclusive on 
the ‘outside’ as well. In other words, it became better to live as a prisoner in eschatology and community, than 
as a ‘free’ individual in neither. 
The normative attention to self—to its care, its projects and its ego-consolidations—would prove too 
costly in the H-Blocks, hence:  
We found the thing by what one does, everybody does. If one’s getting beat, we were all 
getting beat. If somebody smashed a cup in the cell accidentally, that meant that the screws 
would knock his bollocks in, as an excuse if he asked for a new cup. If somebody broke a cup 
the OC would say, ‘Right, everybody smash the cups!’ Everybody smashed the cups. He 





As Jean-Luc Nancy argues, community never was, meaning it is not a lost state that can be 
recaptured.
333
 Community in the H-Blocks was enacted repeatedly, almost ritually, at the intersection of the Irish 
(Gaelic) speech act and the scatological inscription. These complex performatives were saturated by the use of 
Irish, the linguistic community preparing for, prefiguring, and finally enacting the political community.
334
 The 
Dirty Protesters developed—out of ruins, the refuse of their own historically besieged state, out of their own 
extreme vulnerability—a different language game, one constructed with and through literal excrescence. These 
strata of the inassimilable are the rubble of capitalist-modernity: the Irish language; the volatile, (violent) body 
of the ‘criminal’; its modes of non-compliance and its waste products; and finally, the structures of deep 
sociality and oral culture. 
Despite the notorious brutality of H-Blocks discipline, a former inmate can still say: ‘The spirit is 
fantastic. The lads are very good to each other. I only remember one fight between two of the lads. You are all 
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in there because you want to be there’.335 And while there is undoubtedly grave suffering, there is also the 
consistent reportage of high morale, even cheerfulness
336—an affirmation of being-in-common even at the 
collective precipice of death. The ‘passage to the act’ confirms that ‘exiting’ is the only tolerable option. It is 
why Allen Feldman can designate the protest—without irony, because while it is not wholly literal, neither is it 
figurative—a kind of ‘prison break’. The Dirty Protest amounts to a distancing from ‘instrumental political 
action’ in order to replace it with a ‘systematic cognitive and cultural otherness’.337 Feldman reiterates the idea 
that the prisoners indeed began to ‘leave’ the prison. 
Perhaps most importantly, the inmates conducted their protests in the manner of the as if. They 
behaved as if the Gaeltacht were not in ruins, as if their indigenous social fabric were not in tatters, as if native 
oral culture (of history, story, and song) were still the locus of social life; in other words, as if colonialism had 
not shattered the life-world. In so doing—if only briefly, and in the most fragile of circumstances—they brought 
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5. “Even the Dead will not be Safe”: Famine, Hunger, and Messianic Weakness in the H-Blocks 
 
‘What issues from the empty mouth? What speech follows the horrors of 
famine? What mourning can work through the memory of mass 
destruction?’  
 
--David Lloyd, ‘The Memory of Hunger’338 
   
 
‘The question of remembrance itself requires careful thought. Are we 
aware of what we are remembering?  
 
--Christine Kinealy, ‘The Great Irish 
     Famine—A Dangerous Memory?’ 339 
 
 
‘Of course, it is impossible to share another person’s hunger, just as it is 
impossible to share another person’s pain, and both sensations demonstrate 
the savage loneliness of bodily experience. Nevertheless, to formulate 
these feelings even to oneself is necessarily to call upon the common 
tongue and thus to reinvoke the sufferings of others.’ 
 
     --Maud Ellmann, ‘The Hunger Artists’340 
 
i. 
When the fungus, Phytophthora infestans, reached Ireland in 1845 and infected the potato crop, it 
would incur devastation beyond all measure. The population was composed mainly of the rural poor; the potato 
was literally their only foodstuff. The root was highly nutritious and easy to grow on the most marginalised 
land. The Irish peasantry consumed between seven and fifteen pounds of potatoes per person per day.
341
 Though 
the ecological culture of the potato proved resourceful, both encouraging and sustaining an abundant population, 
the fact remained that centuries of colonisation and dispossession had entrenched the Irish poor in a deeply 
precarious situation. Resurgence of the blight and the destruction of the potato crop would occur throughout the 
mid-century years, turning the sole food source into inedible lumps of black, foul-smelling waste. Wide-scale 
catastrophe followed quickly. The starving left their homes to scour the countryside in search of digestible 
nutrition. The many accounts of corpses scattered across the fields and roadsides attest to this unceasing 
movement: ‘It seems they all fell dead out of their standing and the dogs eating at them’.342  
Many died alone in this way, as the blight savaged the social fabric of the clachan. Those left behind 
were too weak to bury their dead. The sheer proportion of dead and starving (about one million) to the living 
meant the latter encountered the former at virtually every turn. The intermingling of live bodies and dead ones 
evoked the most disturbing tableaux, as the proper spaces of the dead became confused with those of the living, 
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such as the baby who suckled the mother’s breast even though the mother was already dead,343 or the couple 
who lay on the cottage floor between their dead parents and dead children, ‘nibbling grain from a sheaf of oats’, 





 changes everything. It wastes the bodies and it erases the language. It scatters the 
population and dissolves what is left of social ties. The truncated and broadly ineffectual relief efforts of the 
British government were hampered by both laissez faire economic philosophy and a racialised distrust of the 
Irish. There was not only a lack of incentive to intervene decisively in the crisis, but also perceived benefits to 
be had from avoiding action. The winnowing of a superfluous population would allow long-sought-after 
modernisations to take place, such as the conversion of patchwork, uneconomic smallholdings into consolidated, 
large-scale pasture land. What relief was offered tended to hasten mortality rather than alleviate it: public works 
projects, for example, provided relief in exchange for hard labour. But most relief recipients were already too 




In many ways, the Famine corpse (‘emaciated . . . partly green from eating docks and nettles and partly 
blue from the cholera and dysentery’347) is a condensed signifier for the violent convulsions of the peripheries as 
they incorporated into the global market by colonial-capitalism. The Famine, indeed, constituted the apotheosis 
of the spread and enforcement of that historically unique system of exchange entitlements, in which it becomes 
possible to say, not that there is no food, but simply that you cannot have any. Contemporary commentators 
have remarked on the large amounts of food still leaving Ireland for export to British markets during the Famine 
years, often escorted under militarised guard. It is suggested that the word ‘starvation’ or An Gorta Mór would 
be a more appropriate designation than ‘famine’ since famine connotes a dearth of food. But Amartya Sen 
suggests that this is always the case: famine means food is available, just not for those without adequate 
exchange entitlements.
348
 The Famine entails the ravages of the logic of capital accelerated and compounded, as 
through a time-lapse camera. If there is no more revealing reflection of the structural relationship between 
colonialism and capitalism than the Famine, then, again, there is no more apt signifier for the convergence of 
instrumental political economy and racial antipathy than the starving Irish body. Likewise, as Allen Feldman has 
argued, there is no more ‘eloquent demonstration’ than the corpse of the Hunger Striker of the ‘condition and 
image of the human body infested with the state apparatus’.349     
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If, as David Lloyd notes, the Famine is first and foremost a colonial (capitalist) catastrophe,
350
 then I 
will argue that the 1981 Hunger Strikes, through the fiercely anti-imperial discourse in which they were 
embedded, should be read as a ‘repetition’ of the Famine. That is, the Hunger Strikes emerge as its evocative 
restaging, as a (concentrated) political gestus meant not simply to remember or memorialise the Famine dead, 
but in Walter Benjamin’s sense, to redeem them. A bio-politics of memory can find no purer actualisation than 
corporeal repetition in the service of revolutionary redress. It will be pointed out right away, however, that the 
Strikers themselves made no explicit claim to bearing the Famine dead in mind. Yet I would argue that they 
need not have been conscious of the repetitive quality of their acts, of their mimetic or repetitive structure, for 
the ordering principles of a Benjaminian ethos to have prevailed in the H-Blocks. Freud would say that it could 
not have been otherwise. A new sort of ‘melancholy’ politics was underway in the H-Blocks—an anti-imperial 
politics of affect, recuperation, and being-in-common. This was already clear to the inmates as well as the 
Republican leadership, who met it with suspicion and trepidation, even if none of them could have so named it. 
The usual concerns and strategies of IRA nationalism were dislodged and reformulated in the H-Blocks in 
accord with a greater radicalism and an increased awareness of the similitude of all the ‘wretched of the earth’, 
irrespective of geography or era.  
ii. 
In his early career, Freud distinguished between melancholy and mourning. He viewed melancholy as a 
hobbled state that inhibited mourning, a pathological disposition wherein the patient could not adapt to the 
suffered loss and move on. Mourning, meanwhile, was that process of adjustment through which the patient 
came to accept death or catastrophe, and with time, to recover from trauma. The melancholic cannot accept 
things as they are; it is she who fails, for whatever reason, to lay the violence and shock of the past to rest. We 
may know the melancholic by her so-called ‘compulsion to repeat’. Freud argued that for the melancholic, the 
loss had been withdrawn from consciousness, as opposed to the one who mourned, for whom ‘no aspect of the 
loss is unconscious’. In fact this unnameable quality of loss—the indeterminacy of its parameters, its 
unknowability—contributed to the urgency with which it persisted and drove the compulsion to repeat. Being 
unable to directly acknowledge what has been lost accords with what Marcia Cavell deems the tendency of the 
melancholic to ‘make a ghost of the lost object’ and preserve it by ‘repetitively acting out its return’.351 She 
states, ‘While the one who has mourned is free to find a new and genuinely gratifying love, the melancholic is 
condemned to a form of passive repetition’.352  
This delineation between melancholy and mourning at the psychic level corresponds to similar 
responses to trauma at the socio-cultural level. The Irish Republic, for example, has officially mourned the 
Famine and gone on to literally more productive national pursuits. As an entity, it has ‘freed’ itself to move on 
to more genuine and ‘gratifying’ exploits rather than remain transfixed in the past. We might recall Brian Friel’s 
famous injunction from Translations: ‘It is not the literal past, the ‘facts’ of history, that shape us, but images of 
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the past embodied in language. . . we must never cease renewing those images; because once we do, we 
fossilise.’ To ‘fossilise’, to fail to look ahead, is tantamount to being ‘condemned to a form of passive 
repetition.’ The perceived necessity to move on, moreover, is more than a little impelled by economic 
exigencies. Melancholic attachments obstruct the production demands of a modernising economy. The example 
of official mourning which best captures these implicit contradictions is the elevation of the largely obsolescent 
Irish language to the position of ‘first official language’, despite the fact that almost no-one speaks it.  
The connection between Freud’s ‘melancholy’ and Benjamin’s ‘historical materialism’ insists in both 
thinkers’ notion of the past as fundamentally open.353 Whereas Freud saw melancholy openness as a psychic 
affliction which should ultimately be subsumed by mourning, Benjamin saw temporal porosity as a crucial 
aspect of radical political endeavour. For Benjamin, it is the memory of one’s ‘enslaved ancestors’,354 that drives 
the revolutionary imperative rather than the vision of an ideal future. In related fashion, David Lloyd asks, is not 
rage the more appropriate response to the Famine than mournful detachment? The one who mourns, according 
to Freud, is the one who has successfully decathected from loss and become an autonomous subject, adjusting to 
‘the way things are’. In the H-Blocks, repeating trauma permits not a ‘coming to terms’ with the past, but rather 
a means to animate it into the present and thus rectify past wrongs. Mourning fixes and rigidifies the past. It is a 
saying goodbye, so that the past is ‘declared resolved, finished, and dead, [whereas] in melancholia the past 
remains steadfastly alive in the present’.355 Moreover, the strikers utilise the Irish language, what Matthew 
Arnold called ‘the badge of a beaten race’,356 in order to forge a temporal ataxia between the famishing past and 
the famishing present. Speaking the language of the dead is already a species of resurrection. The language 
becomes the means of conveyance, the way to invoke and layer several temporalities at once. It shifts the 
(famishing) speakers into Benjamin’s ‘messianism,’ that is, ‘a zone of undecidability, in which the past is 
dislocated into the present and the present is extended into the past’.357 The Hunger Strikers believed that the 
spectacle of their starved corpses leaving the prison—these signifiers as reminders of colonial catastrophe—
would ignite the Benjaminian ‘spark’ on the streets of Belfast and beyond. For ‘messianism’ is not just a 
singularity but a collective cathexis. In Benjamin’s hands, neither is it an onto-theology, but the opposite: it 
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Excess mortality and the drastic erosion of the language go hand in hand. The Famine sounded the 
death knell for the Irish language. As one historian notes, ‘It also confirmed a relationship between the Irish 
language and poverty, in all its meanings’.359 The contiguity of starving and speaking Irish is historically acute 
such that autophagy and glottophagy meet and coincide. Autophagy is that “self-eating” mechanism whereby 
the body compensates a drastic reduction of calories by attempting to maintain cellular homeostatis. In the 
absence of any other nutritive intake, the body will digest its only available source of calories, itself. The exact 
point at which autophagy ceases to be ‘prosurvival’ and instead becomes ‘prodeath’360 is poorly understood 
within the metabolic sciences. Glottophagy (glottophagie), meanwhile, is a term elaborated by the French socio-
linguist Louis-Jean Calvet in his book, Linguistique et colonialisme.
361
 Though similar to the Anglophone 
colonial studies concept of ‘cultural imperialism’ or ‘linguistic imperialism’, Calvet’s term differs in its 
emphasis on the scene of a devouring. Glottophagy refers to that process by which an indigenous language is 
‘eaten’ by an imperial one, a process he also refers to as ‘linguistic cannibalism’.362 Both autophagy and 
glottophagy are, in this context, colonial afflictions. As the bodies of famine victims weaken and either scatter in 
mass emigration or self-consume unto disease and death, so does the language expire with its speakers. In a 
rather obvious but no less profound sense, there must be Irish bodies if there are to be Irish speech acts. There 
must be speakers, if there is to be language. 
It is only after the language collapses that the term Gaeltacht (Irish-speaking area) comes to have any 
meaning.
363
 Prior to that point, one would simply say some version of ‘Ireland’ when she wanted to refer to 
‘Irish-speaking area’, (with the exception of the Pale) since those had not yet become discontinuous. The term 
arises when it is understood that the sign ‘Ireland’ no longer refers to ‘Irish speaking area’ but instead to ‘non-
Irish speaking’ or ‘Anglophone’ area. When Irish-speaking itself becomes a rarity, only then does Gaeltacht 
emerge as a meaningful referent. With less than 6% of the total area of the island designated Gaeltacht, the 
phrase recognises at one and the same time the fact that Irish-speaking was but that it is no longer. 
In the H-Blocks, the prison protesters acquired the Irish language with urgency and against all odds. 
Out of hundreds in the H-Blocks, there were only four speakers with any competence in the language at the 
outset. Officially banned until 1982, their auto-didacticism was technically illegal. They used visits from the 
priests as occasions to obtain clandestine materials and vocabulary. Upon visiting to say Mass, the priest was 
often expected to provide Irish, too, if only a few words and sentences.
364
 In place of more traditional 
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contraband, the protesters smuggled in short stories and grammar lessons in Irish. Ex-inmate Peadar Whelan 
recalls, ‘These pages came down in the illicit tobacco parcels, the gold dust of the H-Blocks—the sacrifice of 
this valuable space shows the importance attached to Irish! . . . We had to fight to learn, and speaking it was a 
form of resistance’.365  
Playing on Gaeltacht, the term ‘Jailtacht’ emerged around this time. ‘Jailtacht’ bespeaks the acquired 
nature of the tongue, as opposed to Gaeltacht, which signifies an accident of birth and geography. Without 
native speakers, however, or anyone with a formal education in its usage, ‘Jailtacht’ communicates the crude 
character of the H-Block dialect. In the absence of writing materials or books, instruction was largely oral and 
thus phonetic. There was no professional tuition, of course, and the dialect mixed an Ulster blás with a series of 
Jail-talk idioms to produce an adulterated linguistic variant. H-Block Irish produced grammatical and 
pronunciation errors that became established and duplicated. Yet its very ‘imperfection’ served to mark it as a 
practice—one not extractable from the lived environment—rather than as a matter for concern over 
‘correctness’. Deleuze and Guattari are energetic on this point—‘[Grammaticality] is a power marker before it is 
a syntactical marker’366—and we can see ‘Jailtacht’ as a subversion of what they call the ‘power takeover’ 
inherent in the spread of English to Ireland and elsewhere. We can also see it as a subversion of proper textbook 
Irish by those who would not have had the chance to learn it in school, including an apprentice bus builder 
(Bobby Sands), a milkman (Raymond McCreesh), a bricklayer (Kevin Lynch), and so on. Most of the Famine 
Irish would not have been literate, much less educated. The Jailtacht Irish is both oral and ‘incorrect’. Yet the 
pejorative term ‘Jailtacht’ also conveys anxiety over the abandonment of ‘purity’ nationalisms. As David Lloyd 
writes, ‘Irish nationalism, in its early theory, as in its later practices, has always sought to be an instrument of 
bourgeois hegemony’.367 Thus the tension between the working-class radicalism of the H-Blocks and more 
traditional cultural nationalism is evinced in the following, when a standard Irish speaker encounters the 
Blanketmen: ‘The Gaelic we were learning, we spoke with our natural accents, which is rough. This woman 
after the protest was over came up from the Free State; she was the first Gaelic news reader on RTE. She had a 
terrible elitist attitude toward the language. She once said to me, “When I hear the Gaelic spoken here in the 
Blocks it makes me shudder”.’368  
Concerns over purity insist, it would seem, because cultural nationalism must occupy itself with 
proving the coloniser ‘wrong’. That is, cultural nationalism asserts that it too has a noble tradition of epic 
heroism, high art, and other forms of elite cultural treasure (such as the literature of the Irish language). The fact 
that we were colonised at all, it seems to say, was a great error in judgment, a fact which we can amply prove. 
Such traditions are ‘invented’369 in order to convince the colonised as well as the coloniser. Yet The H-Blocks 
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protesters, as I argued in the previous chapter, are not interested in sending such messages to the 
coloniser/Other, in part because there is not even a language or an idiom in which to mount such an ‘argument’ 
that does not already belong to the colonizer or derive from its categories. Yet the appropriation of H-Blocks 
fragments into usable political narratives of cultural nationalism, i.e., their redeployment as appeals to the Other, 
are constant and largely beyond the ability of the H-Block dwellers to correct.  
Hence the Hunger Strikes are continually framed and re-written as spectacles of martyrdom, described 
in terms of (paradoxical) self-indulgence by critics and part of a lineage of heroism, or Pearsean blood-sacrifice, 
by supporters. David Lloyd has referred to this relentless discourse, which actually differs very little depending 
on the affiliations of the speaker, as the ‘myth of myth’.370 The American journalist, Padraig O’Malley writes, 
‘Faced with the unacceptable realities of the present and the comforting allure of myth, they chose myth, to 
imagine them-selves “as sacrificial heroes taken from the old mythologies of torn gods”. . . . When all options 
closed, they took refuge in romantic stereotype’.371 O’Malley characterises the strikers as having their ‘eyes 
fixed on a star in a galaxy of patriot-ghosts imploding in their imaginations, their bodies sacrificial offerings to 
the glutinous gods of a degenerative nationalism’.372 Lloyd has shown how even more sophisticated 
commentators, such as Allen Feldman and Maud Ellmann, still have a tendency to accept the vocabulary of 
mythology and sacrifice at face value and to subtly reproduce it.  
This is partly due to a vigorously disseminated Christology on the outside. O’Malley’s obvious 
contempt, in other words, is merely the obverse of the tendency to sanctify or canonise Bobby Sands. After his 
death (and only then) Sands would be popularly depicted as a lost young man, one who fell victim to the 
accumulated indignities of British misrule, Catholic discrimination, and the brutality of the H-Block prison 
system. While this characterisation is not inaccurate, it performs the function of ‘humanising’ him, such that 
Sands’ Christ-like sacrifice—his slow and painful death—can pay a spiritual ransom, as it were, so that the taint 
of terrorism can be burnt off. In his Transitions, Richard Kearney argues as much when he writes, ‘It is certainly 
this sacrificial logic of martyrdom which operated in the minds of the nationalist community when Bobby Sands 
and his nine fellow hunger-strikers were transformed, in the popular perception, from “delinquent criminals” to 
“national heroes”’.373  
Yet such self-aggrandisement was dramatically absent from Sands’ vision. Still, interpretations such as 
Kearney’s accomplish a large amount of ideological labour. Glory and hagiography are simpler, more mobile, 
more emotive, more adequate to meme-making, and thus more effective in mobilising an anti-colonial 
(representational) politics. They ‘absolve’ the strikers from the repulsive, incomprehensible behaviour attached 
to the Dirty Protest, and effectively erase those previous five years of struggle. They successfully overstate the 
personal nature of the Hunger Strikes. While the anguish following Sands’ death is genuine, so is it more than a 
little tinged with relief. ‘Bobby Sands,’ the sensitive patriot, is identifiable and claimable in a way that the long 
season of the ‘animal’ (the life lived in darkness, prolonged nudity, and chronic proximity to excrement) could 
not be. All this horror is nullified in the starvation process, so that Sands’ exit can be, is indeed, a resplendent 
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one. Starvation is the only one of the somatic praxes in the H-Blocks to constitute a mastery over the body, and 
not a seeming descent into its animal functions. The Hunger Strikes eclipse everything else because they lend 
themselves to being read as a muscular overcoming.  
Far from being ‘stage-managed by the IRA’ as Ellmann puts it, the H-Blocks struggles are carried out 
in direct defiance of the IRA leadership. One inmate notes the ‘strong opposition’ that came from the movement 
outside, “Simply because hunger strikes unleash forces you can’t control, not to the same extent as violence . . . . 
The outside was scared to make the logical extension of the struggle we were in’.374 The strikes go ahead, of 
course, despite the fact that they are expressly against the directives of the hierarchy, which made an eleventh-
hour attempt to stop them from going forward. The following smuggled ‘comm’ survives from that exchange:
  
  31.1.81 To Army Council 
 
Comrade, we received your comm (dated 30.1.81). We have listened carefully to what you 
have said and accept the spirit in which it was wrote, likewise in view of the situation we do 
not deny you or criticize your extreme cautiousness. But, however, distressing it may be, we 
regret that our decision to hunger strike remains the same and we reconfirm the decision now 
with the same vigour and determination. . . . We accept the tragic consequences that most 
certainly await us and the overshadowing fact that death may not secure a principled 
settlement. . . . We reconfirm and pledge ‘our’ full confidence and support to you and march 




The IRA outside the prison was afraid that the hunger strikes would indeed spark revolutionary 
violence but worried that they would not have the manpower to direct or control it. Bernadette Devlin made a 
public announcement in which she beseeched the nationalist community to refrain from violence following the 
death of Bobby Sands. The leadership outside remained unconvinced about the H-Block vision, Sinn Féin 
ignored the hunger strike in the early going, and the IRA did its best to stop it. It is thus difficult to reconcile the 
scene at Long Kesh with prevalent claims about an almost cultish martyrology that purportedly took over the 
Republican community in the H-Blocks, a martyrology that was sanctioned and encouraged by the outside 
leadership as the fulfilment of historical continuity. If anything, the H-Blocks struggles constituted a rupture 
with historical continuity, not its mythic culmination. 
Melancholy is not the same as martyrdom. This becomes clear if we examine the way in which the 
Strikers were chosen. Those with physical ailments or lingering injuries were eliminated. Those who had gone 
off the Blanket or Dirty protests were also eliminated.
376
 Those who might have been especially vulnerable to 
family pressures or pressures from the clergy were eliminated. That is to say, men who would not have been 
subject to unusual physical deterioration, who had shown the ability to persevere under extreme duress, and who 
would have had no special susceptibility to emotional intervention—these were the inmates who could volunteer 
their names. O’Malley argues that the strikers see themselves as ‘the chosen few, the elite of the elite’,377 but 
self-valorisation is opposite to the ethos of H-Blocks collectivism. Death ceases to be unthinkable once it is no 
longer a solitary ordeal, but may be endured as a collective undertaking. One inmate said: 
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I started to think about dying, and I didn’t know what good it would do if I came to that point. 
I would try to tell myself that I would be able to die, and then I wasn’t sure. I kept putting off 
the decision. . . . About a week and a half later a note came down through the cells . . . The 
note was the list for the Hunger Strike. The cell below us, both of them put their names down. 
The note came to us and my cell mate put his name down. We had been together a long time. 




The embrace of caducity, according to Agamben, is what Benjamin meant when he spoke of messianic 
weakness. In fact, Agamben argues that as opposed to Paul, who found the caducity inherent to life painful and 
groaning, Benjamin believed that extreme caducity—messianic weakness—was the ‘rhythm of happiness 
itself’.379 Agamben draws attention to the unusual typography in Benjamin’s famous words from the Theses, in 
which Benjamin writes, ‘In the voices we hear, isn’t there an echo of now silent ones? . . . If so, then there is a 
secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Then our coming was expected on earth. Then, 
like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a w e a k messianic power, a power on 
which the past has a claim. Such a claim cannot be settled cheaply. The historical materialist is aware of this’.380 
Why is weak spaced in this way?
381
 Agamben argues so that it will be read twice, it will be ‘hyperread’.382  
The historical materialist cannot assume the point of view of the victor, but of the least, if she is to 
trace the ‘secret index’ of the past in the hope of redemption. ‘W e a k’ refers to just how weak one must be in 
order to deactivate the law. The H-Blocks protesters—surrounded by their own excrement, naked, speaking a 
‘debased’ Irish and finally starving to death—construct an entire existential edifice built on (messianic) 
weakness. In the H-Blocks, they deactivate the law. It is the strikers who determine what happens next. ‘Just as 
messianic power is realised and acts in the form of weakness, so too in this way does it have an effect on the 
sphere of law and its works, not simply by negating or annihilating them, but by de-activating them, rendering 
them inoperative, no-longer-at-work’.383  
Just as Coetzee’s Friday confounds the procedures of the law by not speaking, so do the protesters 
make the law inexecutable, in part by withdrawing their consent from being so governed. In the previous 
chapter, I argued that the H-Blocks struggle had amounted to an effectuation of the Lacanian ‘passage to the 
act’—that is, a disturbance of the Symbolic order so extreme that its actors could not be said to be 
‘communicating’ with the Other at all. Instead the inmates had ‘left the scene’. Lacan endows his ‘leaving the 
scene’ with an appropriate spatial dimension: he likens the Symbolic to a theatre stage, complete with a 
‘proscenium arch’, upon which subjects perform for the big Other. The ‘passage to the act’ involves removing 
oneself from the stage; it is a certain walking off the edge of its borders into the unknown. The usual markers of 
‘civilisation’, such as calendrical time, are replaced by signs such as the weather, and the sense of lived time 
loses its metaphysical appurtenance in the H-Blocks: ‘I could isolate exact days by the weather but not by the 
calendar. I do remember a meeting or a discussion taking place because of the weather that day. The only thing 
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we used as stages and times was the stages of the protest. There was nothing else that meant fuck all. Days were 
measured on meals. Weeks were measured on fuck all’.384 Recall Benjamin’s point that in the French 
Revolution, the first things to be fired on were the clocks.
385
 
 The no-place where one arrives after having ‘left the scene’, that is, the liminal ‘space,’ outside the 
Symbolic order prompts Feldman to refer again and again to the Blanketmen as surviving variously as 
‘anomalous entities’386 and ‘unresolved initiates’.387 This spatial dislocation converges aptly with a disordered 
temporality and with the temporal aspects of waiting. Intermittency may well be the characteristic feature of a 
community with a messianic vocation, the “community of in-between”.388 Hence Feldman remarks, ‘. . . the 
issue of time, its suspension and reactivation, became for them the lever upon which the mechanism of political 
action depended’.389 
iv. 
It has been argued that the protesters decided to embark on Hunger Strike because the Blanket and 
Dirty Protests were ‘going nowhere’.390 Immersion in excrement had not achieved the ‘political status’ the 
Hunger Strikers had sought, so they were forced to shift direction to the representational strategy of Hunger 
Striking. David Lloyd lays out the ways in which the Hunger Strikes succeeded in restoring a representational 
function to political efforts in Northern Ireland while paving the way for the meteoric rise of Sinn Féin and 
ultimately the peace process. Lloyd writes, ‘In a certain sense, the very suspension of the blanket protests and 
the move to the representative structures of the hunger strike already entailed a reorientation of the struggle 
away from the possibility of an alternative conception of community . . . and towards a re-engagement with the 
rhetorical as well as the institutional structures of the state’.391 Lloyd rightly rejects the general consensus that 
the Hunger Strikes were further propelled by the need to perform a self-validating spectacle of martyrdom. Yet I 
would argue that the shift to Hunger Striking comprised not a turning away from the being-in-common that was 
cultivated in the H-Blocks but a means to disseminate it outside the prison walls. The Hunger Strike should not 
be thought of as a break from what preceded it or a reversal of strategy. Rather it was a matter—so common 
with the ‘messianic’ community—of the already us but not yet them. Agamben speaks of the ‘paradoxical 
tension’ of the distance between the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’ characteristic of the messianic. Those with the 
messianic vocation—or in Freudian terms, the melancholy imperative—have already effected the rupture with 
‘empty, homogenous time’; have already consolidated the being-in-common; have already effected the 
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‘subjective destitution’ constitutive of the ‘passage to the act’; have already begun to reclaim the least. But all of 
this remains incomplete insofar as it is ‘just us’ but not yet them.  
Agamben writes, ‘The messianic event has already happened. . . . but, nevertheless, in order to truly be 
fulfilled, this implies an additional time. How should we interpret this unusual scission, since it seems to 
introduce a constitutive delay or deferment into the messianic?’ 392 The inmates seem to be in an experiential 
state that is almost absent of time or voided of it, and this poses a danger. In a political life of deferment, of 
waiting and suspension, of ‘transitional time’, the risk persists in which, ‘as with every transition, it tends to be 
prolonged into infinity and renders unreachable the end that it supposedly produces’.393 After five years on the 
Blanket and Dirty protests, the H-Block men are all too conscious of the potential to slide into a kind of infinite 
holding pattern wherein the outside communities can never quite ‘catch up’. How to hasten this transitional 
time? The urgency is heightened through an awareness of Agamben’s risk of unreachability, but perhaps more 
so from the risk that Badiou will describe as the awful propensity (he calls it ‘evil’) of the militant to forget, to 
drift away from, and ultimately to disavow, her own militancy.
394
 
They intensify their Irish. All the ‘non-conforming’ prisoners engage in the ‘lessons’ shouted from cell 
to cell. But those who put themselves forward for Hunger Strike undertake intensive educational immersions: 
‘The Gaelic was going to be the basis for politicizing the wings and preparing them for the Hunger Strike’.395 
Another time opens when Irish is the living language. Irish-speaking creates a disjunction in time and exploits it, 
just as autophagy does. Hungering becomes the way to compress the spatial and temporal gap between inmate, 
‘enslaved ancestor’ and support community. Hungering wards off the encroachment of both types of risk 
(Agamben’s and Badiou’s), and it bridges the ontological gap between the already us but not yet them. 
Immersion in (corrupted) Irish was held forth as a precursor to starvation, a means to prepare the hunger striker 
to accept his death. And why expend the last of one’s time in this way, learning Irish, if not to ‘commune’ with 
the least? It is almost as if the striker must become Gaelgeoir in order to starve the right way. The Hunger 
Striker became flíocha in Irish, fluent, in order to die.  
The Hunger Strikes are not a break with the logic of the Dirty Protest; the ‘excremental position’ is 
wholly consistent with Benjamin’s weakness. The messianic is here a secularised understanding of restorative 
revolution, not, as in more dominant tropes, a theological visitation. The emphasis on (historical, eschatological) 
time repeatedly emerges in the oral histories. The starving body in the H-Block provokes a disordering of the 
past, present and future. But it is also an action meant to double these temporal displacements by catalysing the 
shift into messianic time. Messianic time is not, in Agamben’s words, ‘another day, homogenous to others; 
rather, it is that innermost disjointedness within time through which one may –by a hairsbreadth—grasp time 
and accomplish it’.396  
Hungering succeeds in abbreviating the prison sentence as well, because it shifts the striker out of 
disciplinary time into what Feldman calls ‘biological time’. The wasting of the organism is comparatively quick; 
the shift amounts to the condensation of a single life into a span of not eighty-some years, but along the order of 
sixty days. One inmate says, ‘We had broken that sense of “the never ending”. You were very conscious then 
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that every day that went past was bringing the day of reckoning closer. There was that much happening and a 
new sense of urgency that set in all around’.397    
Hunger striking ‘buys up time’.398 It is to cause time to ‘contract itself and begin to end’.399 Hunger 
Striking converts regular chronos and penal time into messianic time, because it is an acceleration—‘a 
vertiginous abbreviation’400—of time. Autophagy too is appropriately time-dependent. Each day without food 
becomes a freighted step closer to death and one has, of course, only so many days. As one inmate says, ‘During 
the Hunger Strike you were very very conscious of time. You knew that each day that went in was [. . .] another 
day somebody was closer to death.’401 Each day is made to carry unusual weight in this time of the rapid 
deterioration of the body. Bobby Sands goes from, by all accounts, an intense and ‘chubby’ young man to a 
wasted corpse within a space of just over two months. 
The description of a woman in the midst of advanced autophagy is one of many thousands of such 
stories: She is ‘a little woman’, foraging in ‘the dunghill where she had been found searching out and eating 
juices of potato peel thrown out there . . . . You couldn’t tell was she young or old as her face, which had lost all 
its natural colour, was wrinkled and puckered and covered with a white downy hair’.402 The confusion of youth 
and decrepitude happens during the Famine and is repeated in Long Kesh. When Bobby Sands is in his last 
days, he is less mobile than the woman from Tullaghan (Co. Leitrim) but he is similarly disfigured by starvation 
and impending death. A visitor describes him thus: ‘His left eye was black and closed, the right eye nearly 
closed and his mouth twisted as if he had suffered a stroke. He had no feeling in his legs and could only 
whisper. Every now and then he started dry retching . . . [He said,] “I’m blind. I can’t see you”’.403 The 
deterioration of sight means the body is likely feeding off brain protein.
404
 
At this point in time, Bobby Sands more closely resembles the woman from Tullaghan than anyone 
around him. He is more like her than like himself a year earlier. Agamben says that it is to the same extent that 
one becomes the ‘no longer I,’ that the Messiah ‘lives in him.’ Hence each attempt to reinstall Bobby Sands as 
the ‘I’ of the Hunger Strikes further misapprehends his melancholy purpose, which is also in keeping with the 
desire to impute Christology. In starvation, Bobby Sands removes all predicates that could cohere to form an ‘I’ 
as well as those which would distinguish him from the Tullaghan woman or any other body which so suffered. 
Far from sanctifying or consolidating the ‘I’, Bobby Sands reverses it—he effects a reversal of the cogito. It is 
perhaps understandable why a resolute cultural nationalism would find these moves discomfiting. Instead of 
reifying ‘Irish’, ‘Catholic’ or ‘nationalist’, he has, in effect, dispensed with them all. He has hollowed out 
predication to make way for a traversal of the ‘I’ by the ‘silent golem’405 of the past and in so doing, assumed 
the excremental position instead of that which perpetuates high tradition.  
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Starvation is the means, then, not only to overburden time but also to exploit its disordering so as to 
‘re-collect’ the Famine victims. Benjamin writes, ‘Each now is the now of a particular knowability. In it, truth is 
charged to the bursting point with time.’406 Likewise the starving body expresses a central aspect of messianic 
time—‘recapitulation’—or the summary re-telling of a complete but radically condensed history. Coetzee’s 
Friday is also a ‘recapitulation’: he encapsulates the racial-displacements, mutilations, forced labour, and 
‘muteness’ of the slave. Written on his body is the entire global history of European colonial-capitalism and the 
exploitation of indigenous peoples. On the Hunger Striker’s and Famine victim’s body is inscribed the intrusion 
of the conquerer, the introduction of exchange entitlements, the destruction of cultural resources, silence upon 
the lips where once there had been Irish, and ultimately autophagy unto death. Such recapitulations tell in highly 
compressed and intense displays. The appearance of the recapitulated body outside the prison will serve to 
create an indomitable rushing of the past into the present. Agamben likens recapitulation to ‘the panoramic 
vision that the dying supposedly have of their lives, when the whole of their existence passes before their eyes in 
a flash’—yet this panorama is of suffering, catastrophe and trauma, a history of colonial violence rendered and 
re-activated in a concentrated form. It is the instantaneous recall of the horror of centuries. It is no wonder that 
the strikers assumed there would be eruptions of mass violence on the outside.
407
 Eschatology—messianism—is 
not oriented toward the future, as is commonly believed. Instead ‘recapitulation’ means a ‘contraction of past 
and present, [in which] we will have to settle our debts, at the decisive moment, first and foremost with the 
past’.408 
v. 
Marcia Cavell writes, ‘It is mourning that instructs one in the separateness of other persons, in the 
agency of the self, and in the finality of death’.409 As opposed to mourners, then, the inmates maintain the 
primacy of sociation over separation, of the (revolutionary) impotence of the solitary subject, and a faith in the 
retrievability of the dead. Mourning relegates trauma to the past and obscures the knowledge of its real effects 
on the present, though it is likely to acquire a statist imprimatur. Famine commemoration, for example, proceeds 
from that place in which ‘no aspect of the loss is unconscious’. The state provides a name (The Great Famine); a 
body count (one million dead); depopulation figures (another million exiled) and cathartic ceremonies on 
appropriate anniversaries. 
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Remembering outside the confines of the ‘officially sanctioned’ occasion arouses suspicion. Even 
remembering outside the usual framework is threatening. Luke Gibbons recounts an episode in 1995 when an 
anonymous protester greeted the erection of a golden statue of Queen Victoria on the grounds of University 
College Cork with the words: ‘What about the Famine?’ This ‘nationalist crank’ was arrested.410 The 
melancholic who cannot move on—the one for whom the dead continue to figure in the present, to haunt and 
destabilise it, and to lay a claim upon the living—will appear to be, for all intents and purposes, pathological. 
But if to ‘see reason’ means to accept the violence against the (Famine) dead on which one’s present reality is 
constructed—indeed, if it is to benefit from and even build upon that violent foundation—then ‘melancholy’ 
becomes less an affliction than a fidelity to the least that mourning them would betray. As David Lloyd has 
suggested, ‘Every act of historical violence has sought to destroy less life itself than the unruly, hopeful 
imagination of a future in which that life is lived otherwise’.411 Mourning is consigning the past to archival, 
statist memory. Hungering for all that is unknowably lost is undeniably melancholic. Mournful is the official 
preservation of a language, while melancholy is to speak it. 
Repetition of starvation is a means to reclaim the Famine dead from historicist oblivion. To repeat 
starvation is to take on the colonial-capitalist logic which ‘judged the dead dispensable’,412 to make its violence 
visible and to bear it as one’s own, indeed to inscribe its very signature across one’s body. What stronger way to 
recuperate the dead than by effecting a ‘transubstantiation’ of those who so hungered? What more eloquent 
memorial than to lament the least not by committing them to memory, for memory is ever shifting and 
unreliable—but rather to assume their ontology and thereby enact their rise? In other words, there is no more 
direct way to remember than to become the one who starves.  
Despite the best efforts of the H-Blocks inmates, the Benjaminian spark is not ignited. The appointed 
violence does not come. The sorrow was immense the night Bobby Sands died, but apart from rioting around 
Belfast and scattered parts of Northern Ireland, the ‘expected cathartic upsurge of popular and violent revolt’ did 
not materialise.
413
 A Christological conservatism would swiftly displace any messianic residue that remained 
from the H-Blocks rupture and determine the tenor of representational politics in Northern Ireland up to the 
present time. Seamus Deane writes, ‘The point of crisis was passed without anyone seeming to know why the 
explosion did not come’.414 As Badiou says truth is borne in weakness. Vulnerable, it must be carried as in a 
delicate earthenware vessel. Another sense in which messianic power is weak is that it is fragile, evanescent, 
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6.  Conquest and Signs; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love English 
i. 
Jean-Francois Lyotard opens his book, The Differend, with the following words: ‘You are informed 
that human beings endowed with language were placed in a situation such that none of them is now able to tell 
about it. Most of them disappeared then, and the survivors rarely speak about it. When they do speak about it, 
their testimony bears only upon a minute part of the situation. How do you know that the situation itself existed? 
That it is not the fruit of your informant’s imagination?’415 
 A state such as this—in which damage has occurred, but the afflicted are either dead or not ‘now able 
to tell about it’—reflects what Lyotard calls the differend. The differend is that state of affairs in which 
catastrophe cannot be told because there is no available idiom in which to do so. A survivor would be compelled 
to state what it was that she had lost if she could ever hope to establish grounds for redress, or to explain the 
violation, or to attest that there had been a violation at all. But what has been lost—damaged in the trauma 
itself—is in part the very discourse genre in which her words would have meaning and her telling, significance. 
That discourse genre has been discredited, wiped out; it may no longer even have other speakers. What has been 
lost, therefore, is incalculable, because unsayable. It can only register in the new discourse genre—the victorious 
one—as inarticulate groaning. When the survivor tries to utter her loss in the new discourse genre, it comes out 
as the simpering of a victim-language. Hysteria, enfeeblement, unreality—these characteristics accrue to the 
victim who tries to speak in the idiom that overwhelmed her own, until she becomes disinclined to speak of the 
trauma at all. Hence ‘the survivors rarely speak about it’. Because her discourse genre has been erased, she lacks 
the means to convey that it ever existed in the first place. It is effectively as if, Lyotard suggests, this loss—
because unsayable and thus impossible to prove—did not happen at all. This erasure is perhaps the most 
effective strategy of them all in the repertoire of the colonial-capitalist discourse genre. 
A discourse genre is a ‘means of presenting a universe’. A discourse genre includes language(s) but is 
not identical to it. Rather a discourse genre encompasses many other things besides—including behaviours and 
dispositions, for example, and strategies—what Lyotard calls ‘stakes and interests’. What is at stake in a certain 
discourse genre defines its parameters and its borders, because what is at stake in one discourse genre will not 
be the same as in another. Discourse genres are incommensurable by definition. Lyotard’s incommensurability 
thesis differs from the related theses of Whorf (linguistic relativity), or Kuhn (the incommensurability of 
scientific paradigms), or even Quine (ontological relativity), in that Lyotard stresses the political complications 
of the incommensurability of discourse genres by situating them within a field of power relations. As opposed to 
Whorf, for example, a genre of discourse is not simply a cast of mind and an orientation to reality as constructed 
by one’s native language. Neither does it retain the rather neutral valence of the ‘language games’ thesis that 
Lyotard borrowed from Wittgenstein and deployed in the Postmodern Condition. In a language game, one can 
‘move’ well or one can ‘move’ poorly toward her end, which is ‘winning’. She can ‘throw the game’ but this too 
is a means of playing in a directed manner. In The Differend, Lyotard emphasises the conflictual aspects 
inherent to the encounter between incommensurable discourse genres. The global ‘success’ of the imperial (or 
colonial-capitalist) discourse genre is partly a function of its remarkable skill at engorging, debilitating and even 
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eradicating other discourse genres. That is, its success resides in its ability to maintain the elaborate and violent 
fiction that there are not discourse genres plural, but only one, which is itself.
416
 (Or none, for that amounts to 
the same thing.)   
The differend is defined as the incommensurability between idioms or discourse genres which cannot 
be spoken but which signals grievance, discord and trauma. The differend exists because there is no 
transcendent third discourse genre which could mediate or arbitrate between two discourse genres in conflict, 
and the differend is this lack. In the absence of a third genre, judgment will have to issue forth from one set of 
stakes and interests and thus necessarily wrong the other: ‘A wrong results from the fact that the rules of the 
genre of discourse by which one judges are not those of the judged genre or genres of discourse’.  
The ‘survivor who rarely speaks about it’ will be tempted, it would seem, to expand her grasp of the 
new discourse genre, the victor-idiom, to ensure both fluency and eloquence—imagining in this way that she 
could become good enough to surpass the taint of victim-language, to accede to a level of semantic prowess 
such that even the ‘owners’ of the discourse genre will be forced to yield and to listen. She will rhetorically 
arrange the truth in such a way that the victor cannot avoid it. She will, as it has been said, master the coloniser’s 
language and ‘write back’. But something else, something unexpected, happens in this process. We can see it 
happen in almost every post/colony. As soon as she adopts a discourse genre, so must she necessarily adopt the 
stakes and interests of that discourse genre as her own. If she did not, her speech acts could not coalesce and her 
truth could not be comprehended. (Either that or she will be accused of ‘simpering’). She must use the basic 
coordinates of the adopted genre—its grid of intelligibility and not her own—or else she cannot produce a 
meaningful utterance. But those same stakes and interests—the ones to which she is now committed, if indeed 
she wants to speak—are the very ones entangled with the catastrophe to which she ostensibly bears witness. She 
has to reform her speech acts in accordance with the discourse genre with which she intends to ‘write back’, and 
yet the moment she truly accepts those stakes and interests as her own is the moment at which she can no longer 
speak of the trauma without neutralising it. It is the moment at which the trauma dissipates into an unpleasant 
but necessary turn of events on the way to modern progress. 
This is partly because if she can speak of it, i.e., phrase it in litigious language which can be brought 
before ‘a tribunal competent to hear it’, then it becomes ‘litigation’ rather than differend. ‘Litigation’ can be 
cognised within the new discourse genre whereas differend cannot. If it could be satisfactorily addressed, 
perhaps even remedied or resolved, according to the dictates of the new discourse genre, then it would be 
litigation and not differend. Differend is that which exceeds litigation. The plaintiff must reduce her claims to 
speakable concerns which are subject to judicial pronouncement. Lyotard thus speaks of ‘smothering’ the 
differend into litigation, of ‘neutralising’ and ‘repressing’ differends in this way.  
Consider this example from a remote area of post-Famine Ireland. A man (Myles Joyce of 
Maamtrasna) is accused of a serious crime and must appear before an Anglophone court. He speaks only Irish. 
He is granted an interpreter, who renders his ‘intricate explanations’ and appeals to heaven into ‘dry’ 
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monosyllables (‘He says no, your worship’).417 Each time the judge puts another question to him, the scenario is 
repeated. James Joyce, who records the incident for a newspaper with somewhat comic undertones, describes 
his namesake’s agony thus: ‘The old man was speaking once again, protesting, shouting, almost beside himself 
with the distress of not understanding or making himself understood, weeping with rage and terror.’  418 Still, ‘he 
says no’, is the extent of the translation. Joyce presents the trial as an analogy for Ireland’s image of impotence 
upon the world stage; Ireland ‘at the bar’ of public opinion is ever consigned to the results of poor representation 
in both senses of the word (i.e., incompetent ‘advocacy’ as well as preconceived inferiority). Like Myles Joyce, 
Ireland suffers from ‘inarticulacy’. Were Ireland to be given a fair hearing before the universal court of public 
opinion, Joyce believes, it would be absolved of much of its presumed backwardness. Likewise, had the old man 
had a more serious interpreter, had he had some command of English, had he not been overwhelmed by the 
pomp of civic rituals, then justice might well have been done.  
Yet if we read the anguish of Myles Joyce, as James Joyce does, as a result of the indifference of the 
interpreter, the coldness of the magistrate, or even the brutality of the hangman (‘Legend has it that even the 
hangman could not make himself understood by the victim and angrily kicked the unhappy man in the head to 
force him into the noose’419), then we have duplicated his error. One would have to accept justice so construed 
(as it is in the British court system) in order to formulate a complaint about its miscarriage. In granting his tacit 
assent to this notion of justice, Joyce confined him-self to critiquing not the notion, but the manner of its 
execution. Though it is made with sympathy, Joyce’s error consists in confusing the imposition of the Law with 
an instance of its misapplication. The differend, meanwhile, persists in the rage and terror of Myles Joyce but 
remains unsayable in the context of the courtroom, because in order to speak of what the harm consisted, one 
would have to conform to the norms and lexica of one discourse genre over the other. Lyotard’s point is that the 
old man’s distress is not articulable (or even calculable) according to the dictates of a colonial court, because his 
‘rage and terror’ are to do with having been colonised. And having been colonised is not a grievance that can be 
brought before a British court (or a post-independence Irish one, for that matter).
420
  
 It is true that Myles Joyce would likely have fared better if he had had a grasp of English. As an 
Anglophone subject, well-acquainted with the new discourse genre, he might just have saved himself from the 
noose. The imperative to acquire English (and forget Irish) would seem to be the post/colonial moral derived 
from stories such as this. Suppose that Myles Joyce could replay his court scene again, could return having 
become ‘worldlier’, with skilled representation and a working knowledge of English. He might be spared the 
death sentence this time, but so would he have done his part to entrench a discourse genre he knows (or knew) 
to be violent. And so would he help to repress the differend, to push knowledge of it further from view, to the 
farthest margins, where it is increasingly imperceptible, and more difficult to recognise for what it is.  
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 Lyotard provides a similar example: ‘A Martinican is a French citizen; he or she can bring a complaint 
against whatever impinges upon his or her rights as a French citizen. But the wrong he or she deems to suffer 
from the fact of being a French citizen is not a matter for litigation under French law. It might be under private 
or public international law, but for that to be the case it would be necessary that the Martinican were no longer a 




Let us consider another example—far removed in time and space—but which further conveys the 
incommensurability of discourse genres, the ferocity of the differend, and the absence of an idiom with which to 
tell the catastrophe. It could be argued that talk of conflicting discourse genres is simply ‘linguistic’ and thus not 
really violent. Yet Tzvetan Todorov has convincingly argued that signs are capable of pulling down entire 
civilisations; he calls the conquest of the Americas a conquest of signs. 
When the Aztecs enfolded the Spaniards into their genre of discourse, the latter became vengeful 
deities. When the Spaniards absorbed the Aztecs into their genre of discourse, they became so many (subhuman, 
dispensable) obstacles to the procurement of gold. The Aztecs associated gold with excrement; they had no 
universal equivalent (i.e., concept of money) for which gold would serve as a circulating metaphor. Córtes told 
Montezuma that his men ate this gold for its medicinal qualities, in order to explain this inexplicable 
obsession.
421
 The Spaniards, meanwhile, prized gold so highly that they would do anything (dupe, massacre, 
etc.) in order to acquire it. The stakes and interests of the Spanish discourse genre (including the mission to 
procure gold and convert pagans) precluded Aztec ‘perseverance in being’. The success of one would be 
excluded by the success of the other, or as Lyotard writes, ‘There are stakes tied to genres of discourse. When 
these stakes are attained, we talk about success. There is conflict, therefore’.422  
When one discourse genre begins to subsume and engulf another, then incommensurability has become 
differend. In The Conquest of America: the question of the other, Todorov attempts to articulate why the bold 
and magisterial Aztec empire was broken with such totality and swiftness by what amounted to a motley band of 
conquistadors. He writes, ‘A mystery concerning the very outcome of the combat still hovers over the conquest: 
why this lightninglike victory, when the inhabitants of America are so superior in number to their adversaries 
and fighting on their own territory as well? [. . .] How are we to account for the fact that Cortés, leading a few 
hundred men, managed to seize the kingdom of Montezuma, who commanded several hundred thousand?’423 
While acknowledging the more typical explanations—including the superiority of Spanish weaponry, the 
internecine strife amongst indigenous factions manipulated by Cortés, so-called ‘microbial shock’, and the 
enigmatic figure of Montezuma himself: too hesitant, philosophical or melancholy to resist
424—Todorov argues 
that even when taken together, these factors cannot account for the sheer magnitude and velocity of 
civilizational undoing.  
To say that the devastation of Montezuma’s empire at the hands of the Spaniards was a conquest of 
signs is of course not to say that the conceptual universe of the Aztecs was limited or simplistic and therefore 
                                                          
421
 ‘Córtes, apparently, had offered this explanation: the Spaniards need gold as the cure for sickness. The 
Indians, who identify gold with excrement, find this difficult to accept. Money, as a universal equivalent, does 
not exist. . . . The entire Spanish power structure eludes them’. Tzvetan Todorov, Conquest of America: the 
question of the other, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), 96. 
422
 Lyotard, Differend, 137. 
423
 Todorov, Conquest of America, 53. 
424
 Todorov writes, ‘Unfortunately we lack the documents that might have permitted us to penetrate the mental 
world of this strange emperor: in the presence of his enemies he is reluctant to make use of his enormous power, 
as if he were not convinced he wished to conquer; as Gomara, Cortés’s chaplain and biographer, says: “Our 
Spaniards were never able to learn the truth, because at the time they did not understand the language, and 
afterward no one was found alive with whom Montezuma had shared the secret.” The Spanish historians of the 
period vainly sought the answer to these questions, seeing Montezuma sometimes as a madman, sometimes as a 
philosopher’. Conquest of America, 57. 
104 
 
easily overcome. Nor is it to suggest that language and the manipulation of signs was unimportant in Aztec 
culture. In fact Todorov demonstrates the opposite. The coming of the conquistadors and the subsequent 
widespread slaughter of the indigenes was, for the latter, epistemologically unaccountable,
425
 what Todorov 
refers to as a ‘collision between a ritual world and a unique event’.426 Indeed Montezuma’s failure was nothing 
if not a failure to ‘situate’ Cortés and his men. 427 And yet that is not the whole story. Despite the fact that the 
Aztecs are known for fearlessness and skill in battle, and despite the cultural importance placed on linguistic 
excellence and ornate symbolic systems, Montezuma increasingly becomes increasingly fatalistic and mute. For 
reasons too complex to elaborate here, Todorov shows how Aztec communicative strategies proved profoundly 
maladaptive to the task of doing battle with the Spaniards. As Aztec communication fell apart, so did their 
resistance, and they were massacred with relative ease. It is in signs, but just as importantly in their temporal 
organisation (and in their organisation of temporality)—i.e., in narrative, and in particular, the narrative of 
necessity—that Todorov locates his explanation. In an attempt to compute a series of events for which 
indigenous signs did not exist, the Aztecs ultimately provoke a kind of implosion of their own discourse genre. 
Todorov describes how the arrangement of signs and temporality result in epistemological collapse. In the 
survivor testimonies, he argues, certain narrative patterns emerge: 
 
The [‘Indians’] invariably begin by the enumeration of the omens announcing the coming of 
the Spaniards. Moreover, Montezuma is apparently bombarded with messages that all predict 
the newcomers’ victory. . . . Taken together, these accounts, proceeding from peoples very 
remote from each other, are striking in their uniformity: the arrival of the Spaniards is always 
preceded by omens, their victory is always foretold as certain. Further, these omens are 
strangely alike, from one end of the American continent to the other. There is always a comet, 
a thunderbolt, a fire, two-headed men, persons speaking in a state of trance, etc. 
 
Yet how is it possible to speak of epistemological ‘surprise’ or conceptual rupture if the coming of the 
Spaniards, or some other equally dark force, was already expected? And what of the idea that an unnameable 
malevolence was not simply on its way, but would always certainly prevail? It was destined to prevail because it 
had already arrived and was already doing so. Its being in the process of occurring was all the ‘proof’ required 
of the verity of the predictions. Hence prediction, that is foreknowledge, occurs not beforehand, according to 
Todorov, but after:    
 
Even if we did not want to exclude the reality of these omens a priori, there is something 
about so many coincidences that should put us on our guard. Everything suggests that the 
omens were invented after the fact; but why? . . . Instead of perceiving this fact as a purely 
human if unprecedented encounter—the arrival of men greedy for gold and power—the 
Indians integrate it into a network of natural, social, and supernatural relations, in which the 
                                                          
425
 Todorov writes, ‘The identity of the Spaniards is so different, their behaviour to such a degree unforeseeable, 
that the whole system of communication is upset, and the Aztecs no longer succeed precisely where they had 
previously excelled: in gathering information. If the Indians had known, Bernal Díaz writes on many occasions, 
“how few, how weak and exhausted we were at that time”. All the Spaniards’ actions take the Indians by 
surprise’. Todorov, Conquest of America, 73.  
426
 Ibid., 87. 
427
 Todorov writes, ‘From this collision between a ritual world and a unique event result’s Montezuma’s 
incapacity to produce appropriate and effective messages. Masters in the art of ritual discourse, the Indians are 
inadequate in a situation requiring improvisation, and this is precisely the situation of the conquest. Their verbal 
education favours paradigm over syntagm, code over context, conformity-to-order over efficacity-of-the-
moment, the past over the present. Now, the Spanish invasion creates a radically new, entirely unprecedented 
situation, in which the art of improvisation matters more than that of ritual.’ Ibid., 87. 
105 
 
event thereby loses its singularity: it is somehow domesticated, absorbed into an order of 
already existing beliefs. The Aztecs perceive the conquest—i.e., the defeat—and at the same 
time mentally overcome it by inscribing it within a history conceived according to their 
requirements (nor are they the only people to have done such a thing): the present becomes 
intelligible and at the same time less inadmissible, the moment one can see it already 
announced in the past. And the remedy is so well adapted to the situation that, hearing the 
narrative, everyone believes he remembers that the omens had indeed appeared before the 
conquest. But meanwhile, these prophecies exert a paralyzing effect on the Indians hearing 
them and further diminish their resistance’.428 
 
The psychic resourcefulness of the strategy is evident: to ‘domesticate’ the horror, to absorb it into an order ‘of 
already existing beliefs’, to narratively mitigate its awful singularity, is to ‘overcome’ it. All of these efforts 
were perhaps necessary in order to have orientated oneself in the midst of chaos and mass death. And yet as a 
technique of survival, it will prove disastrous. This inherent paradox is noted hauntingly in the pages of the 
Mayan book of prophecy, Chilam Balam, when it is stated: ‘Those who die are those who do not understand; 
those who live will understand it’.429 Of the former there is Montezuma himself; Montezuma cannot 
‘understand’ and this is equated both rhetorically and literally with (his) death. According to Aztec accounts, 
upon hearing word of the arrival of the Spanish marauders, ‘Montezuma lowered his head, and without 
answering a word, placed his hand upon his mouth. In this way he remained for a long time. He appeared to be 
dead or mute, since he was unable to give any answer’.430 Another account also depicts him with lowered head, 
stating, ‘He remained in this attitude, and did not speak at all, but remained a long time full of affliction, as if he 
were beside himself’.431  
Montezuma becomes catatonic just as Myles Joyce succumbs to weeping with rage and terror and both 
of them die, since ‘those who die are those who do not understand’. Yet ‘dying’ and understanding may not be 
so appreciably different. Understanding would seem to have to do with both narrative and necessity. The Aztecs 
did not die because they ‘believed’ in their prophecies; as that would be to invert the sequence. The Aztecs did 
not die because they believed their fate inescapable—rather they believed it to be inescapable because they were 
dying. As the Aztecs are steadily overcome by the Spaniards, they proceed to posit a retroactive ‘memory’ of 
omens that encodes their deaths into a recognisable, pre-existing order and that thereby facilitates the 
‘admissibility’ of those deaths. Perhaps what Montezuma glimpsed was not necessity but the arbitrary brutality 
of it all, and this was too unbearable—literally—to live with.  
On the temporal sequencing implicit to narrative and the meaning-effect this instantiates, Robert 
Scholes writes, ‘Only one kind of thing can be narrated: a time-thing, or to use our normal word for it, an 
“event”. . . . Narrative is always presented as if the events came first, the text second, and the interpretation 
third, so that the interpretation, by striving toward a recreation of the events, in effect completes a semiotic 
circle. And in this process, the events themselves become humanised—saturated with meaning and value—at 
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the stage of entextualisation and again at the stage of interpretation’.432 To become saturated with meaning and 
value is in some sense to impute necessity, for could it even be possible to describe a discursive object as 
‘narrative’ if it were meaningless and chaotic?433 (It may have elements meant to signify ‘meaninglessness’ and 
‘chaos’ but they are typically inscribed within a legible framework that serves to temper them. This is why 
Homi Bhabha’s call to produce a migrant, literary knowledge of the ‘schizoid and subversive’434—he gives the 
example of Salman Rushdie’s work—may simply constitute one set of compositional and readerly cues or 
directives among many others.
435
 The writer anticipates composing something ‘schizoid and subversive’ and the 
reader anticipates consuming it.) It would seem that narrative functions to contain meaninglessness and chaos, 
hence it occludes violence as a condition of its own inauguration.  
This is Lacan’s point, that the very form of narrative entails repressed violence.436 Lacan argues that the 
narrative function itself is a means of obscuring an originary trauma. In part this works by manipulating 
temporality, as we have seen with the Aztecs, so that a certain recognisability is created out of that which is 
unrecognisable, i.e., chaotic, meaningless and violent. This is not the same thing as saying that words are 
inadequate to the horror they signify, or that our narratives cannot ‘capture’ the suffering of indigenous peoples. 
It is to say that narratives of necessity emerge as a means to reconcile and disavow such violence. Žižek 
explains, ‘It is not only that some narratives are ‘false’: based upon the exclusion of traumatic events and 
patching up the gaps left by these exclusions—Lacan’s thesis is much stronger: the answer to the question “Why 
do we tell stories?” is that narrative as such emerges in order to resolve some fundamental antagonism by 
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rearranging its terms into a temporal succession’.437 To paraphrase Lyotard, the ‘before’ and ‘after’ of narrative 
time stabilises the otherwise radical unleashing of the ‘now’. 
The narrative of necessity within the colonial-capitalist discourse genre erases the evidence of its own 
contingency and violence. Aztec deaths are no longer senseless deaths, but as such neither do they retain any 
impetus for redress (neither litigation nor differend). Meaningful death is more palatable than meaningless 
death, but this very formulation of ‘meaning’ may well consign the dead to their fates. It is in this ex post facto 
ascription that trauma or violence is ameliorated (and arguably, in parallel fashion, that the conquerors are more 
or less exculpated) by the victims themselves. This mechanism of retroactive ascription permits all manner of 
violence to become, in Todorov’s words, both domestic (recognisable) and integral (necessary), i.e., the 
Spaniards were only the incarnations of what was pre-ordained and announced by the omens. If such narrating is 
indeed ‘understanding’, it is also circular: ‘The price one pays for the narrative resolution is the petitio principii 
of the temporal loop—the narrative silently presupposes as already given what it purports to reproduce’.438 The 
Aztec narrative of conquest does not ‘explain’ the coming of the Spaniards so much as it ‘accepts’—by way of a 
retroactive antecedent—the mass death which is already underway. This nascent paralysing effect is what 
Althusser sought to capture in his a/temporal concept of the ‘toujours déjà’–‘the always already’. There is no 
antagonism if this was always-already bound to happen; either because it was prophesied in the scriptures as 
with the collapse of the Aztecs, because God is punishing us for speaking Irish as with the Great Famine,
439
 or 
because the progress of Man depends upon such ruthless modernisations. Althusser wrote, ‘The peculiarity of 
ideology is that it is endowed with a structure and a functioning such as to make it a non-historical reality, in the 
sense in which that structure and functioning are immutable’.440 
iii. 
 Althusser’s immutability is analogous to Bertolt Brecht on ‘inexorable fate’. Brecht traces the 
preference for what he calls ‘catharsis’ all the way back to Aristotelian drama. Catharsis, he argues, turns on the 
presentation of an ‘inexorable fate’ to which the hero displays ‘beautiful and significant reactions’. The 
spectator merges with the hero, identifies with him, and thereby undergoes a kind of ‘spiritual cleansing’ as he 
does so. As this ‘fate’ is by definition necessary (‘inexorable’) then all we can do is respond to it in the most 
beautiful way possible. There is an instructional quality to Aristotelian drama in that sense: ‘The individual 
whose innermost being is thus driven into the open then of course comes to stand for Man with a capital M. 
Everyone (including the spectator) is then carried away by the momentum of the events portrayed, so that in a 
performance of Oedipus one has for all practical purposes an auditorium full of little Oedipuses, an auditorium 
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full of Emperor Joneses for a performance of The Emperor Jones’.441 ‘Gestus’, on the contrary, attempts to 
demonstrate that this order of things is not necessary, but thoroughly contingent. Catharsis would consist of an 
experiential or personal resolution to trauma, displaying the interior oscillations of an individual hero, whereas 
‘gestus’ is designed to display social relations, or constellations of social relations and the social laws that 
govern them. ‘Gestus’ seeks to interrupt the mesmeric effects of cathartic, ‘cleansing’ identifications. (That the 
Aztecs do not see the Spaniards as ordinary men ‘greedy for gold and power’ but as preternatural harbingers of 
death is the difference between one encoding and another. The latter encoding, however, ensures a prophetic 
self-fulfillment. The rewriting of reality-effects can have profound material consequences). This is why gestic 
theatre ‘would at all costs avoid bundling together the events portrayed and presenting them as an inexorable 
fate, to which the human being is handed over helpless . . .  on the contrary, it is precisely this fate that it would 
study closely, showing it up as of human contriving’.442  
  What is unbearable is that a people is exterminated for no other reason than that of arbitrary brutality. 
‘Catharsis’ avoids a confrontation with this unseemly knowledge. As a result, it seems ever bound to 
euphemism: hence Chinua Achebe links the colonial project to a case of ‘racial arrogance’. Achebe tacitly 
appeals to an ‘inexorable fate’ each time he pronounces on the state of English in Nigeria, e.g., ‘These [African] 
languages will just have to develop as tributaries to feed the one central language enjoying nation-wide 
currency. Today, for good or ill, that language is English. Tomorrow it may be something else, although I very 
much doubt it’.443 This does not differ greatly from the Aztec prophecy: We must die because we are dying. We 
must speak English because we are speaking it. 
The post/colonial writer often reconciles herself to a certain ‘cathartic’ logic. She agrees to reduce her 
grievances to litigation in exchange for the maintenance of her ‘voice’. Litigation becomes sufficient, especially 
inasmuch as it permits her voice to be heard. The survivor reasons that she must confine her complaints to 
litigation lest she do away with her ‘only’ obvious medium—her voice itself—and thus her means of expressing 
it. In fact she may come to believe that this ‘identity’, this ‘voice’, was really all that mattered to begin with, and 
that so long as her voice is protected and preserved, than no violation has taken place. Moreover, the English 
language can incorporate the pertinent features of her original discourse genre with minimal mutilations, she 
imagines, so long as the ‘translation’ is done with due care and sensitivity. Indeed there is a certain seductive 
promise of catharsis in the notion of identity. It is through ‘identity’, in other words, that the post/colonial 
narrator is permitted a personal ‘resolution’ to colonial violence and an opportunity to display the ‘beauty and 
significance of [her] reactions’ to adversity. ‘Identity’ purports, at least to some extent, to preserve the modes of 
social organisation its assumption makes impossible to resume. There is no such thing as Irish ‘identity’ prior to 
the onset of modernity, because it does not have a function and has no occasion to arise. ‘Identity’ becomes a 
pressing need only when what it is meant to retrieve is already gone. (As Marx noted in Capital, ‘Men made 
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clothes for thousands of years, under the compulsion of the need for clothing, without a single man ever 
becoming a tailor’).444 
 Narratives of identity emerge in response to violence in a manner entirely consistent with Lacan’s 
thesis that narrative arises in response to repressed antagonism. Lacan reserved particular ire for the ‘ego 
psychology’ practices that dominated in America, in which assumptions about the restoration to wholeness that 
could be affected by language, self-knowledge, and narrative were the psychoanalytic order of the day. For 
Lacan, the subject has no wholeness to restore; rather it is constitutively fractured—split—and thus 
presumptions to restoring (narrative) unity should be cause for profound suspicion. The analyst who encourages 
the patient to build a new narrative of self—‘with all the traumas properly integrated’445—rather than help the 
patient realise that the illusion of (narrative) unity is itself the affliction, is fundamentally remiss. ‘Identity’ is 
bought at the price of chasing the differends to the margins, or as Lyotard puts it: ‘An “internal” peace is bought 
at the price of perpetual differends on the outskirts. (The same arrangement goes for the ego, that of self-
identification)’. This is why Brecht rejected the entire edifice of cathartic drama.  
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, the Kenyan novelist and playwright, is the post/colonial writer who has arguably 
done the most to assert gestic principles and bear witness to the differend. In that sense, he is a philosopher: 
‘One’s responsibility before thought consists . . . in detecting differends and in finding the (impossible) idiom 
for phrasing them. This is what a philosopher does. An intellectual is someone who helps forget differends, by 
advocating a given genre, whichever one it may be . . . for the sake of political hegemony’.446 If catharsis 
displaces differends and helps forget them, then gestus has the aim of causing them to appear.
447
 
As David Lloyd writes, ‘The prohibitive function of power constitutes the subject as always in relation 
to an abandonment of potential relations that can only be retrospectively realised from the position of the 
subject’.448 Helping forget differends is a means of obliterating other possibilities, other worlds, and other 
‘potential relations’ that are less violent. Though Ngugi seemingly had to become a fully-fledged subject of 
post/colonial capital in order to realise retrospectively what he had lost, it was with breathtaking gestic finality 
that he enacted a reversal of that baleful trajectory (baleful because it is so effective at forgetting differends). 
Ngugi rejected his white name, ‘James’, and replaced it with ‘wa Thiong’o’. He retracted his conversion to 
Christianity. He attempted to undo the prolonged mission-school mentality in which he was groomed for his 
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would-be career in colonial administration. He folded himself back into the peasant community from which he 
was severed as a (because a) promising child, especially with the Kamiriithu people’s theatre experiment in 
which he was deeply immersed when arrested by the neo-colonial Kenyan state. He refused, finally, as a 
culmination of this reversal, to compose in English. It was as if he removed as best he could the very scars, 
markings, insignia and epistemic moorings of colonisation. As a gestus, moreover, it implied if others followed 
suit, the ‘restoration’ of a desolated discourse genre was imminently possible. 
 If ‘what is at stake . . . is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them,’ then Gikuyu is not 
the preformed idiom. Rather it is in the conspicuous shift from an imperial language to an indigenous one that 
gestus may find its materialisation, because what is being signified is not the golden age of the past but a 
repressive (neo)-colonial social relation. The shift itself is the entirety of the content. The switch to Gikuyu 
forces the differend to surface. That is why further ‘explanations’ of Ngugi’s farewell, in English, in this genre 
of discourse, seem flimsy and run aground. This is because the shift is between discourse genres and it measures 
the rapacious subsumption of one by the other; the shift is not a nativist affirmation nor is it a cathartic 
‘understanding’—it is the woeful gap in between the two where violence that must be spoken remains 
unspeakable. If Ngugi is not, cannot be, a pure witness, still his shift, his gestus, is nevertheless pure differend. 
Ngugi stages this paradox of one who has suffered catastrophe and in the process been robbed of the discourse 
genre in which to tell it. 
Almost everyone misunderstands or maligns him. But this is almost how it must be until the differend 
to which he bears witness is rendered explicit. If Ngugi’s actions, motivations, intentions, meanings could be 
fully ‘explained’ then this would amount to a catharsis, such that the drama of his farewell would reveal his 
‘innermost being’. It would, as in all Aristotelian drama, have the ‘object of driving the hero into spiritual 
conflicts’. But gestus thwarts this emotional discharge and Ngugi knows this. It is why he says, there will be no 
‘national accolades’ and no ‘new-year honours’ for him.449 Simon Gikandi and others cannot fathom Ngugi 
because his commitments (to a dispossessed peasantry) risk –indeed, in some ways promise—his own 
discursive erasure. Like Myles Joyce, Ngugi speaks the language of peasants and workers, a language that is 
therefore not ‘audible’ at the bar of global opinion. Not only that, but Ngugi’s actions contain an implicit affront 
to the rest of us, for ‘how can you establish what is not without criticizing what is?’450 The gestus demonstrates 
that our (victorious) idiom did not ‘deserve’ to win, it was victorious only because it was the more unexpectedly 
brutal. Ngugi becomes ever the sorry plaintiff for whom the ‘author of the damages turns out directly or 
indirectly to be one’s judge’.451  
   As a ‘plaintiff’ he is responsible for proving that there was a discourse genre that now is gone. But it 
being gone, how is he to do that? ‘The plaintiff lodges his or her complaint before the tribunal, the accused 
argues in such a way as to show the inanity of the accusation’.452 (‘That was not culture; that was savagery, 
backwardness, etc’.) And Lyotard continues 
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You neutralise the addressor, the addressee, and the sense of the testimony; then 
everything is as if there were no referent (no damages.) If there is nobody to adduce 
the proof, nobody to admit it, and/or if the argument which upholds it is judged to be 
absurd, then the plaintiff is dismissed, the wrong he or she complains of cannot be 
attested. . . . If he or she persists in invoking this wrong as if it existed, the others 
(addressor, addressee, expert commentator on the testimony) will easily be able to 




The only other people who could ‘adduce the proof’ and ‘admit it’ along with Ngugi are the same ones 
who now occupy positions of authority in the post/colonial Kenyan state, that is, his classmates at Alliance High 
School and Makere University, i.e., the Anglophone comprador elite. It is easy to make Ngugi pass for mad. He 
is called a ‘tribalist’, an ‘essentialist’, a ‘fetishist’ and a ‘prisoner’, an ‘ethnic chauvinist’, a ‘Gikuyu 
imperialist’454 and a falsifier of history.455 When Ngugi tries to register the scale of continuing violence, he is 
dismissed as either personally bitter or hopelessly nostalgic. From almost every possible quarter he is disowned. 
The simplest thing in the world to say is: what differend? 
iv. 
 
All colonial conquest is at least partly an enterprise of signs—without signs, we would not be able to 
speak meaningfully of colonisation at all, but merely of raiding, piracy, or primitive accumulation. It is only 
with the successful manipulation of signs that a state of affairs resembling colonisation arises, and furthermore, 
only when the reproduction of those same signs is effected by the colonised themselves that colonisation 
becomes recognisable as such. 
Chinua Achebe speaks of the illimitable capacity of English to be indigenised. English, as a universal 
language, Achebe believes, can be faithful to all traditions. It can allow for any contingency and express any 
multiplicity. Yet the apparent capacity of English to neutralise every incommensurability is not something 
phenomenal about English or world languages in general but is rather constitutive of a specific strategy in the 
colonial-capitalist genre of discourse. Indeed Lyotard also describes the ‘economic genre of discourse’ 
(capitalism) as that which best pretends to universality, that which ‘seems able to admit all others’. He writes, 
‘The differends between phrase regimens or genres of discourse are judged to be negligible by the tribunal of 
capitalism’.456 English is capacious, just like capitalism. But is the insistence on the fruitful potential for the 
indigenisation of English not simply another way to say that there are not discourse genres plural, but only one? 
To say that there are not genres of discourse is also to say that there are no differends. All is litigation. 
The differend is not substantial. It resists even words. It finds no litigious phrasing and no courtroom in 
which to ‘have its day’. It is confined to searing traces, asking to be remembered. Because the differend signals 
ruin, it is amongst the ruins that we will have to look for the possibilities unrealised in other discourse genres, 
other worlds. David Lloyd writes, as if with a ‘peasant language’ or the differend in mind:  
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After all, one is inevitably rooting through the shards and remnants of spent lives and of ways 
of living that the ongoing process of progress and development has consigned to the rubbish 
heap, tracing the contours of things whose value both in use and in exchange has evaporated, 
listening for voices and waiting for ghosts. Out of such remainders, no consoling narrative is 
likely to emerge laden with the promise of future redemption. On the contrary, only in the 
most unpromising of materials, in the waste of which no use can be made, can one decipher 
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Naming the Conjuncture: Concluding Remarks on Materiality and Language 
i. 
In the previous chapters, I have explored a number of texts that investigate the potential of indigenous 
languages (namely Irish) to challenge the hegemony of post/colonial, Anglophone social relations in particular 
and global capital in general. From OʼHaraʼs satirical pieces and Coetzeeʼs mute Friday to the Dirty Protests and 
the semiotic conquest of the New World, I have sought to show that language is far from neutral or immaterial. 
The philosophical dream of a transcendental meaning and a pure signified is necessarily shorn of context. What 
these texts demonstrate then is the obscured violence inherent to such (imperial) aspirations. What stitches these 
disparate forms together is a visceral sense of the manner in which violence constitutes the inaugural moment of 
capital, and an abiding preoccupation with the means by which the language of capital secures its dominance 
only by a perpetual effacement of this moment. Capital renders the present transparent by occulting the past. 
These texts are distinguished in the end by the ways they resurrect the past, a past in which different forms of 
social existence appeared not only possible, but viable, and so explode not only the apparent innocence of the 
present, but its seeming inevitability—thereby hinting at alternate modes of living that could exist beyond the 
orb of capital. 
David Lloyd speaks of ‘the historical role of the state in negating cultural formations that are 
articulated through contiguity or locality rather than through ‘imaginary’ relations of identity expressed in terms 
of abstract space and . . . ‘empty, homogenous time’. The capitalist state seeks to displace such practices and 
replace them with ‘symbolic identifications that mediate the relation of the individual subject with the nation; to 
subordinate the axis of metonymy, with its subversive and unregulated movements of contagion, rumour, and 
dissemination, to that of metaphor that subsumes difference into identity; to supplant the modalities of the oral 
community with those of civil society and with the practices of written documentation and codified 
rationalisation that sustain the governmental apparatus of modernity’.458 
One such local, contiguous practice in Northern Ireland encapsulates the threat to capitalist modernity 
of the non-subjective, non-metaphorical speech situation. 
*** 
Steve McQueen’s acclaimed 2008 film, Hunger, opens onto a black screen and a soundtrack of 
cacophonous noise. The following words appear: ‘Northern Ireland 1981. 2187 people have been killed in ‘The 
Troubles’ since 1969’. The clanging sound is multiple and diffuse, difficult to identify, at once a hailstorm 
pounding a tin roof, and a demonic factory-works in full production. Its pulse is both machinic and frenzied. 
More words appear—‘The British government has withdrawn the political status of all paramilitary prisoners’—
while patterns in the sound-scape seem to coalesce before collapsing back into plangent dissonance. ‘Irish 
Republicans in the Maze prison are on a “blanket” and “no wash” protest’. The camera cuts to a close-up of the 
source of the clangour: one of many metal bin-lids striking and re-striking the pavement in spasmodic 
percussion, before cutting to a medium shot of a girl in late childhood, staring straight ahead, her brow knitted in 
concentration as her whole body shakes with the vehemence of her effort. The camera cuts back to the bin-lid, 
but the rapid-fire movement and the street-light glinting off both metal and wet asphalt, cause the visual 
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elements of the shot to jump and blur. The sight is no more isolatable than the audio and both give way to an 
indiscernible sense of convulsive urgency. Cut to the word ‘hunger’ and the sound abruptly stops. 
The banging of bin-lids, most often in Catholic, nationalist areas of urban Northern Ireland, exhibited 
several ‘linguistic’ functions, though the most straightforward was to alert the community that British troops or 
RUC officers were encroaching upon the neighbourhood, likely with the aim of raiding and interning suspected 
insurgents. (The journalist Tim Pat Coogan also tells of a high-pitched cry which he likens to keening alongside 
the banging of bin-lids, pots and pans, and whistle blowing.) As of 9 August, 1971, the Stormont government 
resumed an internment law that allowed authorities to raid residences, arrest suspects and detain them without 
trial for indefinite periods of time. On the first day of the activation of this internment law, 300 suspects were 
detained in pre-dawn raids.
459
 Deployed in order to warn those who were concealing fugitives or illegal weapons 
caches, or to impel the fugitives to flee, the banging of the bin-lids comprised a collaborative and polysemic 
‘speech act’. Upon hearing a bin-lid banging, the understood injunction was to go out and ‘answer’ it, since in 
this way, the noise would swell beyond the immediate area and warn persons as far as several streets away.
 460 
‘Designed to expand quickly’, anyone hearing her neighbours bang the bin-lids ‘was expected to move to the 
street in front of her house to join in the clamour’.461 The practice provoked a spatial ‘re-territorialisation’ and 
followed a simple call-and-response pattern which anyone (men, women, children, the elderly) could heed. The 
call convened the community, and it moved them into the street. It was a sonic action and in important respects 
a ‘linguistic’ intervention as well. 
How can simple noise-making be likened to language? In what way is banging a bin-lid a linguistic 
intervention? The profound materiality of language is often overlooked because of presumptions we carry about 
its ‘transparency’ and its basis as the conveyance of non-material ideas. As Richard Rorty has noted, however, 
language can only be instantiated in either ‘marks or noises’.462 (It enjoys no purely mentalist realm.) In fact, 
bin-lid banging shares a number of the presuppositions of a materialist philosophy of language as elaborated by 
Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser, and Lenin (as brilliantly synthesised by Jean-Jacques Lecercle). In the 
following concluding remarks, I look to the practice of bin-lid banging in order to explore both the materiality of 
language, language as behaviour, and the (linguistic) mobilisation of bodies toward political ends. In order to 
summarise and reiterate the themes of this dissertation, I examine the ‘marks and noises’ of  ‘Troubles’-era 
praxes in order to elaborate the relationship between material culture, the ‘rough music’ depicted in McQueen’s 
opening sequence, and the politicised speech community. 
The Subaltern Studies collective have produced sophisticated research on ‘subaltern’ networks of 
communication through the idiom of ‘rumour’ and its role in the spread of insurgency amongst peasants in 
colonial India. Ranajit Guha writes of the ‘anonymous verbal signal [which] helped not merely to frighten those 
against whom a particular insurrection or jacquerie was directed, but above all, to spread the message of revolt 
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among the people’.463 ‘The solidarity generated thus by the “uncontrollable” force of its transmission’ is also 
pertinent to the contagion of bin-lid banging in the North of Ireland, a practice that itself emerged out of a 
matrix of community empathy, class-based vulnerability, and susceptibility to colonial bureaucracy. Megan 
Sullivan argues that bin-lid banging arose in the 1950’s in response to unannounced housing inspections on low-
income estates. It provided a means of alerting the neighbours when an inspector was spotted on the premises. 
Feared for their ability to dispense fines and impose punishments and disliked for their ‘unpleasant demeanour’, 
an incursion of housing officials could occasion a flurry of bin-lid banging as a form of advanced warning.
464
 Its 
status as a working-class practice is established from its outset, and the resurgence of bin-lid banging during the 
‘Troubles’ accords with its prevalence in the nationalist ghettoes of west Belfast and Derry in particular. The 
ritual has been memorialised in several popular culture venues including the folk ballad, ‘The Lid of Me 
Granny’s Bin’, which encourages members of the assailed community to ‘raise an awful din’ because ‘the Brits 
is comin’ in’. Its lyrics recognise the power of subaltern networks to operate ‘beneath’ the superior technology 
that the enemy has at his disposal and for information to travel quickly and effectively despite its ‘primitive’ 
methods. The song also acknowledges the power differential at play between a weaker guerrilla insurgency and 
the resources of an imperial military apparatus: ‘The English have the telly, the radio and press./ To all 
communications, they’ve always had access./ But from Pettigo to Bellaghy, from the bone to Castlefin,/The only 
way to spread the news, is to rattle your granny’s bin’.465  
Deleuze would argue, furthermore, that ‘rumour’ does not constitute a contaminated sub-discourse, but 
is in fact the form taken by all language. Language is always ‘hearsay’ because it has no identifiable origin: 
‘Language is not content to go from a first party to a second party, from one who has seen to one who has not, 
but necessarily goes from a second party to a third party, neither of whom has seen’.466 The anonymous relay is 
not unique to rumour or to bin-lid banging but is constitutive of all language, according to Deleuze. In rumour, 
the distinction between communicator and audience is untenable; rather the message itself moves ‘from a teller 
to a hearer who himself becomes a teller’.467 In this sense, all speech is ‘reported speech’ and all language is 
indirect discourse. Thus the lateral transmission of subaltern rumour becomes a model for language as such, 
rather than the ‘privileged example’ of dialogue. Dialogue presumes ‘the so-called communication of direct 
verbality, of two immediately self-present sources or “authors”’.468 Like rumour in the subaltern context, bin-lid 
banging and other insurgent speech, according to Spivak, ‘evokes comradeship because it belongs to every 
“reader” or “transmitter”. No one is its origin or source. Thus rumour is not error but primordially (originarily) 
errant, always in circulation with no assignable source. This illegitimacy makes it accessible to insurgency’.469  
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Bin-lid banging follows the rhizomes and tendrils of rumour or gossip and traverses the same spaces: 
‘Beside banging lids in the confrontational space of the street, the other spaces for this performance are the 
backyards and connecting alleyways behind the brick houses, which are also the customary spaces for women’s 
networks and for gossip’.470As a means to de-territorialise and re-territorialise the nationalist areas and its spaces 
and praxes of insurgency, the British army painted the walls black up to a certain height so that their black 
Saracens (armoured cars) could patrol the nationalist areas relatively undetected. They entered the ghettos with 
blackened faces and upon initiating a raid they would smash the street-lights. (Coogan argues that in the 1920’s, 
the B-Specials or ‘murder gangs’ would also blacken their faces and invade the Falls Road areas in stockinged 
feet, the better to enter and exit undetected: ‘They loomed up out of the darkness to shoot a passer-by dead on 
the street or to hurl a hand grenade through a window, escaping like phantoms’.471) The depth and intensity of 
blackness was such that the British soldiers became effectively invisible.
472
 The foot patrols were also lost in 
blackness. The Falls Road community took to repainting the walls white and hurling white paint bombs at the 
Saracens. As one observer stated, ‘Our crowd started going out and painted all the black walls white. The Brits 
would repaint them black. This was going on for weeks, black/white, black/white, back and forth. The British 
army retaliated by firing water cannons into people’s houses followed by black paint’.473 If stealth had been the 
goal, then bin-lid banging was the apex of its subversion: ‘The women would come out with pots, spoons, and 
bin-lids, banging them and following behind the Brits. The noise was everywhere. You always knew when the 
Brits were raiding through the districts’.474 White paint, but more so bin-lids, and pots and spoons, were objects 
ready to hand that could be used instrumentally to protect the community. As I have argued throughout this 
dissertation, imperialism is a semiotic event and thus so will insurgency be inordinately semiotic. 
 
ii. 
Drawing on the famous pamphlet written by Lenin, ‘On Slogans’ (1917)—and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
reading of that text in A Thousand Plateaus, and another unattributed text rumoured to have been written by 
Louis Althusser—Jean-Jacques Lecercle lays out the tenets of a new materialist philosophy of language. Of this 
schema, there are approximately five main aspects: context, performativity, correctness, truth, and politics. 
Though writing chiefly on Lenin’s theory of slogans, Lecercle adds that we mean not so much individual 
slogans, as ‘an articulated set that justly names the moment of the conjuncture’.475 Firstly, Lecercle develops ‘a 
concept of meaning (an utterance) that is bound up with the conjuncture in which the utterance is produced’ and 
which is thus inseparable from that context if it is to retain meaning.
476
 Banging bin-lids produces meaning that 
is not transferable outside the context in which it is created, but which is entangled there. I cannot bang a bin-lid 
in a different milieu (i.e., early morning, West London) and expect to forge the same meaning. Hence the 
meaning of the utterance is totally reliant on its occurrence at the intersection of the socio-cultural and historical 
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forces out of which it emerges. In this materialist philosophy of language, therefore, we could not speak of 
universal meaning.   
Secondly, bin-lid banging carries no substantive descriptive content but rather intervenes in a 
conjuncture, or as Lecercle writes, ‘An utterance is not the description of a state of affairs within a conjuncture, 
but an intervention in the conjuncture: it reflects but also helps to alter, the balance of forces that gives it its 
meaning’.477 There is no cause for interpretation upon hearing the sound of banging bins, but only immediate 
response. Whereas we would normally anticipate the lag of interpretation implicit in the displacements of 
metaphor, in bin-lid banging, there is no deferral. As with the semiotics of the Dirty Protest, the meaning of the 
speech act inheres in the performance itself. It is language, as Deleuze has argued, not as metaphor but as 
metamorphosis. The form is the content and vice versa. Lenin, moreover, recalls that the etymology of slogan is 
‘war-cry’. A ‘war-cry’ is not an objective description, so much as a performative, acting upon its recipients in 
such a way as to marshal force, not (simply) reflect it. Bodies—accumulating on the street, each one engaged in 
a clamorous speech act—alter the balance of forces by disorientating military objectives and scattering 
suspected targets.  
Thirdly, banging the bin-lids is ‘correct’. (The concept of ‘correctness’ was critical to Althusser in his 
analyses of Lenin on the conjuncture.) It is ‘correct’ insofar as it accurately assesses the situation by 
simultaneously designating the danger and moving the hearers to act. Lecercle writes, ‘There is a reflexive 
circularity between the slogan which names the moment of the conjuncture and the conjuncture that allows it to 
make sense. The conjunctural character of meaning is the content of the concept of correctness’. Because it is 
‘correct’ and it works, so is it ‘true’. Banging the bin-lids avails the besieged community of vital knowledge of 
the state of struggle and at the same time proffers instruction. This identification of both impending threat and 
the political task at hand produces the ‘truth’ of the situation. Because banging the bin-lids is ‘correct’ so is it 
also the truth, its activity a form of truth-telling to one another. Thus Lecercle states: ‘An appropriate slogan is 
not true but correct . . . The word ‘truth’ is nevertheless used by Lenin . . . But this ‘truth’ is strictly dependent 
on the correctness of slogans; it is an effect, if not an affect, of this correctness’.478 Finally, it is a political 
performative because it lays out the coordinates of struggle according to class forces, (anti-) imperialist forces 
and nationalist forces and materially intervenes in them. Throughout this dissertation, all of my examples of 
materialist speech acts have resonated with banging bin-lids. Each belongs to an instance of semiotic weaponry 
that transforms not merely the meaning of the utterances but the very context of understanding. By recalling 
once again the genesis of the context in violence, they also supply the means to alter this inheritance and 
interrupt its continued incarnations.  
Deleuze and Guattari are especially interested in Lenin’s pamphlet because he shows how the correct 
naming of the conjuncture (i.e., the slogan) actually ‘anticipates the political body that it organises’. According 
to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘the power of the slogan is not only performative, it is constitutive of the class that it 
summons into existence’.479 The implication here is that Marx understood that there is no ‘proletariat’ in pre-
existence, but only a mass of workers with the potential to form a proletariat. The proletariat will have to be 
called forth from that undifferentiated mass—interpellated in order to be actualised as such. To a great degree, 
this is what Marx himself was doing in his own work—naming, and thus calling into being, this ‘proletariat’. 
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The work of the slogan is to name the conjuncture with such clarity and precision—such ‘correctness’—that a 
class is called into being who will make revolution, and that class is called by name, in such a way that they 
cannot not respond. ‘Slogans,’ Lecercle argues, ‘are always collective, and their meaning derives not from their 
author’s political genius (for they have no author, not even Lenin) but from their capacity to intervene in the 
conjuncture they analyse, but also, in naming it, to call it into being’.480 This is the work of the ‘slogan’, and we 
can already see glimpses of its force amongst the bin-lids. 
Those who are otherwise connected through little more than deprivation, the inhabitants of West 
Belfast, are called forward to become defenders of a community—they become that community—with a call 
they do not (cannot?) resist. It is a perfect ‘slogan’ because it is a condensed, intelligible embodiment of the 
distribution of power relations in a given conjuncture, and it interpellates a group who know precisely what to 
do (the political task at hand) and how to do it. It is partly spontaneous and partly choreographed, but it is ‘true’ 
because it works. Banging the bin-lids inverts the quietude of stealth and internment; insurgent cacophony 
exposes the violent mechanisms of capitalist militarism, even in its performance of ‘peace-keeping’. In order for 
the encoding of capital to become operative, it has to first efface its own violence and drive it underground. Bin-
lid banging interrupts the requirements of stealth and by extension, the subterranean violence of capitalist social 
relations. It meets this violence head-on with a melee that displays its own formidability (it would ‘frighten 
those against whom a particular insurrection or jacquerie was directed’) and its commitment to damming the 
flows of perpetual, exogenous violence.   
Throughout this dissertation, I have suggested that political language has the task of naming the 
conjuncture. I have also been concerned to show that the deployment of indigenous language in an Anglophone 
context may be an effective means to do just that. Bobby Sands knew, perhaps better than anyone, that this was 
a possibility, and the phrase he coined in the H-Blocks, Tiocfaidh ár lá, was to circulate after his death as an 
actual slogan. Can the speaking of Irish on its own produce the effects that Lenin theorised? Speaking a form of 
Irish in the pre-colonial period would not have been of interest because it is what everyone else spoke, too. 
Speaking Irish in a militarised site of colonial occupation has a meaning that arises from its juxtaposition with 
an imperial replacement language. In the chapter, ‘Bad Subjects’, I attempted to show the contextual and 
relational nature of belligerent spoken Irish and the language of occupation, English. In the chapter on Daniel 
O’Hara’s short films, I showed how speaking Irish in an unauthorised post/colonial context (the Republic) also 
produced anxiety. Though this tension is rendered in humorous terms by O’Hara, rather than the volatile and 
violent terms of answering an English-language hail in Irish, there are similarities. Both highlight and grapple 
with a negated language. Even O’Hara’s remarkable wit cannot remove the traces of palpable loss. 
Secondly, I have rejected the idea that description takes precedence over intervention. Much of the 
debate on post/colonial writing has to do with how well an indigenised imperial language can ‘describe’ the 
post/colonial experience. I have suggested that ‘description’ in this sense displaces intervention and indulges in 
a kind of subjective catharsis. In my chapter on ‘Conquest and Signs’ I argued that the content of Ngugi’s 
writings in Gikuyu were less important than the (linguistic) form they took. This is because the fact that he had 
switched to Gikuyu was all that was required to invoke a breath-taking gestus in an Anglophone neo-colonial 
conjuncture. That he enlivened the novel form in African literature is a fortunate by-product of what is 
unmistakably an intervention. Gestus, as opposed to catharsis, is that operation whereby an oppressive social 
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relation is exposed and decried in a spectacular fashion. Catharsis is the disavowal of those relations, often 
through a ‘beautiful’ subjective discharge. Bin-lid banging cannot be cathartic because it is not beautiful, but 
unnerving, loud, and intimidating.   
Speaking Irish in the H-Blocks, meanwhile, is ‘correct’. It is correct because it interpellated an 
eschatological community out a group of young men (and women at Armagh) in a desperately brutal situation. It 
named the conjuncture as a colonial war-zone and told the collective how to proceed. When one H-Block inmate 
spoke to another in Irish, this act alone named the (anti-colonial) struggle and proffered a task, which was to 
answer back. Because most of the inmates did not know the language well enough to ‘answer back’, they 
embarked on immersive auto-didacticism to the exclusion of almost everything else. And as I suggested in the 
chapters on the H-Blocks, this was not a prelude to socio-political transformation, but the transformation itself. 
The definition of revolution—and we can see Bobby Sands and the other prisoners awakening to this 
understanding—would amount to a state in which everyone ‘answered back’. This resurrection of the Irish 
language speech community is foreshadowed in the banging of the bin-lids and in the Gaeltacht at Long Kesh. 
The combination of correctness and truth in the H-Blocks lead to an overwhelming desire by the inmates to ‘tell 
this truth’ to whomever was prepared to hear it on the outside of the prison, which relates to my explanation of 
the Hunger Strikes. Written about the same time as the Hunger Strikes, we can see that Friel’s play does not 
show the distribution of political power and the coordinates of the state of struggle but obscures them. Despite 
its elements of the poetic and beautiful, Friel has seen that Irish is absent from the play, and thus the political 
task would seem to be to forget it. 
*** 
 What names the conjuncture and assembles bodies will be retroactively ‘correct’ and in that sense it is 
difficult to know beforehand what the language (in all its respects) should be. As Lenin well knew, a slogan that 
is correct at one stage will be incorrect the next, which points to the reality of constant variation in the rapports 
de force of a given conjuncture and the need to adapt political language accordingly. Yet there would seem to be 
potential in the speaking of indigenous language in the Anglophone post/colony. Still, we must continually 
formulate and reformulate the name of the conjuncture in the dark, ever looking to find the ‘correct’ and 
therefore ‘true’ concatenation of phrases and bodies to call forth the group that will seize the conjuncture. This 
naming is a crucial part of remembering the horrors of the past. To literally re-member, as in to gather together 
again, is the Benjaminian fulcrum on which redeeming our ‘enslaved ancestors’ turns. What was an exhausted 
situation becomes—through a new figuration of language and a sudden shift of meaning—that call to revolution 
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